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Abstract
This thesis investigated the contribution of the nucleus accumbens core (AcbC) and the hippocampus (H)
to choice and learning involving reinforcement that was delayed or unlikely. Animals must frequently act
to influence the world even when the reinforcing outcomes of their actions are delayed. Learning with
action–outcome delays is a complex problem, and little is known of the neural mechanisms that bridge
such delays. Impulsive choice, one aspect of impulsivity, is characterized by an abnormally high prefer-
ence for small, immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards, and is a feature of attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), addiction, mania, and certain personality disorders. Furthermore,
when animals choose between alternative courses of action, seeking to maximize the benefit obtained,
they must also evaluate the likelihood of the available outcomes. Little is known of the neural basis of this
process, or what might predispose individuals to be overly conservative or to take risks excessively
(avoiding or preferring uncertainty, respectively), but risk taking is another aspect of the personality trait
of impulsivity and is a feature of a number of psychiatric disorders, including pathological gambling and
some personality disorders.
The AcbC, part of the ventral striatum, is required for normal preference for a large, delayed reward
over a small, immediate reward (self-controlled choice) in rats, but the reason for this is unclear. Chapter
3 investigated the role of the AcbC in learning a free-operant instrumental response using delayed rein-
forcement, performance of a previously learned response for delayed reinforcement, and assessment of
the relative magnitudes of two different rewards. Groups of rats with excitotoxic or sham lesions of the
AcbC acquired an instrumental response with different delays (0, 10, or 20 s) between the lever-press re-
sponse and reinforcer delivery. A second (inactive) lever was also present, but responding on it was never
reinforced. The delays retarded learning in normal rats. AcbC lesions did not hinder learning in the ab-
sence of delays, but AcbC-lesioned rats were impaired in learning when there was a delay, relative to
sham-operated controls. Rats were subsequently trained to discriminate reinforcers of different magni-
tudes. AcbC-lesioned rats were more sensitive to differences in reinforcer magnitude than sham-operated
controls, suggesting that the deficit in self-controlled choice previously observed in such rats was a con-
sequence of reduced preference for delayed rewards relative to immediate rewards, not of reduced prefer-
ence for large rewards relative to small rewards. AcbC lesions also impaired the performance of a previ-
ously learned instrumental response in a delay-dependent fashion. These results demonstrate that the
AcbC contributes to instrumental learning and performance by bridging delays between subjects’ actions
and the ensuing outcomes that reinforce behaviour.
When outcomes are delayed, they may be attributed to the action that caused them, or mistakenly at-
tributed to other stimuli, such as the environmental context. Consequently, animals that are poor at form-
ing context–outcome associations might learn action–outcome associations better with delayed rein-
forcement than normal animals. The hippocampus contributes to the representation of environmental
context, being required for aspects of contextual conditioning. It was therefore hypothesized that animals
with H lesions would be better than normal animals at learning to act on the basis of delayed reinforce-
ment. Chapter 4 tested the ability of H-lesioned rats to learn a free-operant instrumental response using
delayed reinforcement, and their ability to exhibit self-controlled choice. Rats with sham or excitotoxic H
lesions acquired an instrumental response with different delays (0, 10, or 20 s) between the response and
reinforcer delivery. H-lesioned rats responded slightly less than sham-operated controls in the absence of
delays, but they became better at learning (relative to shams) as the delays increased; delays impaired
learning less in H-lesioned rats than in shams. In contrast, lesioned rats exhibited impulsive choice, pre-
ix
ferring an immediate, small reward to a delayed, larger reward, even though they preferred the large re-
ward when it was not delayed. These results support the view that the H hinders action–outcome learning
with delayed outcomes, perhaps because it promotes the formation of context–outcome associations in-
stead. However, although lesioned rats were better at learning with delayed reinforcement, they were
worse at choosing it, suggesting that self-controlled choice and learning with delayed reinforcement tax
different psychological processes.
Chapter 5 examined the effects of excitotoxic lesions of the AcbC on probabilistic choice in rats. Rats
chose between a single food pellet delivered with certainty (probability p = 1) and four food pellets deliv-
ered with varying degrees of uncertainty (p = 1, 0.5, 0.25, 0.125, and 0.0625) in a discrete-trial task, with
the large-reinforcer probability decreasing or increasing across the session. Subjects were trained on this
task and then received excitotoxic or sham lesions of the AcbC before being retested. After a transient
period during which AcbC-lesioned rats exhibited relative indifference between the two alternatives com-
pared to controls, AcbC-lesioned rats came to exhibit risk-averse choice, choosing the large reinforcer
less often than controls when it was uncertain, to the extent that they obtained less food as a result. Rats
behaved as if indifferent between a single certain pellet and four pellets at p = 0.32 (sham-operated) or at
p = 0.70 (AcbC-lesioned) by the end of testing. When the probabilities did not vary across the session,
AcbC-lesioned rats and controls strongly preferred the large reinforcer when it was certain, and strongly
preferred the small reinforcer when the large reinforcer was very unlikely (p = 0.0625), with no differ-
ences between AcbC-lesioned and sham-operated groups. These results suggest that the AcbC contributes
to action selection by promoting the choice of uncertain, as well as delayed, reward.
Key words:
delay
uncertainty
impulsivity
addiction
nucleus accumbens
hippocampus
xAcknowledgements
First and foremost, I thank Tim Cheung and Nathan Howes for their contributions to this project. Tim
performed much of the behavioural testing and a substantial part of the surgery and histological process-
ing for the experiments reported in Chapters 2 and 3, under my tutelage. Nathan performed much of the
behavioural testing for the experiments reported in Chapter 4 under my supervision. Both contributed to
the ensuing discussion about the results, and both were a pleasure to work with; it is my privilege to have
done so.
I thank Anthony Dickinson, Nick Mackintosh, Trevor Robbins, John Parkinson, Barry Everitt, Ann
Kelley, Ron Dahl, Rudy Vuchinich, Nick Heather, Suzanne Mitchell, Olav Gjelsvik, Robert MacCoun,
and George Ainslie for helpful discussions; Trevor, also, for making available the facilities of his depart-
ment; Caroline Parkinson, Mercedes Arroyo, Jeff Dalley, and Rutsuko Ito for skilled technical assistance;
and all those who looked after the animals so well. I also thank Barry Everitt, Trevor Robbins, Warren
Bickel, Martin Ince, Anthony Phillips, Elliot Stein, and nine anonymous referees for their helpful com-
ments on portions of this text.
This research was supported by a Wellcome Trust programme grant (to Trevor W. Robbins, Barry J.
Everitt, Angela C. Roberts, and Barbara J. Sahakian), and was conducted within the UK Medical Re-
search Council (MRC) Behavioural and Clinical Neuroscience Centre at Cambridge (now the University
of Cambridge Behavioural and Clinical Neurosciences Institute, supported by the MRC and the Well-
come Trust). I thank these funding bodies and investigators for their support.
Thanks to Hannah, Ann, and John for all their love and support, and to Puzzle, a veteran of neurosci-
ence, for providing insistent distractions. Thanks also to Mike, Meredith, Tanya, Nicola, Luke, Phyllis,
Ulrich, Henry, and Andrew for providing such a pleasant and entertaining working environment!
xi
Abbreviations
ε? Huynh–Feldt epsilon
ε price elasticity
(a, b) a range a–b that includes neither a nor b, i.e. a range a < x < b.
[a, b) a range a–b that includes a but not b, i.e. a range a ≤ x < b.
[a, b] a range a–b that includes both a and b, i.e. a range a ≤ x ≤ b.
5-HIAA 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid
5-HT 5-hydroxytryptamine (serotonin)
Acb nucleus accumbens
AcbC nucleus accumbens core
AcbSh nucleus accumbens shell
ADHD attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder
AMPA α-amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazolpropionate
ANCOVA analysis of covariance
ANOVA analysis of variance
AP-5 D-(–)-2-amino-5-phosphonopentanoic acid
BLA basolateral amygdala
BOLD blood oxygen level dependent (of an fMRI signal)
CA cornu ammonis (Ammon’s horn)
cf. confer (compare)
ch. chapter
COD changeover delay
CPP 3-(2-carboxypiperazin-4-yl)-propyl-1-phosphonic acid
CR conditioned response
CRH corticotrophin-releasing hormone (also known as corticotrophin-releasing factor, CRF)
CS conditioned stimulus
CSF cerebrospinal fluid
DA dopamine
df degrees of freedom
DRL differential reinforcement of low rates
DRO differential reinforcement of other behaviour
ECS electroconvulsive shock (synonym for ECT)
ECT electroconvulsive therapy (synonym for ECS)
e.g. exempli gratia (for example)
et al. and others (et alii, masculine plural; et aliae, feminine plural; et alia, neutral plural)
etc. et cetera (and the rest)
FI fixed interval
fMRI functional magnetic resonance imaging
FR fixed ratio
h hour
H hippocampus
i.e. id est (that is to say)
i.m. intramuscular
xii
i.p. intraperitoneal
ICSS intracranial self-stimulation
ISI interstimulus interval
ITI intertrial interval
L. Latin for
LL larger, later (in the context of rewards)
LTP long-term potentiation
LTD long-term depression
min minute
mPFC medial prefrontal cortex
MRI magnetic resonance imaging
n number of subjects or observations
NA noradrenaline
NMDA N-methyl-D-aspartate
NS not significant
OCD obsessive–compulsive disorder
OFC orbitofrontal cortex
p probability
P(A) probability of event A occurring
P(A│B) probability of A occurring, given that B has occurred
p., pp. page, pages
PBS phosphate-buffered saline
PFC prefrontal cortex
PIT Pavlovian–instrumental transfer
PKA protein kinase A (cyclic-adenosine-monophosphate-dependent protein kinase)
preinforcer probability of delivery of a reinforcer after it has been chosen
pstatistical statistical p value (probability of obtaining the observed data, or results more extreme,
were the null hypothesis to be true)
q.v. quod vide (which see)
r2 proportion of variance explained
RI random interval
RR random ratio
SED standard error of the difference between means
SEM standard error of the mean
SHR spontaneously hypertensive rat
SNc substantia nigra pars compacta
S–R stimulus–response
SS sum of squares (sum of squared deviations from a mean) (in the context of statistics)
SS smaller, sooner (in the context of rewards)
STN subthalamic nucleus
TCP/IP transmission control protocol/internet protocol
US unconditioned stimulus
v. versus
xiii
v/v volume per unit volume1
VR variable ratio
VTA ventral tegmental area
w/v weight per unit volume
                                                     
1 Concentrations given as percentages are calculated as follows. A 1% solution, volume per unit volume (v/v), is a solution in which 1/100 of the
total volume is solute. A 1% solution, weight by unit weight (w/w), is one in which 1% of the total weight of the solution is solute; thus, a 1%
solution implies 1 g of solute dissolved in 99 g of solvent. A 1% solution, weight by unit volume (w/v), is a solution of 1 g in a total volume of
100 ml (10 g l –1); “100%” denotes 1 kg l–1. Similarly, the notation “1:1000” denotes 1 g l–1 (1 mg ml–1).
xiv
Publications
The publications listed below are submitted in support of this dissertation, under Regulation 7 of the Or-
dinances of the University of Cambridge concerning the degree of Doctor of Medicine (Ordinances,
Chapter 7, at http://www.admin.cam.ac.uk/univ/so/so_ch07.pdf). These publications do not form part
of work I have submitted for any other degree, diploma or qualification at any University. Those marked
(*) are central to the material presented in this thesis.
Articles indexed by digital object identifier (DOI) can be retrieved electronically from the publisher: if
the DOI is xxx, the URL is <http://dx.doi.org/xxx>. An up-to-date publication list, with electronic
copies, is at <http://pobox.com/~rudolf/publications>.
2001
1. Rahman S, Sahakian BJ, Cardinal RN, Rogers RD, Robbins TW (2001). Decision-making and
neuropsychiatry. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5: 271–277. DOI 10.1016/S1364-
6613(00)01650-8.
2. Dalley JW, McGaughy J, O’Connell MT, Cardinal RN, Levita L, Robbins TW (2001). Dis-
tinct changes in cortical acetylcholine and noradrenaline efflux during contingent and non-
contingent performance of a visual attentional task. Journal of Neuroscience 21: 4908–4914.
3. Di Ciano P, Cardinal RN, Cowell RA, Little SJ, Everitt BJ (2001). Differential involvement of
NMDA, AMPA/kainate, and dopamine receptors in the nucleus accumbens core in the acquisition
and performance of Pavlovian approach. Journal of Neuroscience 21: 9471–9477.
4. Cardinal RN, Aitken MRF (2001). Whisker, version 2, computer software. Described in detail at
<http://www.whiskercontrol.com>.
2002
5. Cardinal RN, Parkinson JA, Lachenal G, Halkerston KM, Rudarakanchana N, Hall J, Mor-
rison CH, Howes SR, Robbins TW, Everitt BJ (2002). Effects of selective excitotoxic lesions of
the nucleus accumbens core, anterior cingulate cortex, and central nucleus of the amygdala on
autoshaping performance in rats. Behavioral Neuroscience 116: 553–567. DOI
10.1037//0735-7044.116.4.553.
6. Parkinson JA, Dalley JW, Cardinal RN, Bamford A, Fenhert B, Lachenal G, Rudarakan-
chana N, Halkerston KM, Robbins TW, Everitt BJ (2002). Nucleus accumbens dopamine de-
pletion impairs both acquisition and performance of appetitive Pavlovian approach behaviour: im-
plications for mesoaccumbens dopamine function. Behavioural Brain Research 137: 149–163.
DOI 10.1016/S0166-4328(02)00291-7.
2003
7. Cardinal RN, Robbins TW, Everitt BJ (2003). Choosing delayed rewards: perspectives from
learning theory, neurochemistry, and neuroanatomy. Chapter 6 (and reply to commentary) of
Vuchinich RE, Heather N (eds), Choice, Behavioral Economics and Addiction (proceedings of a
conference in Birmingham, Alabama, USA; 15–17 March 2002). Elsevier, Amsterdam (ISBN
0080440568), pp. 183–213 and 217–218. (*)
xv
8. Everitt BJ, Cardinal RN, Parkinson JA, Robbins TW (2003). Appetitive behavior: the impact
of amygdala-dependent mechanisms of emotional learning. Annals of the New York Academy of
Sciences 985: 233–250.
2004
9. Cardinal RN, Winstanley CA, Robbins TW, Everitt BJ (2004). Limbic corticostriatal systems
and delayed reinforcement. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1021: 33–50. DOI
10.1196/annals.1308.004. (*)
10. Cardinal RN, Everitt BJ (2004). Neural and psychological mechanisms underlying appetitive
learning: links to drug addiction. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 14(2): 156–162. DOI
10.1016/j.conb.2004.03.004.
11. Dalley JW, Cardinal RN, Robbins TW (2004). Prefrontal executive and cognitive functions in
rodents: neural and neurochemical substrates. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 28: 771–
784. DOI 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2004.09.006.
12. Cardinal RN (2004). Waiting for better things. The Psychologist 17: 684–687.
13. Winstanley CA, Theobald DEH, Cardinal RN, Robbins TW (2004). Contrasting roles of ba-
solateral amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex in impulsive choice. Journal of Neuroscience 24:
4718–4722. DOI 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5606-03.2004.
14. Dalley JW, Theobald DE, Bouger P, Chudasama Y, Cardinal RN, Robbins TW (2004). Cor-
tical cholinergic function and deficits in visual attentional performance in rats following 192 IgG-
saporin-induced lesions of the medial prefrontal cortex. Cerebral Cortex 14: 922–932. DOI
10.1093/cercor/bhh052.
2005
15. Cardinal RN, Cheung THC (2005). Nucleus accumbens core lesions retard instrumental learning
and performance with delayed reinforcement in the rat. BMC Neuroscience 6: 9. DOI
10.1186/1471-2202-6-9. (*)
16. Winstanley CA, Theobald DEH, Dalley JW, Cardinal RN, Robbins TW (2005). Double disso-
ciation between serotonergic and dopaminergic modulation of medial prefrontal and orbitofrontal
cortex during a test of impulsive choice. Cerebral Cortex 16: 106–114 (advance access 13 April
2005). DOI 10.1093/cercor/bhi088.
17. Cheung THC, Cardinal RN (2005). Hippocampal lesions facilitate instrumental learning with
delayed reinforcement but induce impulsive choice in rats. BMC Neuroscience 6: 36. DOI
10.1186/1471-2202-6-36. (*)
18. Cardinal RN, Howes NJ (2005). Effects of lesions of the nucleus accumbens core on choice be-
tween small certain rewards and large uncertain rewards in rats. BMC Neuroscience 6: 37. DOI
10.1186/1471-2202-6-37. (*)
19. Robbins TW, Cardinal RN, Di Ciano P, Halligan PWG, Hellemans KGC, Lee JCL, Everitt
BJ (2005). Neuroscience of drugs and addiction. UK Office of Science and Technology Fore-
sight: Brain Science, Addiction and Drugs project, 13 July 2005; <http://www.foresight.gov.uk>.
[The OST is part of the Department of Trade and Industry; the project was also supported by the
Home Office and the Department of Health.] (*)
xvi
2006
20. Cardinal RN, Aitken MRF (2006). ANOVA for the behavioural sciences researcher. Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, New Jersey (ISBN 0805855858 hardback or 0805855866 paperback). Sup-
porting Web site at <http://www.psychol.cam.ac.uk/statistics>.
21. Cardinal RN (2006, in press). Neural systems implicated in delayed and probabilistic reinforce-
ment. Neural Networks. (*)
xvii
List of figures
Figure 1: Discrimination learning with delayed reinforcement.....................................................................................6
Figure 2: Free-operant learning with delayed reinforcement ........................................................................................7
Figure 3: The speed of free-operant learning with delayed reinforcement in normal rats.............................................8
Figure 4: Temporal discounting ..................................................................................................................................10
Figure 5: An early example of precommitment...........................................................................................................12
Figure 6: Exaggerated temporal discounting in drug addicts ......................................................................................19
Figure 7: Key elements of the limbic corticostriatal “loop” ........................................................................................21
Figure 8: Coronal sections of the rat brain, showing selected limbic and related structures. ......................................22
Figure 9: Sagittal paramedian views of the rat brain, showing selected limbic and related structures........................23
Figure 10: Horizontal views of the rat brain, showing selected limbic and related structures. ...................................24
Figure 11: “Glass brain” views showing selected limbic and related structures. ........................................................25
Figure 12: Diagram of the rat hippocampus ................................................................................................................28
Figure 13: Outline of connections of the hippocampus...............................................................................................29
Figure 14: Cross-sectional structure of the primate hippocampus...............................................................................30
Figure 15: Task schematic: choice between small, immediate and large, delayed rewards ........................................38
Figure 16: Schematics of lesions of the nucleus accumbens core (AcbC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC)........................................................................................................................38
Figure 17: Choice between immediate, small and large, delayed rewards in rats with lesions of the AcbC, ACC, or
mPFC..................................................................................................................................................................39
Figure 18: Further testing of AcbC-lesioned rats in the delayed reinforcement choice task .......................................40
Figure 19: Delay and magnitude discounting applied to choice..................................................................................41
Figure 20: Choice between immediate, small and large, delayed rewards in rats with lesions of the orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC).......................................................................................................................................................46
Figure 21: Choice between immediate, small and large, delayed rewards in rats with lesions of the basolateral
amygdala (BLA) or OFC ....................................................................................................................................47
Figure 22: Task schematic: free-operant instrumental responding on an FR-1 schedule with delayed reinforcement53
Figure 23: Stereotaxic frame .......................................................................................................................................55
Figure 24: Operant chamber ........................................................................................................................................56
Figure 25: Schematic of lesions of the AcbC ..............................................................................................................60
Figure 26: Photomicrographs of lesions of the AcbC..................................................................................................61
Figure 27: Effects of delays to reinforcement on acquisition of free-operant responding under an FR-1 schedule....63
Figure 28: Effect of AcbC lesions on acquisition of free-operant responding with delayed reinforcement................64
Figure 29: Programmed and experienced delays to reinforcement in AcbC-lesioned and sham-operated rats...........66
Figure 30: Learning as a function of programmed and experienced delays to reinforcement in AcbC-lesioned and
sham-operated rats ..............................................................................................................................................67
Figure 31: Discrimination of reinforcer magnitude: matching of relative response rate to relative reinforcement rate
in AcbC-lesioned and sham-operated rats ..........................................................................................................69
Figure 32: Postoperative performance under an FR-1 schedule for delayed reinforcement........................................71
Figure 33: Effect of AcbC lesions on performance of free-operant responding for delayed reinforcement................72
Figure 34: Programmed and experienced delays to reinforcement following AcbC lesions made after initial training
............................................................................................................................................................................73
xviii
Figure 35: Performance as a function of delays to reinforcement in animals trained preoperatively before sham or
AcbC lesions were made ....................................................................................................................................74
Figure 36: Locomotor activity in a novel environment and body mass in AcbC-lesioned and sham-operated rats....75
Figure 37: Schematic of lesions of the hippocampus ..................................................................................................88
Figure 38: Photomicrographs of lesions of the hippocampus......................................................................................89
Figure 39: Effects of delays to reinforcement on acquisition of free-operant responding under an FR-1 schedule....91
Figure 40: Effect of hippocampal (H) lesions on acquisition of free-operant responding with delayed reinforcement
............................................................................................................................................................................92
Figure 41: Programmed and experienced delays to reinforcement in H-lesioned and sham-operated rats .................94
Figure 42: Learning as a function of programmed and experienced delays to reinforcement in H-lesioned and sham-
operated rats........................................................................................................................................................95
Figure 43: Effects of hippocampal lesions on choice between immediate, small rewards and large, delayed rewards
............................................................................................................................................................................97
Figure 44: Locomotor activity in a novel environment and body mass in H-lesioned and sham-operated rats ..........99
Figure 45: Task schematic: choice between small, certain and large, uncertain rewards..........................................110
Figure 46: Schematic of lesions of the AcbC ............................................................................................................114
Figure 47: Choice with probabilistic reinforcement in AcbC-lesioned and sham-operated rats ...............................115
Figure 48: Choice, by experienced probability, in AcbC-lesioned and sham-operated rats......................................118
Figure 49: Indifference probabilities in AcbC-lesioned and sham-operated rats ......................................................119
Figure 50: Amount of food obtained, and effects of satiety on choice, in AcbC-lesioned and sham-operated rats ..121
Figure 51: Locomotor activity in a novel environment in AcbC-lesioned and sham-operated rats ..........................122
Figure 52: A simple mechanism for transient involvement of the hippocampus in memory storage........................133
Figure 53: The “primrose path” to addiction.............................................................................................................142
Figure 54: Skog’s classification of addiction ............................................................................................................143
Figure 55: Key limbic corticostriatal structures involved in processing delayed reinforcement...............................150
List of tables
Table 1: Some inputs to the nucleus accumbens .........................................................................................................27
Table 2: Some outputs from the nucleus accumbens...................................................................................................27
Table 3: Interpretation of lesion studies ......................................................................................................................30
Table 4: Training and testing schedule for reinforcer magnitude matching task.........................................................58
Table 5: Parameters for excitotoxic hippocampal lesions ...........................................................................................84
Table 6: Testing schedule for probabilistic choice task.............................................................................................113
Chapter 1: Introduction 1
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 OVERVIEW
The problems of learning with delayed and uncertain reinforcement, and of choosing delayed or uncertain
rewards, are interesting from a theoretical and a practical perspective.
The theoretical perspective concerns the neural mechanisms of learning and choice. Animals act to
obtain rewards including food, shelter, and sex. Sometimes, their actions are rewarded or reinforced im-
mediately, but often this is not the case. Often, natural reinforcers follow the action that obtains them by a
delay, even if it is short; to be successful, animals must learn to bridge these delays and act on the basis of
delayed reinforcement. They may also profit by choosing delayed reinforcers over more immediate rein-
forcers, if the delayed reinforcers are sufficiently large. Likewise, animals that can act despite uncertainty
as to what the future holds and can calculate risk appropriately are placed at a competitive advantage.
The practical perspective concerns individual variation in sensitivity to delayed and uncertain rein-
forcement. Individuals differ in their ability to choose delayed rewards. Self-controlled individuals are
strongly influenced by delayed reinforcement, and choose large, delayed rewards in preference to small,
immediate rewards; in contrast, individuals who are relatively insensitive to delayed reinforcement
choose impulsively, preferring the immediate, smaller reward in this situation (Ainslie, 1975). Impulsivity
has long been recognized as a normal human characteristic (Aristotle, 350 BC / 1925) and in some cir-
cumstances it may be beneficial (Evenden, 1999b), but impulsive choice contributes to deleterious states
such as drug addiction (Poulos et al., 1995; Heyman, 1996; Bickel et al., 1999; Evenden, 1999a; Mitchell,
1999) and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (Sagvolden et al., 1998; Sagvolden & Ser-
geant, 1998). Similar individual differences in the tendency to work for uncertain rewards may contribute
to personality traits such as venturesomeness (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1977; Evenden, 1999a), but risk tak-
ing is another aspect of impulsivity (Daruna & Barnes, 1993; Eysenck, 1993; Evenden, 1999a) and is a
feature of a number of psychiatric disorders, including pathological gambling and certain personality dis-
orders (Roy et al., 1989; Coccaro & Siever, 1995; APA, 2000; Holt et al., 2003).
In this chapter, top-down (behavioural economic) and bottom-up (animal learning theory) approaches
to action and decision making are outlined. The specific problems that delays and uncertainty cause for
learning and choice are reviewed, with a discussion of the relevance of individual differences in delay and
uncertainty processing. The effects of delays and uncertainty upon learning and choice in normal animals
are reviewed. Next, systemic psychopharmacological studies examining delayed or uncertain reinforce-
ment are discussed. Neurobiological studies are then examined, beginning with a brief review of the anat-
omy of relevant parts of the limbic system, followed by an overview of the role of these structures in rein-
forcement learning in general, and concluding with a review of neuroanatomical studies specifically con-
cerning delayed and/or uncertain reinforcement. An overview of experimental work contained in this the-
sis is then provided.
1.2 NORMATIVE AND BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO
DECISION MAKING
Behavioural economics is a merging of traditional economic theory with psychological studies of choice
(Rachlin et al., 1976; Allison, 1979) that offers a quantitative approach to choice and decision making.
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Much of economics is based on utility theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947; Russell & Norvig,
1995), which assumes that agents are rational in that they exhibit certain reasonable attributes of prefer-
ence. For example, one assumption is transitivity of preference: if an agent prefers A to B and B to C,
then it must prefer A to C (or it would easily be exploited by more rational agents). Given these assump-
tions, there must exist a utility function that assigns unidimensional values to real-world multidimensional
events or outcomes, such that the agent prefers outcomes with higher utility. Psychologically and neu-
rally, a similar process must also happen (Shizgal, 1997)—if at no earlier stage of processing, incompati-
ble behaviours must compete for access to motor output. Agents can then use their knowledge about the
world, and about the consequences of their actions (which may be uncertain), to act so as to maximize
their expected utility (Arnauld & Nicole, 1662). To allow for the fact that actions may not always have
totally predictable consequences, the agent’s knowledge about the causal nature of the world may be rep-
resented in the form P(action → outcomen│evidence) denoting the probability, given the available evi-
dence, that action causes outcomen. If U(outcomen) is the utility of obtaining outcomen, then the expected
utility of an action is therefore given by EU(action│evidence) = ∑nP(action → outcomen│
evidence)⋅U(outcomen). Rational decision making follows if the agent selects the action with the maxi-
mum expected utility (the MEU principle). The theory specifies neither the utility functions themselves—
anything can be valued—nor the way that the decision is arrived at. Rational behaviour need not require
complex, explicit thought; merely that observed behaviour follows rational principles.
Conversely, if agents are logical, then we can infer their value system (utility function) by observing
their behaviour—the principle of revealed preference (Friedman, 1990; Williams, 1994). To do so, we
must assume that agents have reasonably simple objectives (for if we allow that the behaviour we observe
is itself the agent’s objective, we could explain any arbitrary behaviour).
Assuming rationality allows us to predict behaviour much better than not assuming rationality, unless
we can predict the specific way in which people will be irrational (Friedman, 1990). However, humans do
not always choose according to rational norms. Introducing an element of randomness into decision
making can be theoretically optimal in some situations (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947; Mérö, 1998)
and the requirement to make rapid decisions may promote the use of heuristics to approximate rational
decision making (Russell & Norvig, 1995). Empirically, humans systematically deviate from the opti-
mum when making decisions (Kahneman et al., 1982; Heckerman et al., 1992; Lopes, 1994; Chase et al.,
1998; Mullainathan, 2002). They do so because human cognitive abilities are limited (“bounded rational-
ity”) and because people frequently make choices that aren’t in their long-term interest (“bounded will-
power”). In particular, humans and animals do not discount the future in a self-consistent way (Ainslie,
1975; 2001). This point will be expanded upon later, but it serves to illustrate the departure of animal de-
cision making from economic optimality in some situations.
1.3 BASIC PSYCHOLOGY OF REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
An alternative perspective on actions and their consequences stems from the animal learning theory lit-
erature. Whereas behavioural economists tend to adopt a top-down approach, treating the agent as a single
decision-making entity, animal learning theorists have sought to identify subcomponents and mechanisms
giving rise to overt behaviour. The study of motivated action is the study of instrumental conditioning—
the process by which animals alter their behaviour when there is a contingency between their behaviour
and a reinforcing outcome (Thorndike, 1911). Reinforcement learning (Minsky, 1961; Russell & Norvig,
1995; Haykin, 1999) has been studied for a long time (Thorndike, 1905; Thorndike, 1911; Grindley,
Chapter 1: Introduction 3
1932; Guthrie, 1935; Skinner, 1938; Hull, 1943). At its most basic level, it is the ability to learn to act on
the basis of important outcomes such as reward and punishment; events that strengthen (increase the like-
lihood of) preceding responses are called positive reinforcers, and events whose removal strengthens pre-
ceding responses are called negative reinforcers (Skinner, 1938; 1953). If reinforcers are defined by their
effect on behaviour, then, to avoid a circular argument, behaviour cannot be said to have altered as a con-
sequence of reinforcement (Skinner, 1953). However, to explain behaviour, rather than merely to describe
it, internal processes such as motivation must also be accounted for. Central motivational states, such as
hunger and thirst, are intervening variables that parsimoniously account for a great deal of behavioural
variability (Erwin & Ferguson, 1979; Toates, 1986; Ferguson, 2000). For example, water deprivation,
eating dry food, hypertonic saline injection, and the hormone angiotensin II all induce a common state
(thirst) that has multiple effects: thirsty animals drink more water, drink water faster, perform more of an
arbitrary response to gain water, and so on. The ideas of motivational state entered early theories of rein-
forcement. For example, it was suggested that events that reduce “drive” states such as thirst are posi-
tively reinforcing (Hull, 1943). However, on its own this simple model cannot account for many instru-
mental conditioning phenomena, let alone “unnatural” reinforcement such as intracranial self-stimulation
(ICSS) and drug addiction.
Modern neuropsychological theories of instrumental conditioning recognize that many processes con-
tribute to a simple act such as pressing a lever to receive food (e.g. Dickinson, 1994). I will merely sum-
marize these processes here; for a full review, see Cardinal et al. (2002a). Rats and humans exhibit goal-
directed action, which is based on knowledge of the contingency between one’s actions and their out-
comes, and knowledge of the value of those outcomes. These two knowledge representations interact so
that we work for that which we value (Dickinson, 1994; Dickinson & Balleine, 1994). Environmental
stimuli (“discriminative stimuli” or SDs) provide information about what contingencies may be in force in
a given environment (Colwill & Rescorla, 1990; Rescorla, 1990a; 1990b). Remarkably, the value system
governing goal-directed action is not the brain’s only one. This “cognitive” value system (sometimes
termed “instrumental incentive value”) may be distinguished and dissociated (Balleine & Dickinson,
1991) from a different valuation process that determines our reactions when we actually experience a goal
such as food—termed “liking”, “hedonic reactions”, or simply “pleasure” (Garcia, 1989). Under many
normal circumstances the two values reflect each other and change together. However, the fact that they
are different means that animals must learn what outcomes are valuable (hedonically pleasant) in a given
motivational state, a process referred to as incentive learning. For example, rats do not know that to eat a
particular food while sated is not as valuable as to eat the same food while hungry until they have actually
eaten the food while sated (Balleine, 1992).
Just as there is more than one value system, there is more than one route to action. Not all action is
goal directed. With time and training, actions can become habitual (Adams, 1982)—that is, elicited in
relevant situations by direct stimulus–response (S–R) associations. S–R habits are less flexible than goal-
directed action, because their representation contains no information about what the outcome will be, and
therefore cannot alter quickly if the desirability of a particular outcome changes. However, habits may be
important to reduce the demands on the cognitive, goal-directed system in familiar settings.
Finally, environmental stimuli have effects beyond eliciting habits and serving as discriminative stim-
uli. Stimuli that predict reward may become conditioned stimuli (CSs), associated with the reward (un-
conditioned stimulus, US) through Pavlovian associative learning (Pavlov, 1927). Pavlovian CSs can
elicit Pavlovian conditioned responses (CRs), can influence ongoing instrumental behaviour directly
(termed Pavlovian–instrumental transfer or PIT), and can serve as the goals of behaviour (termed condi-
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tioned reinforcement) (see Estes, 1948; Lovibond, 1983; Dickinson, 1994; Dickinson & Balleine, 1994;
Cardinal et al., 2002a).
1.4 DELAYED AND UNCERTAIN REINFORCEMENT: THE PROBLEMS
OF LEARNING AND CHOICE
Natural and artificial learning agents must grapple with the problem of selecting actions to achieve the
best possible outcome under their value system. However, the outcome of a given action is not always
certain and immediate. Outcomes are frequently uncertain: agents do not always obtain that for which
they work. Furthermore, when an agent acts to obtain reward or reinforcement, there is often a delay be-
tween its action and the ultimate outcome. This applies both to positive reinforcers (things whose presen-
tation increases the likelihood of preceding actions) and negative reinforcers (things whose removal in-
creases the likelihood of preceding actions) (Skinner, 1938), though I will focus on positive, or appetitive,
reinforcers, such as food; I will also use the term “reward” for an appetitive positive reinforcer. For opti-
mal performance, therefore, agents must learn and choose on the basis of reward or reinforcement that is
uncertain or delayed.
As discussed above, agents may act procedurally, meaning that they act without an representation of
the outcome of their actions, but merely on the basis that an action has been reinforced or led to unspeci-
fied “good things” before. Direct links between representations of triggering stimuli and particular re-
sponses exemplify procedural responding, or stimulus–response (S–R) learning; the S–R links are
strengthened in some way as a result of the arrival of reinforcement, but without the nature of that rein-
forcement being explicitly encoded. Alternatively, or additionally, agents may encode the outcomes of
their actions explicitly, and use these explicit (sometimes termed declarative) representations of antici-
pated actions when choosing what to do. Animals exhibit both stimulus–response (procedural) and truly
goal-directed or action–outcome (declarative) responding (Dickinson, 1994; Dickinson & Balleine, 1994;
Cardinal et al., 2002a). This complicates the analysis of motivated behaviour in animals, including the
analysis of learning with and choosing uncertain and delayed rewards.
In an S–R learning system, it is easy to envisage connectionist mechanisms by which uncertain and
delayed reinforcers could drive learning. Suppose an agent experiences its world, causing many different
“stimulus units” to become activated, and suppose it acts randomly by activating different “response
units”. Let us consider the basic case of appetitive, certain, immediate reinforcement. Suppose a hard-
wired mechanism exists to detect events of innate importance to the agent, such as food to a hungry ani-
mal. Suppose also that this mechanism, upon detecting an important appetitive event, triggers an internal
reinforcement signal that acts to strengthen links between currently active units (stimulus units and re-
sponse units). By strengthening links between units representing the stimuli currently being perceived and
the response currently executing, this simple system would reinforce the response, i.e. increase the prob-
ability of executing the response again in the same situation. These S–R links do not encode the nature of
the food. If the relationship between responses and food is uncertain, i.e. if 0 < P(outcome│action) < 1,
then S–R connections will be reinforced on occasions when food is delivered, but not reinforced on occa-
sions when it is not. S–R links would thus develop to reflect the statistical relationships between actions
and reward in a particular stimulus environment: more reliable action–outcome contingencies in the envi-
ronment come to be reflected in stronger S–R links. To extend this to delayed reinforcement, when the
time t(action → outcome) > 0, requires that some representation of recently executed responses remains
active until the reinforcing outcome actually arrives, if the correct response is to be reinforced. If the ac-
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tion representation decays gradually (or if it persists until a new action is begun, and the probability of
remaining in the same “action state” therefore declines with time), then the likelihood of reinforcing the
correct response will decline gradually as action–outcome delays increase, and the agent will learn less
well as reinforcement is progressively delayed. None of these ideas are new (Thorndike, 1911; Grindley,
1932; Hull, 1932; Guthrie, 1935; Hull, 1943; Spence, 1956; Mowrer, 1960; Revusky & Garcia, 1970;
Mackintosh, 1974; Killeen & Fetterman, 1988).
In a goal-directed (action–outcome) learning system, the agent must encode both the action–outcome
relationship and the value of the outcome, and these two representations must interact to determine the
probability of selecting a given action (Tolman, 1932; Dickinson, 1980; Dickinson, 1994; Dickinson &
Balleine, 1994; Cardinal et al., 2002a). Declarative representations are substantially harder to represent
using a simple connectionist framework (Holyoak & Spellman, 1993; Shastri & Ajjanagadde, 1993;
Sougné, 1998). The problem of detecting and encoding the action–outcome relationship (the conse-
quences of the agent’s actions) is itself complex, but the additional issues concerning uncertain and de-
layed outcomes are much the same as in the S–R case. That is to say, it may be more difficult to learn that
an action causes a given outcome if that outcome is inconsistent or delayed. On top of this, even if the
agent knows perfectly well that an action produces an outcome with a certain probability and/or a certain
delay, the agent may value uncertain or delayed rewards less than certain or immediate rewards, reducing
the likelihood of its choosing that action. For example, if we ask a man whether he prefers £10 now or
£20 next week, we usually assume that he represents the action–outcome contingencies equally (i.e. that
he believes that selecting the “£10 now” option is as likely to produce £10 now as selecting the “£20 next
week” option is to produce £20 next week) and that his choice simply reflects the relative value to him of
the two options. On the other hand, if we train rats to press levers for (say) immediate and delayed re-
ward, we must bear in mind the possibility of inequalities both in the representation of the action–out-
come contingency for immediate and delayed reward, and in the values of the two outcomes—not to
mention differences in S–R learning that the delays may engender. There are few mechanistic models of
explicit (declarative) delay or uncertainty coding applicable to animal learning, although a recent model
proposes the encoding of action uncertainty as a way of mediating competition between goal-directed and
S–R responding (Daw et al., 2005).
1.5 INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES: RISK TAKING AND IMPULSIVITY
Individual differences in responsivity to uncertain or delayed reinforcement are also of considerable inter-
est. When making decisions under conditions of uncertainty, individuals vary as to how much uncertainty
or risk they are willing to tolerate. Formally, individuals differ in how much they discount the value of
reinforcers as the uncertainty of the reinforcer increases—i.e. as the probability of the reinforcer declines,
or the odds against obtaining the reinforcer increase (Ho et al., 1999). Risk taking is one aspect of the
personality trait of impulsivity (Daruna & Barnes, 1993; Eysenck, 1993; Evenden, 1999a) and is a feature
of a number of psychiatric disorders, including pathological gambling, antisocial personality disorder, and
borderline personality disorder (Roy et al., 1989; Coccaro & Siever, 1995; APA, 2000; Holt et al., 2003).
The term “risk” implies exposure to the possibility of an aversive consequence (OUP, 1997), which may
include the possibility of not obtaining an anticipated reward. In the appetitive domain, risk taking is ex-
emplified by the tendency to choose large rewards that are very uncertain, in preference to smaller, cer-
tain rewards. Abnormal risk taking may reflect dysfunction of reinforcement learning systems that medi-
ate the effects of uncertain reward or punishment.
Chapter 1: Introduction 6
Furthermore, individual variation in the ability to use delayed reinforcement may determine another
aspect of impulsivity: an animal able to forgo short-term poor rewards in order to obtain delayed but bet-
ter rewards may be termed self-controlled, whereas an animal that cannot tolerate delays to reward may
be said to exhibit impulsive choice (Ainslie, 1975; Evenden, 1999b; Evenden, 1999a; Ainslie, 2001). Ab-
normalities in learning from delayed reinforcement may be of considerable clinical significance (Rahman
et al., 2001). Impulsivity is part of the syndrome of many psychiatric disorders, including mania, drug
addiction, antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, and ADHD (APA, 2000). Im-
pulsivity is a broad concept that may be divided into preparation impulsivity (failure to take all relevant
information into account before making a decision), execution or “motor” impulsivity (termination of a
behavioural chain before the goal is reached), and outcome or “choice” impulsivity (choice of a quick but
less valuable outcome rather than a later but more valuable outcome). These measures may be pharma-
cologically dissociated (Evenden, 1999b; Evenden, 1999a). Impulsive choice, one aspect of impulsivity
(Evenden, 1999b), may reflect dysfunction of reinforcement learning systems mediating the effects of
delayed rewards (Ainslie, 1975; Sagvolden & Sergeant, 1998).
1.6 LEARNING WITH DELAYED REINFORCEMENT IN NORMAL
ANIMALS
1.6.1 Basic phenomena
Delays can hamper both Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning (Dickinson, 1980; Mackintosh, 1983;
Dickinson, 1994; Gallistel, 1994; Hall, 1994). For example, instrumental conditioning has long been ob-
Figure 1: Discrimination learning with delayed reinforcement
Grice (1948) trained rats on a visual discrimination task with delayed reinforcement. The rats had a choice of a
white or a black start alley (which varied in their left/right position); the delay was provided by two grey alleys of
variable length which terminated in two grey goal boxes (a). Choosing white led to a goal box with food; choosing
black led to an empty box. Grice found that learning was noticeably impaired by as short a delay as 0.5 s, and se-
verely impaired by 5 s, with little learning at a delay of 10 s (b, c). This deficit could be ameliorated by having more
discriminable (black and white) goal boxes, or forcing the rats to make discriminable motor responses (climbing an
incline or dodging between blocks) in the black and white start alleys (data not shown). Figures from Grice (1948).
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served to be systematically impaired as the outcome is delayed (Skinner, 1938; Perin, 1943; Grice, 1948;
Harker, 1956; Lattal & Gleeson, 1990; Dickinson et al., 1992) (Figure 1). Despite this, normal rats have
been shown to acquire free-operant responding (Figure 2) with programmed response–reinforcer delays
of up to 32 s, or even 64 s if the subjects are pre-exposed to the learning environment (Dickinson et al.,
1992) (Figure 3). Delays do reduce the asymptotic level of responding (Dickinson et al., 1992), though
the reason for this is not clear. There are several psychological reasons why action–outcome delays might
impair learning or performance of an instrumental response (Ainslie, 1975; Cardinal et al., 2004). As dis-
cussed above, it may be that when subjects learn a response with a substantial response–reinforcer delay,
they never succeed in representing the instrumental action–outcome contingency fully. Alternatively, they
may value the delayed reinforcer less. Finally, the delay may also retard the acquisition of a procedural
stimulus–response habit and this might account for the decrease in asymptotic responding. It is presently
not known whether responses acquired with delayed reinforcement are governed by a different balance of
habits and goal-directed actions than responses acquired with immediate reinforcement.
Figure 2: Free-operant learning with delayed reinforcement
When an animal is free to perform an action (operant) to obtain a rewarding outcome, it readily learns to do so if the
action–outcome contingency (the increase in the likelihood of obtaining the outcome that is produced by performing
the action) is good and if there is no delay between action and outcome (a). Even with a perfect action–outcome
contingency, learning is impaired by imposing delays between the action and the outcome (b), yet animals do suc-
ceed in this task.
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Figure 3: The speed of free-operant
learning with delayed reinforcement in
normal rats
Dickinson et al. (1992) trained rats on a
free-operant, fixed-ratio-1 (FR-1) schedule
of reinforcement with delays between
pressing the lever and obtaining reinforce-
ment (see Figure 2). Responding was com-
pared to that of a yoked control group (who
received the same pattern of reinforcement
as the “master” rats but whose lever presses
had no consequence). The rate of learning,
and the asymptotic level of responding, de-
clined across groups as the response–rein-
forcer delay was increased from 0 to 32 s;
rats trained with a 64-s delay failed to learn
at all, compared to yoked controls. How-
ever, when rats were exposed to the training
context, in the absence of the lever or any
reinforcers, prior to training, their learning
was improved, and successful discrimina-
tion was seen even with a delay of 64 s
(data not shown), attributed to an underlying
process of contextual competition (see text).
From Dickinson et al. (1992).
1.6.2 Cues and context
Two additional factors must be considered. Cues or signals present during the delay to the reinforcer may
become associated with the primary reinforcer, becoming conditioned reinforcers capable of reinforcing
actions themselves; conditioned reinforcers may therefore help to bridge action–outcome delays. Indeed,
such signals tend to increase responding for delayed reinforcers (Lattal, 1987; Mazur, 1997). One other
important factor in learning to act using delayed reinforcement may be the role of the environmental
context. The animal’s task is to attribute the outcome to its actions; instead, it may erroneously associate
the outcome with the context, since the context is a cue that is temporally closer to the outcome than the
action is. The longer the delay, the more this contextual competition comes to impair the learning of the
action–outcome contingency. Instrumental conditioning with delayed reinforcement can be enhanced if
rats are exposed to the relevant contextual cues prior to instrumental training, and this enhancement is
lessened if “free” (non-contingent) rewards are given during the contextual pre-exposure periods
(Dickinson et al., 1992; Dickinson & Balleine, 1994). These results are consistent with the theory that
during the action–outcome delay, contextual cues compete with the action to become associated with the
outcome; pre-exposing the animals to the context with no consequences reduces this contextual competi-
tion, by making the context a bad predictor of the outcome (perhaps via latent inhibition or learned irrele-
vance), and this in turn makes the action–outcome contingency more salient and easier to learn
(Dickinson et al., 1992; Dickinson & Balleine, 1994).
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1.7 CHOICE WITH DELAYED AND UNCERTAIN REINFORCEMENT IN
NORMAL ANIMALS
1.7.1 Delayed and probabilistic reinforcement: equivalent or distinct processes?
It has been suggested that delay (or temporal) discounting, the process by which delayed reinforcers lose
value, and probability (or odds) discounting, the process by which uncertain reinforcers lose value, reflect
the same underlying process (Rotter, 1954; Mischel, 1966; Rachlin et al., 1986; Stevenson, 1986; Rachlin
et al., 1987; Mazur, 1989; Rachlin et al., 1991; Mazur, 1995; Green & Myerson, 1996; Mazur, 1997; So-
zou, 1998). For example, choosing an uncertain reinforcer five times but only obtaining it on the fifth re-
sponse might be seen as equivalent to a very long delay, on average, between choice of the reinforcer and
its eventual delivery. Alternatively, delays may be seen as entailing the ecological risk of losing the re-
ward during the delay. In animal models, while subjects are learning to respond for delayed or probabilis-
tic rewards, both may initially be similarly unpredictable (although delayed rewards can become more
accurately predicted following learning in a manner that stochastic rewards cannot). However, there is
evidence that time and probability discounting are different and dissociable processes (Ho et al., 1999;
Mitchell, 2003; Green & Myerson, 2004). Most simply, it is not surprising that currency inflation affects
human decisions involving delayed but not probabilistic financial reward (Ostaszewski et al., 1998).
Moreover, the absolute magnitude of rewards can have different effects on delayed and probabilistic dis-
counting (Green et al., 1999; Myerson et al., 2003; Green & Myerson, 2004). A study looking at human
choices in a gambling task found that individuals’ propensity to choose rapidly (one, perhaps motoric,
measure of delay aversion) and their propensity to bet large amounts of money on uncertain outcomes (a
measure of risk taking) represented independent factors (Deakin et al., 2004). Some studies have found
abnormal delay discounting, but not uncertainty discounting, in drug addicts (Vuchinich & Calamas,
1997; Mitchell, 1999; Mitchell, 2003; Reynolds et al., 2004b), while gamblers have been observed to dis-
count probabilistic rewards less steeply than controls (i.e. to take risks) without showing differences in
delay discounting (Holt et al., 2003).
1.7.2 Temporal or delay discounting
In a typical delayed reinforcement choice task, a subject chooses between an immediate, small (“smaller,
sooner” or SS) reward or a large, delayed (“larger, later” or LL) reward; the temporal discounting func-
tion quantifies the effect of the delay on preference (Figure 4). Early models of choice assumed an expo-
nential model of temporal discounting (see Kacelnik, 1997a), so that if V0 is the value of a reinforcer de-
livered immediately, then the value of a reinforcer delivered after time t is
Vt = V0e–Kt
where K quantifies an individual’s tendency to “discount” the future (to value delayed rewards less). The
exponential model makes intuitive sense, whether you consider the underlying process to be one in which
the subject has a constant probability of “forgetting” its original response per unit time (making it pro-
gressively less available for reinforcement), one in which the “strength” of the response’s representation
decays to a certain proportion of its previous value at each time step, or one in which the subject behaves
as if there is a constant probability of losing the delayed reward per unit of waiting time. A S–R learning
view accounts for some of the theoretical appeal of exponential temporal discounting models: in expo-
nential decay, at any one moment in time the trace strength of a response follows directly from the trace
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strength at the previous instant. If xt is the trace strength at time t and A is the starting value, then
xt = x0e–kt
and
xt+1 = e–kxt
a b
c
 
d
Figure 4: Temporal discounting
(a) The basic, intuitive, and well-validated phenomenon of temporal discounting is that the subjective value of a
reward declines monotonically as the reward is progressively delayed: all other things being equal, immediate re-
wards are worth more than delayed rewards. (b) Individuals may vary in their propensity to discount delayed re-
wards. Individuals who discount the future steeply are said to be impulsive; individuals who discount the future
shallowly (giving the future relatively greater weight) are said to be self-controlled. (c) Different mathematical mod-
els of temporal discounting have been proposed; exponential and hyperbolic discounting are shown. Exponential
temporal discounting is described by the equation value = immediate value × e–K⋅delay. Hyperbolic temporal dis-
counting is governed by the equation value = immediate value / (1 + K⋅delay). Large values of the discounting pa-
rameter K give the steepest curve (the most impulsive behaviour) in both cases. There is strong empirical support for
the hyperbolic, not the exponential, discounting model. One critical difference in the predictions of these two mod-
els is the phenomenon of preference reversal, since hyperbolic discounting allows curves for different rewards to
cross. (d) Preference reversal, illustrated for two hypothetical rewards. Given a choice between an early reward of
value 0.6 and a later reward of value 1, hyperbolic discounting predicts that the larger reward will be chosen if the
choice is made far in advance (towards the left of the graph). However, as time advances, there may come a time
just before delivery of the small reward when the value of the small reward exceeds that of the large reward; prefer-
ence reverses and the small reward is chosen. Figures adapted from Ainslie (1975) (and also published in Robbins et
al., 2005).
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However, the exponential model has been emphatically rejected by experimental work with humans and
other animals. Instead, temporal discounting appears to follow a hyperbolic or very similar discount
function, such as
0
1
VV
Kt
= +
(Grice, 1948; Mazur, 1987; Mazur et al., 1987; Grace, 1996; Richards et al., 1997b).
One interesting prediction that emerges from hyperbolic (but not exponential) models is that prefer-
ence between a large and a small reward should be observed to reverse depending on the time that the
choice is made (Figure 4d), and such preference reversal is a reliable and important experimental finding
(see Ainslie, 1975; Green et al., 1981; Bradshaw & Szabadi, 1992; Ainslie, 2001). For example, humans
generally prefer £100 now to £200 in three years’ time, but also generally prefer £200 in nine years to
£100 in six years, despite this being the same choice viewed at a different time. If you are aware that your
preference may change in this way, you may be able to improve your happiness in the long run by using
self-control strategies (Ainslie & Monterosso, 2003). Ainslie (2001) refers to this as bargaining with your
future self; the most famous example of precommitment is that of Odysseus (Homer, ~800 BC / 1996,
book 12, translation lines 44–60 and 172–217) (Figure 5); others include the use of disulfiram by alco-
holics and social precommitment by announcing publicly one’s intention to diet. Even pigeons have been
observed to use the self-control strategy of precommitment. When pigeons choose between SS and LL
rewards, they are often impulsive (Rachlin & Green, 1972), choosing the SS reward, but they have been
shown to work to avoid being offered the option of choosing the SS alternative (Ainslie, 1974; Ainslie &
Herrnstein, 1981).
It is also worth noting that in the hyperbolic discounting model and all others in which preference re-
versal occurs, the value at any one moment cannot be calculated directly from the value immediately pre-
ceding it in time; therefore, hyperbolic discounting implies that more information is being maintained by
the agent than is required for exponential discounting.
It is not known why hyperbolic discounting arises (Kacelnik, 1997a), or what neuropsychological pro-
cesses are responsible for it. Such discounting might in principle result from some combination of poor
knowledge of the contingencies between actions and their outcomes at long delays, weak S–R habits, or
because subjects are perfectly aware that the delayed reward is available but assign a low value to it
(Cardinal et al., 2003b). Hyperbolic discounting might also be explicable as the overall effect of two or
more different systems—for example, a cognitive, declarative system that exhibits minimal or exponen-
tial discounting, plus phenomena such as PIT, conditioned salience, or “visceral factors” that make re-
wards more salient and promote their choice when they are immediately available (Loewenstein, 1996;
Cardinal et al., 2003b; Gjelsvik, 2003; Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2004). As discussed above, perhaps
the most obvious difference between studies of human impulsive choice and animal models is that hu-
mans can be offered explicit choices (hypothetical or real: the difference does not appear to be important;
Lagorio & Madden, 2005) without prior experience of the situation (Rachlin et al., 1991; Myerson &
Green, 1995; de Wit et al., 2002)—“pre-packaged” action–outcome contingencies. Other animals must
learn these contingencies through experience, implying that the whole gamut of psychological represen-
tations that contribute to their actions (including goal-directed actions, S–R habits, and conditioned rein-
forcers) can influence their choices. Nevertheless, hyperbolic discounting has been observed in humans
and other experimental animals.
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a
b Figure 5: An early example of
precommitment
(a) Waterhouse (1891), Ulysses
and the Sirens, depicting Odysseus
(Ulysses) from Homer’s (~800 BC
/ 1996) Odyssey (book 12, transla-
tion lines 44–60 and 172–217).
Aware that the Sirens—originally
bird-like creatures in Greek my-
thology—would lure his ship onto
the rocks through the eldritch in-
fluence of their song on men’s
minds, yet wishing to hear their
song for himself, Odysseus com-
mands his men to stop up their ears
and lash him to the mast. He gives
them strict instructions not to untie
him until they are safely past the
sirens, and to ignore any further
instructions from him until that
point. (b) Later painters depicted
the sirens in more human fashion,
or as mermaids; this is Draper’s
(1909) painting of the same title.
1.7.3 Uncertainty discounting
Similarly, the dominant model of uncertainty or probability discounting (Rachlin et al., 1986; Rachlin et
al., 1991; Ho et al., 1999; Green & Myerson, 2004) suggests that subjects calculate a value for each rein-
forcer, according to its size and other parameters, and discount this by multiplying it by 1/(1+Hθ). In this
equation, θ represents the odds against obtaining the reinforcer, θ = (1 – p)/p, where p is the probability
of obtaining the reward, and H represents an odds discounting parameter that is specific to the individual
subject but stable over time for that subject. In this model, value is a hyperbolic function of the odds θ:
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1
magnitudeV
H θ= + ⋅
Such a hyperbolic function is supported by empirical research, at least in humans (Rachlin et al., 1986;
Rachlin et al., 1991; Rachlin & Siegel, 1994; Kacelnik, 1997b; Richards et al., 1999b; Rachlin et al.,
2000). Preference reversal effects are also observed in choice under risk or uncertainty (Slovic & Lichten-
stein, 1983; Lopes, 1994), with subjects preferring gambles with a low probability of winning a large
prize when asked to assign monetary values to the gambles, but then preferring gambles with moderate
probabilities and prizes when faced with a direct choice—that is, the task used to measure preference al-
ters that preference. Ho et al. (1999) suggested that hyperbolic processes of discounting apply to the de-
lay, probability (odds), and magnitude of a reward, and that these three discounting processes are inde-
pendent, multiplicative, and each governed by its own discounting parameter (K for delay, H for prob-
ability/odds, Q for magnitude) that is relatively stable for an individual. Their combined model is there-
fore as follows:
1 1
1 1
magnitudeV
K delay H magnitude Qθ= × ×+ ⋅ + ⋅ +
It should be noted in passing that although effects of delay, probability, magnitude, and so forth are often
assumed to be calculated independently (Killeen, 1972; Rachlin et al., 1991; Ho et al., 1999), and though
there is some support for this assumption (Mazur, 1987; Mazur, 1997), others have found that the effects
of reinforcer delay and magnitude are not independent (Ito, 1985; White & Pipe, 1987). In addition, as
discussed below in the context of drug addiction, humans may show quantitatively different temporal
(delay) discounting for qualitatively different reinforcers, such as drugs and money. Furthermore, depri-
vation of one commodity can selectively increase preference for SS over LL rewards for that commodity
(e.g. Mitchell, 2004a), suggesting that parameters such as K and/or Q are not unitary parameters that ap-
ply to all reinforcers, and/or that additional parameters specific to reinforcer classes must be added to
characterize behaviour fully.
1.8 SYSTEMIC PHARMACOLOGICAL STUDIES OF DELAYED OR
UNCERTAIN REINFORCEMENT
Given the importance of impulsive choice in disorders such as addiction (Poulos et al., 1995; Heyman,
1996; Bickel et al., 1999; Evenden, 1999a; Mitchell, 1999) and ADHD (Sagvolden et al., 1998;
Sagvolden & Sergeant, 1998), a number of groups have studied the effects on impulsive choice of ma-
nipulating neurochemical and neuroanatomical systems implicated in these disorders. I will review phar-
macological and neurochemical studies first. To date, more have examined choice involving delayed rein-
forcement than choice involving uncertain reinforcement, and many more have used appetitive positive
reinforcement (reward) than aversive reinforcement such as punishment.
1.8.1 Serotonin (5-HT)
Serotonin (5-hydroxytryptamine, 5-HT) has long been implicated in impulse control. Drugs that suppress
5-HT function were observed to reduce behavioural inhibition, making animals more impulsive in a
“motor” sense, as defined above (Soubrié, 1986; Evenden, 1999b). Correlational studies have indicated
that low cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) levels of the 5-HT metabolite 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA)
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are associated with risk taking in monkeys (Mehlman et al., 1994; Evenden, 1998) and impulsive aggres-
sion, violence, and suicide in humans (Åsberg et al., 1976; Linnoila et al., 1983; Brown & Linnoila,
1990; Linnoila et al., 1993; Mann, 2003).
Forebrain 5-HT depletion leads to impulsive choice in a variety of paradigms (Wogar et al., 1993; Ri-
chards & Seiden, 1995; Bizot et al., 1999; Mobini et al., 2000b) and has been suggested to steepen the
temporal discounting function, such that delayed rewards lose their capacity to motivate or reinforce be-
haviour (Wogar et al., 1993; Ho et al., 1999; Mobini et al., 2000a). The 5-HT-depleted animal becomes
hypersensitive to delays, or hyposensitive to delayed reward. As delayed rewards have unusually low
value, the animal chooses SS rewards over LL rewards, a characteristic of impulsivity (Ainslie, 1975).
Conversely, increasing 5-HT function with the 5-HT indirect agonist fenfluramine decreases impulsive
choice (Poulos et al., 1996). Since choice between SS and LL rewards may be affected by changes in the
sensitivity to reinforcer magnitude as well as reinforcer delay (Ho et al., 1999), it is important to note that
5-HT depletion does not appear to alter reinforcer magnitude discrimination (Mobini et al., 2000a; Mo-
bini et al., 2000b).
Altered 5-HT function has also been strongly implicated in depression (see e.g. Delgado et al., 1990;
Feldman et al., 1997, pp. 842–847; Caspi et al., 2003), but the relationship between depression, impul-
sivity, and 5-HT is complex. The precise neurochemical abnormality or set of abnormalities in depression
is far from clear (e.g. Feldman et al., 1997; Dhaenen, 2001; Stockmeier, 2003). There is no clear-cut rela-
tionship between depression itself and levels of 5-HIAA in the CSF (Åsberg, 1997; Feldman et al., 1997,
p. 843), although antidepressant drugs themselves tend to lower CSF 5-HIAA (see Bäckman et al., 2000).
However, there is a consistent association between low CSF 5-HIAA and suicidal behaviour—not only in
depression, but also in schizophrenia and other disorders (see Träskman-Bendz et al., 1986; Cooper et al.,
1992; Åsberg, 1997; Cremniter et al., 1999). Patients who are prone to suicide, many of whom are de-
pressed, show high impulsivity (Plutchik & Van Praag, 1989; Apter et al., 1993; Corruble et al., 2003).
Thus, low 5-HT function has been linked with impulsive behaviour, which is a risk factor for suicide, and
abnormalities of the 5-HT system are also associated with depression, also a strong risk factor for suicide.
However, the results relating 5-HT to impulsivity are not wholly clear-cut. The effects of forebrain 5-
HT depletion to promote impulsive choice have sometimes been transient (Bizot et al., 1999) or not ob-
served (Winstanley et al., 2003), and a nonselective 5-HT antagonist has been observed to promote self-
controlled choice (Evenden & Ryan, 1996). In humans, lowing 5-HT levels via dietary tryptophan deple-
tion (Biggio et al., 1974; Clemens et al., 1980; Delgado et al., 1989) decreases levels of 5-HT metabolites
in CSF (Carpenter et al., 1998; Williams et al., 1999), an indirect indicator of brain 5-HT levels. How-
ever, although tryptophan depletion may increase “motor” impulsivity in some tasks (Walderhaug et al.,
2002), it does not affect stop-signal reaction time (Clark et al., 2005; Cools et al., 2005), a basic measure
of motor control, and it has not been shown to increase impulsive choice in humans (Crean et al., 2002).
Likewise, a recent rodent study found that forebrain 5-HT depletion increased motor impulsivity but not
delay discounting (Winstanley et al., 2004a). Furthermore, 5-HT efflux in prefrontal cortex (PFC), as
measured by microdialysis (as opposed to CSF metabolite levels or whole-tissue post mortem measure-
ment) centred on the prelimbic cortex (PrL), was unexpectedly found to be positively correlated with
premature responding in an attentional task, a form of motor impulsivity (Dalley et al., 2002). Post mor-
tem analysis of the same subjects failed to show differences in total tissue 5-HT or 5-HIAA levels be-
tween the more impulsive and more self-controlled subgroups. 5-HT may modulate impulsivity in differ-
ent ways depending on the involvement of different receptor subtypes (Evenden, 1999b; Evenden &
Ryan, 1999; Winstanley et al., 2004c). Furthermore, the acute effects of serotonergic drugs on impulsivity
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can be the opposite of the chronic effects (Liu et al., 2004), with evidence for complex adaptations within
the PFC 5-HT system.
Although manipulations of 5-HT have influenced choice involving delayed reinforcement, there is less
evidence that they influence choice involving uncertainty and risk. Although forebrain 5-HT depletion
has affected temporal (delay) discounting, as discussed above, it does not appear to influence choice in-
volving probabilistic reinforcement. Dietary tryptophan depletion has not been shown to affect probability
discounting in humans (Anderson et al., 2003; Rogers et al., 2003; but see Cools et al., 2005); similarly,
forebrain 5-HT depletion in rats does not affect choice between small, certain rewards and large, uncer-
tain rewards (Mobini et al., 2000b).
1.8.2 Noradrenaline (NA)
Relatively little is known about the role of noradrenaline (NA) in delayed or probabilistic reinforcement.
It has been suggested that NA neurons encode some aspects of uncertainty in the general sense of making
predictions in a given context, in a manner complementary to that of acetylcholine (ACh) (Yu & Dayan,
2005). In causal studies, systemic NA blockade has been shown to affect decision making under uncer-
tainty in humans, by reducing the discrimination between magnitudes of different losses when the prob-
ability of losing was high (Rogers et al., 2004a), though NA reuptake inhibition has not been shown to
affect the Iowa gambling task (O’Carroll & Papps, 2003), in which subjects must choose between decks
of cards differing in magnitude and probability of their expected gains and losses (Bechara et al., 1994).
1.8.3 Dopamine (DA)
1.8.3.1 Temporal difference learning and dopamine
Since prediction of the future is of key importance in designing artificial intelligence agents, a number of
mathematical and computational models have been developed to learn from delayed and/or probabilistic
reinforcement (Russell & Norvig, 1995), including some forms of Q-learning (Watkins, 1989) and tempo-
ral difference (TD) learning (Sutton, 1988). Some models have been compared directly to mammalian
neural systems. For example, the TD learning model of Sutton (1988) has been extended to an actor–critic
architecture (see Barto, 1995; Houk et al., 1995). In this scheme, a “critic” has access to sensory and mo-
tor information and primary reinforcement, and learns to predict reward on the basis of this information
using a TD algorithm. “Immediate” reinforcement is held to follow the causing action by one time unit,
and the reinforcement at time t is referred to as rt. Delayed reinforcement is given a lesser weighting by
being multiplied by a factor γ for every time step it is delayed (where 0 ≤ γ < 1); high γ indicates a strate-
gic or long-term orientation and low γ indicates a tactical, short-term, or impulsive orientation. If the
critic is perfect, then its prediction P would be
Pt = rt+1 + γrt+2 + γ2rt+3 + …
Therefore, the prediction for time t–1 would be
Pt–1 = rt + γrt+1 + γ2rt+2 + …
and thus, for perfect prediction,
Pt–1 = rt + γ(rt+1 + γrt+2 + …)
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Pt–1 = rt + γPt
rt + γPt – Pt–1 = 0
The TD error δ can therefore be defined as
δ = rt + γPt – Pt–1
This quantity δ represents the difference between predicted and actual reward. The critic learns by ad-
justing its reinforcement prediction on the basis of the TD error: if δ > 0, reward occurred that was not
predicted, and the prediction at t–1 should be increased for next time; if δ < 0, reward was predicted but
did not occur, and the prediction at t–1 should be decreased. The critic teaches not only itself but also an
“actor”, which selects an action, and then modifies the propensity to perform that action on the basis of
the TD error (if δ = 0, the consequences of the last action were expected; if δ > 0, the consequences were
better than expected, and the response tendency of the action made at t–1 should be strengthened; if δ < 0,
the consequences were worse than expected, and the response tendency at t–1 should be decreased).
The result is that if a consistent sequence of stimuli predicts reward, this system will learn the se-
quence, with the TD error teaching the system about earlier and earlier consistent predictors with each
iteration. As the critic learns about future rewards, it is able to teach the actor to act on the basis of them.
Thus the system exemplifies S–R learning with an enhanced ability to act on the basis of future reward. It
has been of particular neurobiological interest since the firing of midbrain dopamine (DA) neurons ap-
pears to correspond very closely to the TD error δ (Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 1998; Schultz et al.,
1998; Schultz & Dickinson, 2000; Daw & Touretzky, 2002; McClure et al., 2003b; Schultz, 2006), and
other components of the basal ganglia innervated by midbrain DA neurons have been proposed to corre-
spond to the actor and critic, be those components the matrix and striosome compartments of the striatum
(Houk et al., 1995) or the dorsal and ventral striatum (O’Doherty et al., 2004).
1.8.3.2 Psychostimulants and impulsivity
However, the original interest in the relationship between DA and impulsivity stems from the discovery
that amphetamine and similar psychostimulants are an effective therapy for ADHD (Bradley, 1937).
Though these drugs have many actions, they are powerful releasers of DA from storage vesicles in the
terminals of dopaminergic neurons, and prevent DA re-uptake from the synaptic cleft, potentiating its ac-
tion (for references see Feldman et al., 1997, pp. 293/552/558). It has been proposed that many features
of ADHD, including preference for immediate reinforcement and hyperactivity on simple reinforcement
schedules, are due to abnormally steep temporal discounting, and that this is due to a hypofunctional nu-
cleus accumbens (Acb) DA system (Sagvolden et al., 1998; Sagvolden & Sergeant, 1998; Johansen et al.,
2002). Indeed, they go on to suggest Acb DA as the specific culprit (Sagvolden et al., 1998; Sagvolden &
Sergeant, 1998). Acb DA has long been implicated in aspects of responding for reinforcement, though its
role is not yet fully understood (Cardinal et al., 2002a; Salamone et al., 2005). However, whether ADHD
is characterized by a hypodopaminergic or a hyperdopaminergic state, and how this and other (e.g.
noradrenergic/serotonergic) abnormalities might be “normalized” by psychostimulants is controversial
(Swanson et al., 1998; Zhuang et al., 2001; Seeman & Madras, 2002; Solanto, 2002; Fone & Nutt, 2005;
Russell et al., 2005; Williams & Dayan, 2005).
Many of the inferences regarding the neural abnormalities in children with ADHD have been drawn
from studies of the spontaneously hypertensive rat (SHR), an inbred strain of rat that serves as an animal
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model of ADHD (Wultz et al., 1990; Sagvolden et al., 1992; Sagvolden et al., 1993; Sagvolden, 2000;
Russell et al., 2005). This rat exhibits pervasive hyperactivity and attention problems that resemble
ADHD, exhibits a steeper “scallop” of responding on fixed-interval (FI) schedules of reinforcement,
which can be interpreted as abnormally high sensitivity to immediate reinforcement (Sagvolden et al.,
1992), is impulsive on measures of “execution impulsivity” (Evenden & Meyerson, 1999), and has a
complex pattern of abnormalities in its DA system (de Villiers et al., 1995; Russell et al., 1995; Papa et
al., 1996; Carey et al., 1998; Papa et al., 1998; Russell et al., 1998; Russell, 2000). Depolarization- and
psychostimulant-induced DA release in Acb brain slices is altered in the SHR compared to Wistar Kyoto
progenitor control rats in a complex pattern that has been attributed to hypofunction of the mesolimbic
DA system projecting to the Acb (de Villiers et al., 1995; Russell et al., 1998; Russell, 2000), though ab-
normalities have also been found in DA release in slices of dorsal striatum and PFC (Russell et al., 1995).
Within the Acb, differences in gene expression and DA receptor density have been observed in both the
core and shell subregions (Papa et al., 1996; Carey et al., 1998; Papa et al., 1998).
Impulsive choice may reflect a lack of effectiveness of delayed reinforcement, and has been suggested
to underlie at least some subtypes of ADHD (Sagvolden et al., 1998; Sagvolden & Sergeant, 1998; Kuntsi
et al., 2001; Sonuga-Barke, 2002). The efficacy of psychomotor stimulants in ADHD (Bradley, 1937;
Solanto, 1998) suggests that they might promote the choice of delayed rewards. In fact, the effects of
acute administration of psychostimulants on laboratory models of impulsive choice have varied. Some
studies have found that they promote choice of delayed reinforcers (Sagvolden et al., 1992; Richards et
al., 1997a; Richards et al., 1999a; Wade et al., 2000; de Wit et al., 2002), while others have found the
opposite effect (Logue et al., 1992; Charrier & Thiébot, 1996; Evenden & Ryan, 1996); the same psy-
chostimulant can even have opposite effects in different tasks designed to measure impulsivity (Richards
et al., 1997a). One factor that may explain some of these discrepant effects is the presence of cues or sig-
nals present during the delay to the larger/later alternative. Such signals tend to increase responding for
the delayed reinforcer (Lattal, 1987; Mazur, 1997), perhaps because they become associated with the pri-
mary reinforcer and themselves become conditioned reinforcers, thus affecting choice (Williams & Dunn,
1991). Psychostimulants increase the effect of conditioned reinforcers (Hill, 1970; Robbins, 1976; Rob-
bins, 1978; Robbins et al., 1983), and their effects in delayed reinforcement choice tasks can depend on
whether explicit signals are presented during the delay (Cardinal et al., 2000). However, conditioned rein-
forcement is certainly not the only procedural difference between studies that have found differing effects
of psychostimulants.
1.8.3.3 Dopamine D1 and D2 receptors and impulsivity
It should also be emphasized that few studies of the effects of psychostimulants on impulsive choice have
addressed the pharmacological basis of their effects. Some of the effects may indeed not be dopaminer-
gic: for example, the effects of amphetamine may depend in part on 5-HT (Winstanley et al., 2003).
However, Wade et al. (2000) have shown that D2-type DA receptor antagonists and mixed D1/D2 antago-
nists induce impulsive choice, while D1-type receptor antagonists do not, suggesting that DA D2 receptors
normally promote choice of delayed reinforcement.
The role of DA in reward uncertainty is also not well understood. DA neurons respond to reward pre-
diction errors with changes in their phasic firing rate, as discussed above, and may also carry information
in their sustained firing rate specifically about reward uncertainty (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Fiorillo et al.,
2005; Niv et al., 2005; Tobler et al., 2005), but little is known of the causal role of DA in choice involv-
ing uncertain rewards.
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1.8.4 Relationship between addictive drugs and impulsivity
Given that impulsivity is part of the syndrome of drug addiction, with impulsive choice playing a promi-
nent role in maintaining the selection of drugs of abuse in favour of other, longer-term rewards (Poulos et
al., 1995; Heyman, 1996; Bickel et al., 1999; Evenden, 1999a; Mitchell, 1999; APA, 2000), the relation-
ship between addictive drugs and impulsive choice is of clear interest. Studies examining discounting in
addicts have focused primarily on delay, rather than uncertainty discounting (see Mitchell, 2003; 2004b;
2004a). There is little evidence for differences in uncertainty discounting among smokers (Mitchell,
1999) or alcohol abusers (Vuchinich & Calamas, 1997), though alcohol has been shown to modify deci-
sion making under uncertainty (George et al., 2005). However, decision-making deficits in risk-taking
and gambling tasks have been demonstrated in opiate and amphetamine users (Rogers et al., 1999a; Er-
sche et al., 2005; Leland & Paulus, 2005). The fact that the deficits were in some cases correlated with the
number of years of abuse suggests (but does not prove) that the deficits were drug-induced; the possibility
remains that the decision-making deficits predated and predisposed to the addiction.
Abnormally steep delay discounting has been demonstrated in drug addicts, including alcoholics
(Vuchinich & Calamas, 1997; Petry, 2001), cocaine users (Coffey et al., 2003; Kirby & Petry, 2004), opi-
ate users (Madden et al., 1997; Kirby et al., 1999; Kirby & Petry, 2004), and smokers (Bickel et al.,
1999; Mitchell, 1999; Mitchell, 2003; Reynolds et al., 2004b; Ohmura et al., 2005; Reynolds, 2006);
again, the question of cause and effect is hard to determine, although steeper discounting in current ad-
dicts compared to ex-addicts again raises the possibility of an effect of ongoing drug use. Many studies
have looked at the pharmacological effects of addictive drugs on measures of impulsivity including re-
sponse inhibition; rather fewer have looked specifically at delay and/or probability discounting in a for-
mal experimental (causal) design. Chronic cocaine administration transiently increases delay discounting
(increases impulsive choice) in rats (Paine et al., 2003), as does acute morphine administration (Kieres et
al., 2004); acute administration of psychostimulants was discussed above, and chronic methamphetamine
has been shown to increase impulsive choice in rats (Richards et al., 1999a). In keeping with everyday
experience, alcohol has been observed to increase risk taking (Lane et al., 2004). However, the findings
for a given drug have not always been consistent. For example, Ortner et al. (2003) recently found that
alcohol reduced delay discounting in humans, while Richards et al. (1999b) found no effect of alcohol on
this measure; in contrast, several investigators have found impulsive choice to be induced by alcohol in
rats (Tomie et al., 1998; Evenden & Ryan, 1999; Hellemans et al., 2005) and some also in humans
(Reynolds et al., 2006). Benzodiazepines have not been shown to affect impulsive choice in humans
(Reynolds et al., 2004a), and in different studies have been observed both to increase (Thiebot et al.,
1985; Cardinal et al., 2000) and to decrease (Evenden & Ryan, 1996) impulsive choice in rats. These dis-
crepancies may in some cases be due to the sensitivity of the particular task used, but may also be because
the drugs (or the state of addiction) do not have a unitary effect on discounting, but one which depends
heavily on the situation and the particular choices involved. For example, Mitchell has shown that ciga-
rette deprivation increases choice impulsivity when decisions concern cigarettes, but not when they con-
cern money (Mitchell, 2004a); likewise, smokers temporally discount cigarettes more than money (Bickel
et al., 1999), as well as discounting money more than controls; opiate abusers discount opiates more than
money (Madden et al., 1999) (Figure 6), and cocaine users discount cocaine more than money (Coffey et
al., 2003).
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Figure 6: Exaggerated temporal discounting in drug addicts
Summary of a number of studies conducted by Bickel and colleagues examining temporal discounting in human
drug addicts. (a) Smokers discount cigarettes slightly more steeply than money. (b) Current smokers discount
money more than ex-smokers, or those who have never smoked, do. (c) Opioid-dependent humans discount money
more than control subjects do. (d) Opioid addicts discount heroin more steeply than they discount money. Data for
smokers from Bickel et al. (1999); data for heroin addicts from Madden et al. (1999), reproduced from Bickel &
Johnson (2003).
1.9 ANATOMY AND CONNECTIONS OF KEY LIMBIC STRUCTURES
In this section I will outline the concept of the limbic system and in particular the anatomy of the limbic
corticostriatal “loop”, the striatal component of which is the nucleus accumbens. I will describe the basic
anatomy and connectivity of the Acb and of the hippocampus, the two areas whose roles in de-
layed/uncertain reinforcement are examined in this thesis.
1.9.1 Anatomy of the limbic corticostriatal “loop”
Early investigations of the functions of hypothalamic regions (Hetherington & Ranson, 1939; Anand &
Brobeck, 1951) demonstrated that electrolytic regions of the lateral hypothalamus appeared to leave ani-
mals demotivated, with impairments in unlearned behaviour (including aphagia, adipsia, and a reduction
in sexual, exploratory, and maternal behaviours) and in learned behaviour (impaired instrumental re-
sponding). However, such lesions also disrupt the medial forebrain bundle, a fibre tract that passes
through the lateral hypothalamus and contains the projection from midbrain DA nuclei, the substantia
nigra pars compacta (SNc) and the ventral tegmental area (VTA), to the forebrain. Use of the DA-
depleting toxin 6-hydroxydopamine (6-OHDA) showed that lesions of this projection or DA depletion of
the striatum, one of its targets, produced a similar pattern of behavioural impairment (Stricker & Zig-
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mond, 1976; Marshall & Teitelbaum, 1977); this focused attention on the role of DA and the structures
that it innervated in motivated behaviour.
The basal ganglia comprise a number of subcortical nuclei, including the striatum. The striatum may
be considered the “input layer” of the basal ganglia; nearly the entire neocortex projects to it (Kemp &
Powell, 1971). In turn, the striatum projects to the globus pallidus, which projects via thalamic nuclei
back to the cortex; the whole makes up a “loop”. It is a particular characteristic of basal ganglia–thalamo-
cortical (“corticostriatal”) loops that although large areas of cortex send information into the loop, only a
relatively small area of cortex is targeted by the return projection. Information flow in different loops is
segregated—that is, the loops operate in parallel—and the loops are named for the areas of cortex to
which they project. They are the motor loop (projecting in primates to the premotor cortex, supplementary
motor area, and primary motor cortex, and involved in the initiation of motor acts); the oculomotor loop
(projecting to the frontal eye fields); the dorsolateral prefrontal or “cognitive” loop; the lateral orbito-
frontal loop, and the anterior cingulate or limbic loop (projecting to the anterior cingulate cortex and me-
dial orbitofrontal cortex) (DeLong & Georgopoulos, 1981; Alexander et al., 1986). Indeed, functional
segregation (parallel processing) is apparent even within each loop (Alexander & Crutcher, 1990). The
loops may also be differentiated on the basis of the parts of the basal ganglia and thalamus they pass
through; thus, while inputs to the motor and cognitive loops target the dorsal striatum (caudate–putamen
or neostriatum), information entering the limbic loop does so through the ventral striatum. The ventral
striatum consists of the Acb, ventromedial portions of the caudate and putamen, and the olfactory tuber-
cle; the largest component is the Acb. Within each corticostriatal loop, the basic circuitry is similar across
the dorsal striatum and much of the ventral striatum (Heimer et al., 1995); it is therefore likely that the
various basal ganglia loops process information in qualitatively similar ways, with the nature of the corti-
cal target determining the apparent function of each loop.
Information processing in the basal ganglia is complex, involving not only a “direct” pathway from
striatum to globus pallidus (more specifically, in primates, to the internal segment of the globus pallidus
and the substantia nigra pars reticulata) but a functionally antagonistic “indirect” pathway from the stria-
tum to the globus pallidus (external segment), which projects to the subthalamic nucleus, and thence to
the globus pallidus (internal segment) (Alexander & Crutcher, 1990). Cellular activity in the striatum is
regulated by dopaminergic projections from the midbrain. The dorsal striatum is innervated by the SNc
while the ventral striatum receives its projections from the VTA. In a further subdivision of the dorsal
striatum, histochemically distinct patches or striosomes may be defined, which may project back to mid-
brain dopaminergic and cholinergic neurons, while the matrix circuitry is as described above (Grove et
al., 1986; Jiménez-Castellanos & Graybiel, 1989; Gerfen, 1992a; Gerfen, 1992b; Fallon & Loughlin,
1995), though it is not clear that this distinction applies to the ventral striatum (Heimer et al., 1995). In
addition, there are significant DA projections to cortical structures that provide information to, and re-
ceive information from, the basal ganglia, such as the PFC and amygdala (Fallon & Loughlin, 1995).
Here, I will focus on the limbic loop, depicted in Figure 7. Its components include many of the struc-
tures considered part of the limbic system. The term “limbic” was coined by Broca (1878) for the cortical
structures encircling the upper brain stem (limbus, L. edge or border). The “limbic lobe” was suggested to
have a role in emotional experience and expression by Papez (1937), concepts later to be elaborated by
MacLean (1949; 1952; 1993), who introduced the expression “limbic system” to refer to the limbic lobe
and its connections with the brainstem. The limbic system is not precisely defined: as the limbic lobe was
considered the neural substrate for emotions, structures whose functions have to do with motivation and
emotion have since been added to the anatomical definition. A modern definition of the limbic system in
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primates would include cingulate and orbitofrontal cortex; the hippocampal formation, parahippocampal
gyrus and mammillary bodies; anterior and medial thalamic nuclei; the nucleus accumbens and ventral
pallidum; the amygdala and the hypothalamus. Key elements of the limbic corticostriatal loop are shown
in Figure 7 (p. 21), with anatomically accurate depictions in Figure 8 (coronal views; p. 22), Figure 9
(sagittal views; p. 23), Figure 10 (horizontal views; p. 24), and Figure 11 (“glass brain” views; p. 25).
Figure 7: Key elements of the limbic corticostriatal “loop”
Simplified schematic of the limbic corticostriatal loop (after Cardinal et al., 2002a), showing key structures. OFC,
orbitofrontal cortex; mPFC, medial prefrontal cortex (prelimbic/infralimbic cortex in the rat); ACC, anterior cingu-
late cortex; H, hippocampal formation; BLA, basolateral amygdala; CeA, central nucleus of the amygdala; Acb,
nucleus accumbens; STN, subthalamic nucleus; VP, ventral pallidum; MD, mediodorsal; VTA, ventral tegmental
area; SNc, substantia nigra pars compacta. Not all structures and connections are shown; for example, there are pro-
jections from prefrontal cortical regions, including the OFC, to the STN (Berendse & Groenewegen, 1991; Maurice
et al., 1998; Hamani et al., 2004).
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Figure 8: Coronal sections of the rat brain, showing selected limbic and related structures.
For full legend, see p. 26.
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Figure 9: Sagittal paramedian views of the rat brain, showing selected limbic and related structures.
For full legend, see p. 26.
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Figure 10: Horizontal views of the rat brain, showing selected limbic and related structures.
For full legend, see p. 26.
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Figure 11: “Glass brain” views showing selected limbic and related structures.
For full legend, see p. 26.
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Legends continued from Figure 8–Figure 11 (pp. 22–25).
Figure 8 (p. 22): Coronal sections of the rat brain, showing selected limbic and related structures.
Coronal sections are shown at 1.5 mm intervals (from +4.2 mm to –9.3 mm relative to bregma, with positive being
anterior). Colours indicate selected regions of interest. Ventricles are shown in black; the SNc is shown in near-
black and is located inferiorly and bilaterally at –4.8 mm and –6.3 mm slices. Coronal sections are taken from Paxi-
nos & Watson (1997). The hippocampus is not highlighted (for which, see Figure 12). Abbreviations and regional
definitions: PrL, prelimbic cortex; IL, infralimbic cortex; Cg1, cingulate area 1; Cg2, cingulate area 2; OFC, orbito-
frontal cortex (including areas MO [medial orbital cortex], VO [ventral orbital cortex], and LO [lateral orbital cor-
tex]). The insula, or insular cortex, includes agranular insular cortex (AI), dysgranular insular cortex (DI), and
granular insular cortex (GI). BLA, basolateral amygdalar complex (including the basolateral amygdaloid nucleus
BL, the basomedial amygdaloid nucleus BM, and the lateral amygdaloid nucleus La); CeA, central amygdaloid nu-
cleus; AcbC, nucleus accumbens core; AcbSh, nucleus accumbens shell; VP, ventral pallidum; MD, mediodorsal
nucleus of the thalamus; STN, subthalamic nucleus (STh in the terminology of Paxinos & Watson, 1997). “Nucleus
basalis” refers to the nucleus basalis magnocellularis, or basal nucleus of Meynert (B in the terminology of Paxinos
& Watson, 1997). Raphé nuclei shown include the dorsal raphé nucleus (DR), the median raphé nucleus (MnR), and
the B9 group of serotonergic cells. SNc, substantia nigra pars compacta (SNC in the terminology of Paxinos & Wat-
son, 1997); VTA, ventral tegmental area.
Figure 9 (p. 23): Sagittal paramedian views of the rat brain, showing selected limbic and related structures.
Top and middle panels: sagittal sections at 0.4 mm lateral to the midline, from Paxinos & Watson (1997), with
scales in mm. Superimposed upon these sections are coloured strips at 0.5 mm intervals indicating the maximum
vertical extent of each structure at that anteroposterior level, throughout the brain (not just at 0.4 mm lateral to the
midline); data from coronal sections of Paxinos & Watson (1997). The groupings of structures in the upper and
middle panels are not functional groupings, but are chosen to minimize overlap in the figures. Bottom panel: an-
other sagittal view at 0.4 mm lateral to the midline, from Paxinos & Watson (1998), labelled. Not all abbreviations
will be defined here; the picture illustrates the surface topography of prefrontal cortex (particularly areas PrL, IL,
MO, Cg1, and Cg2) near the midline. Abbreviations are as in Figure 8. The hippocampus is not shown (for which,
see Figure 12).
Figure 10 (p. 24): Horizontal views of the rat brain, showing selected limbic and related structures.
Horizontal sections of the rat brain, with scales in mm. The outline of the rat brain is traced from that of MIVA ver-
sion 0.9 (Sullivan & Zhang, 2005). Superimposed upon these are coloured strips at 0.5 mm intervals indicating the
maximum horizontal extent of each structure at that anteroposterior level. The groupings of structures in the three
panels are not functional, but are chosen to minimize overlap in the figures. The hippocampus is not shown (for
which, see Figure 12).
Figure 11 (p. 25): “Glass brain” views showing selected limbic and related structures.
Images showing views of a transparent rat brain shell (“glass brain”) in two three-dimensional projections (seen
from the front/left/above, and seen from directly above) with structures illustrated as defined in and rendered by
MIVA version 0.9 (Sullivan & Zhang, 2005). S, superior; I, inferior; A, anterior; P, posterior; R, right; L, left.
1.9.2 Basic anatomy of the nucleus accumbens
The nucleus accumbens may be divided into the core (AcbC), the shell (AcbSh), and the rostral pole, a
border zone with features of the other two compartments (Zaborszky et al., 1985; Zahm & Brog, 1992).
The pattern of innervation of these structures differs, and the Acb may be considered as having two broad
functional divisions (Brog et al., 1993): (1) the core, rostral pole and lateral shell; and (2) the medial shell
and septal pole. Of these, the core division more closely resembles the dorsal striatum, projecting pre-
dominantly to the ventral pallidum, while the shell division also projects to subcortical structures, such as
the lateral hypothalamus and periaqueductal grey, involved in the control of innate behaviours. The con-
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nections of the Acb are summarized in Table 1 and Table 2. As a recipient of information from a consid-
erable array of limbic structures that projects additionally to nuclei known to be involved in behavioural
expression, the Acb has famously been suggested to represent a “limbic–motor interface” (Mogenson et
al., 1980).
Region in Acb Cortical afferents Subcortical afferents
To all/most of the
nucleus accumbens
orbital cortex
posterior agranular insular cortex
entorhinal cortex
basal amygdala
hippocampal formation (via subiculum)
(Note that none of these inputs is a primary or secon-
dary sensory area or relay.)
raphé nuclei
ventral tegmental area
thalamic nuclei
Shell-preferential
(meaning medial shell
and septal pole)
dorsal peduncular cortex
infralimbic cortex
pyriform cortex
ventral subiculum
bed nucleus of the stria terminalis
hypothalamus
medial amygdala
lateral habenula
laterodorsal tegmental nucleus
sublenticular substantia innominata
lateral septal nucleus
locus coeruleus
Core- or rostral pole-
preferential
anterior cingulate cortex
medial precentral cortex
dorsal and ventral prelimbic area
agranular insular cortex
perirhinal cortex
dorsal subiculum
dorsolateral ventral pallidum
subthalamic nucleus
globus pallidus
substantia nigra pars compacta
Table 1: Some inputs to the nucleus accumbens
Subcortical connections are nearly all reciprocal. Information from Brog et al. (1993) and Berendse et al.
(1992). See Brog et al. (1993) for further details of thalamic connections. Table reproduced from Cardinal
(2001).
Region in Acb Efferent connections
Core ventral pallidum
subthalamic nucleus
substantia nigra pars reticulata
Shell ventral pallidum
ventral tegmental area
substantia nigra pars compacta
hypothalamus (preoptic, medial, lateral areas)
lateral septum
bed nucleus of the stria terminalis
lateral habenula
periaqueductal grey
Indirect, via ventral pallidum mediodorsal thalamus
pedunculopontine area (part of the mesencephalic locomotor region)
Table 2: Some outputs from the nucleus accumbens
For references, see Pennartz et al. (1994). Table reproduced from Cardinal
(2001).
1.9.3 Basic anatomy of the hippocampus
The term “hippocampus” is usually taken to mean the cornu ammonis (CA, or Ammon’s horn), the den-
tate gyrus, and the subiculum (Aggleton & Brown, 1999). The cornu ammonis has a number of subfields,
termed CA1–4. The hippocampus is archicortex. It has bidirectional links with adjacent entorhinal cortex,
which itself communicates with perirhinal and parahippocampal cortex. The other main conduit of infor-
mation to and from the hippocampus is via the fornix, a fibre tract that starts with its fimbriae (L. fringes)
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on the hippocampus, and terminates predominantly in the mammillary bodies (part of the hypothalamus),
and the anterior thalamic nuclei, but also in the nucleus accumbens. The mammillary bodies themselves
project to these thalamic nuclei via the mammillothalamic tract. The macroscopic anatomy of the rat hip-
pocampus is shown in Figure 12.
Within the hippocampus, there is a well-described trisynaptic circuit (Andersen et al., 1969; 1971)
(Figure 13, Figure 14). All major association areas of cortex project reciprocally to the entorhinal cortex.
(1) Entorhinal cortex cells project via the perforant path directly to the dentate gyrus, crossing the hippo-
campal fissure in the process. (2) Dentate gyrus cells (specifically, granule cells) project via so-called
mossy fibres to CA3. (3) In addition to sending axons out along the fornix, CA3 cells project via Schaffer
collaterals to the CA1 field. After this, CA1 axons project either back to the subiculum (and from there
back to entorhinal cortex) or to the fornix. The complete set of circuitry is, of course, more complex than
Figure 12: Diagram of the rat hippocampus
Drawings of the rat brain showing the three-dimensional organization of the hippocampus and related structures.
Three coronal sections through the left hippocampus are shown at the bottom right of the figure, with their approxi-
mate anteroposterior coordinate relative to bregma. CA1, CA2, CA3: cornu ammonis fields 1–3; DG: dentate gyrus;
EC: entorhinal cortex; f: fornix; s: septal pole of the hippocampus; S: subiculum; t: temporal pole of the hippocam-
pus. Adapted from Figure 1 of Amaral & Witter (1995); copyright Elsevier 1995; reproduced in Cheung & Cardinal
(2005) with permission from Elsevier.
Chapter 1: Introduction 29
this basic description (Figure 13). The hippocampus also receives important modulatory input, including
ACh. The main forebrain cholinergic innervation comes from the nucleus basalis, which provides ACh to
neocortex, and the nearby septum (septal nuclei) and diagonal band of Broca in the basal forebrain, which
together provide much of the ACh input to the hippocampus. Cholinergic cells of the medial septum proj-
ect via the fornix to all regions of the hippocampus; in turn, CA3 projects back to the lateral septum,
where inhibitory interneurons project to the medial septum.
Figure 13: Outline of connections of the hippocampus
The hippocampus comprises the cornu ammonis, the dentate gyrus, and the subiculum. Left: basic intrinsic and ex-
trinsic connections of the hippocampus, excluding the fornix. Right: synaptic connections in more detail, showing
principal excitatory neurons and including fornical connections. CA, cornu ammonis; D, deep pyramidal cells; DG,
dentate gyrus granule cells; F, forward inputs to association cortex areas from preceding cortical areas in the hierar-
chy shown at left; mf, mossy fibres; PHG, parahippocampal gyrus and perirhinal cortex; pp, perforant path; rc, re-
current collateral of the CA3 hippocampal pyramidal cells; S, superficial pyramidal cells; 2, pyramidal cells in layer
2 of the entorhinal cortex; 3, pyramidal cells in layer 3 of the entorhinal cortex. Thick lines above cell bodies repre-
sent dendrites. Figure taken from Rolls (2000).
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Figure 14: Cross-sectional structure of the primate hippocampus
Coronal section: medial is to the right, superior is upwards. The diagram shows the interlocking C shapes (CA fields
and dentate gyrus) that typify the hippocampus, and the major pathways through the hippocampal formation. Modi-
fied from Martin (1989, p. 391). CA subfields are numbered with CA1 closest to the subiculum. In this diagram, the
entorhinal cortex is considered part of the parahippocampal gyrus.
1.9.4 A note on the interpretation of excitotoxic lesion methods
Although correlative techniques such as electrophysiology and functional neuroimaging allow the func-
tioning of the normal brain to be measured, interventional techniques (such as lesion studies or drug infu-
sions) are required to establish a causal link between a neural structure and an aspect of behaviour. In
such studies, the anatomical specificity of the method is important. The use of aspirative or radiofre-
quency lesions, or local anaesthetic inactivation, will destroy or inactivate neurons in the target area, but
will also affect fibres (axons) passing through the target structure, potentially affecting the function of
neurons whose cell bodies are elsewhere. In the present thesis, excitotoxic lesion techniques are used to
affect neurons in the target site selectively. Excitotoxins typically activate N-methyl-D-aspartate-type
(NMDA-type) glutamate receptors on neurons, leading to abnormal Ca2+ influx and cell death via apopto-
sis or excitotoxic necrosis; reviews have been provided by Choi (1988; 1995). Table 3 shows the conclu-
Manipulation Conclusions that may be drawn from impairment Conclusions that may be drawn from nor-
mal behaviour
Lesion, then train/test Structure is required for learning or performance of
the task.
Structure is not required for learning or
performance of the task, though it may still
be involved.
Train, lesion, test Structure is required for performance of the task.
Does not distinguish “mnemonic” from “motor”
function.
Structure not required for performance of
the task.
Train in the presence of
reversible inactivation; test
subsequently
Either of:
(a) the structure is required for task performance,
and successful performance is required as part
of the learning process (e.g. instrumental be-
haviour);
(b) the structure is involved in learning the task.
Structure not required to learn the task.
Disconnection lesion (unilat-
eral lesion of site A and
unilateral lesion of site B in
the opposite hemisphere)
Site A or B must be intact bilaterally for task per-
formance (control procedures should address this
issue), or a functional connection between structures
A and B is necessary for the task.
Either of:
(a) a direct or indirect connection exists
between the remaining A and B sites;
(b) functional communication between A
and B is not necessary for the task.
Table 3: Interpretation of lesion studies
Modified from Cardinal (2001).
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sions that may be drawn from some of these interventional techniques.
1.10 BASIC NEUROBIOLOGY OF REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
Having outlined the psychological processes known to play a part in reinforcement learning (p. 2) and the
structures of the limbic corticostriatal loop (p. 19), it will be helpful to attempt a rough correspondence
before examining the specific contribution of limbic structures in the context of delayed and uncertain
reinforcement. A number of limbic cortical and subcortical structures play a role in assessing the value of
reinforcers and of stimuli that predict them, and in actions directed at obtaining those reinforcers or stim-
uli (Cardinal et al., 2002a); here, I will summarize some major themes in reinforcement neuroscience.
1.10.1 Mesolimbic dopamine and the nucleus accumbens
The discovery that rats would work very hard to stimulate regions of their brain electrically—ICSS (Olds
& Milner, 1954)—was historically important. Many sites that support ICSS lie on the path of dopaminer-
gic (DAergic) neurons from the SNc and VTA to limbic sites including the ventral striatum (nucleus ac-
cumbens), and ICSS is substantially reduced after Acb DA depletion (Fibiger et al., 1987). Furthermore,
the rate at which rats learn an ICSS response is correlated with the degree of potentiation of synapses
made by cortical afferents onto striatal neurons, a potentiation that requires DA receptors (Reynolds et al.,
2001). The natural idea that follows is that DA “stamps in” stimulus–response connections. Indeed, DA
has acute effects to modulate corticostriatal transmission, but it also has lasting effects; most likely, the
combination of cortical (presynaptic) and striatal (postsynaptic) activity normally induces long-term de-
pression of corticostriatal synapses, but if the same pattern of activity is paired with a pulse of DA, then
the active synapses are strengthened (Reynolds & Wickens, 2002). Natural reinforcers, drugs of abuse,
and CSs that predict either, trigger increases in DA release in the Acb (Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Datla
et al., 2002; Ito et al., 2002; Carelli & Wightman, 2004; Young, 2004). DA neurons fire to unexpected
rewards, or unexpected stimuli that predict reward; that is, they signal reward prediction error (Schultz et
al., 1997; Schultz, 1998; Schultz et al., 1998; Schultz & Dickinson, 2000; Schultz, 2006). DA neuron
firing may be a teaching signal used for learning about actions that lead to reward (Schultz et al., 1997).
The Acb similarly responds to anticipated rewards (Schultz et al., 1992; Miyazaki et al., 1998; Martin &
Ono, 2000; Schultz et al., 2000; Breiter et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2001; de la Fuente-Fernandez et al.,
2002; Cromwell & Schultz, 2003; Elliott et al., 2003; McClure et al., 2003a; Bjork et al., 2004; Zink et
al., 2004). Other parameters of DA neuronal firing may signal reward uncertainty (Fiorillo et al., 2003;
Schultz, 2004; 2006).
An early suggestion was that Acb DA mediated the pleasurable aspects of reward (Wise, 1981; 1982;
1985), but there is good evidence against this idea. Certainly, DA is released in response to appetitive re-
inforcers (e.g. Fiorino et al., 1993; Wilson et al., 1995; Schultz et al., 1997; Berridge & Robinson, 1998;
Schultz, 1998; Schultz et al., 1998; Schultz & Dickinson, 2000; Datla et al., 2002; Ito et al., 2002; Carelli
& Wightman, 2004; Young, 2004), intra-Acb DA agonists are reinforcing (Phillips et al., 1994), animals
may titrate their drug taking to maintain high Acb DA levels (Pettit & Justice, 1989), and some aspects of
naturally reinforced and drug-reinforced responding depend on Acb DA (e.g. Pettit et al., 1984; Caine &
Koob, 1994; Baker et al., 1998; Ikemoto & Panksepp, 1999; Dickinson et al., 2000; Parkinson et al.,
2002; Salamone & Correa, 2002; Salamone et al., 2003). However, Acb DA does not mediate “pleasure”
(Fibiger & Phillips, 1988; Robbins & Everitt, 1992; Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Volkow et al., 1999)—
though its release may correlate with activity in other systems that do—and reinforcement operates in its
absence (Ettenberg et al., 1982; Pettit et al., 1984). Measured by microdialysis techniques, DA is also
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released in response to aversive stimuli, CSs that predict them, and other salient stimuli (see e.g.
Salamone, 1994; Horvitz, 2000; Young, 2004), which would be consistent with a more general motiva-
tional role. These results are not easy to reconcile with electrophysiological studies of DA neuronal firing,
which have generally suggested that firing occurs in response to appetitive but not aversive stimuli. It is
possible that DA neurons fire to strong, not mild, aversive events, that the DA response to aversive events
is gradual rather than phasic, or that local modulation of DA release in target regions dissociates DA re-
lease from the firing of DA neurons (reviewed by Salamone, 1994; Horvitz, 2000; Joseph et al., 2003).
Targets of DA neurons certainly influence instrumental learning and responding. It is not clear what
structures learn from the DA teaching signal; these probably include the dorsal striatum and PFC, but
much attention has focused on the Acb. Blockade of NMDA glutamate receptors in the AcbC has been
shown to retard instrumental learning for food under a variable-ratio-2 (VR-2) schedule (Kelley et al.,
1997), as has inhibition or over-stimulation of cyclic-adenosine-monophosphate-dependent protein kinase
(protein kinase A; PKA) within the Acb (Baldwin et al., 2002a). Concurrent blockade of NMDA and DA
D1 receptors in the AcbC synergistically prevents learning of a VR-2 schedule (Smith-Roe & Kelley,
2000). Once the response has been learned, subsequent performance on this schedule is not impaired by
NMDA receptor blockade within the AcbC (Kelley et al., 1997). Furthermore, infusion of a PKA inhibi-
tor (Baldwin et al., 2002a) or a protein synthesis inhibitor (Hernandez et al., 2002) into the AcbC after
instrumental training sessions impairs subsequent performance, implying that PKA activity and protein
synthesis in the AcbC contribute to the consolidation of instrumental behaviour. Thus, manipulation of
the Acb can affect instrumental learning.
However, it is also clear that the Acb is not required for simple instrumental conditioning—but it is
strongly implicated in providing “extra motivation” for behaviour, especially when such motivation is
triggered by Pavlovian CSs, or when reinforcers are delayed or require substantial effort to obtain. Rats
with Acb or AcbC lesions acquire lever-press responses on sequences of random ratio (RR) schedules at
normal or near-normal levels (Corbit et al., 2001; de Borchgrave et al., 2002) and are fully sensitive to
changes in the action–outcome contingency (Balleine & Killcross, 1994; Corbit et al., 2001; de
Borchgrave et al., 2002). Thus, the Acb is not critical for goal-directed action (see Cardinal et al., 2002a);
rather, it appears to be critical for some aspects of motivation that promote responding for rewards in real-
life situations. For example, the Acb plays a role in promoting responding for delayed rewards (Cardinal
et al., 2001), to be discussed later, and is required for Pavlovian CSs to provide a motivational boost to
responding (Hall et al., 2001; de Borchgrave et al., 2002), i.e. for PIT. PIT has sometimes been termed
“wanting” (Wyvell & Berridge, 2000; Wyvell & Berridge, 2001), although the term “wanting” could
equally refer to the instrumental incentive value underpinning true goal-directed action. PIT can be fur-
ther enhanced by injection of amphetamine into the Acb (Wyvell & Berridge, 2000) or by corticotropin-
releasing hormone (CRH) acting in the AcbSh (Pecina et al., 2006), and depends on DA (Dickinson et al.,
2000), possibly under the control of the central nucleus of the amygdala (CeA) (Hall et al., 2001). CeA
control of midbrain dopaminergic systems has also been demonstrated in other tasks (Lee et al., 2005a;
Lee et al., 2005b; Holland & Gallagher, 2006). Other motivational effects of Pavlovian CSs also depend
on the Acb. CSs serve as goals for behaviours (conditioned reinforcers); although lesions of Acb subre-
gions do not prevent animals responding for conditioned reinforcement entirely (Parkinson et al., 1999a),
enhancement of DA neurotransmission within the Acb can boost the efficacy of conditioned reinforce-
ment (Taylor & Robbins, 1984; 1986; Cador et al., 1991; Parkinson et al., 1999a). CSs that have been
paired with reward also elicit approach (Brown & Jenkins, 1968); this effect also depends on the Acb
(Parkinson et al., 1999a; Parkinson et al., 1999b; Parkinson et al., 2000c) and its DA innervation
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(Parkinson et al., 2002). Acb DA may also be involved in learning this approach response, again perhaps
under the control of the CeA (Parkinson et al., 2000b; Hall et al., 2001; Cardinal et al., 2002b; Parkinson
et al., 2002; Phillips et al., 2003). Acb DA also contributes directly to subjects’ motivation to work hard
(Ikemoto & Panksepp, 1999; Salamone & Correa, 2002; Salamone et al., 2003). In naturalistic situations,
rewards are frequently available only after a delay, require considerable effort to achieve, and are sig-
nalled by environmental stimuli; thus, the Acb is central to a number of processes that require motivation
(Mogenson et al., 1980).
This motivational process has been suggested to be particularly significant in some addictions, and
modification of it may have therapeutic potential. Although DA systems are affected by drugs of abuse
and natural reinforcers such as food, some abused drugs may be more potent in this regard. For example,
both food and drugs of abuse increase Acb DA, but the DA response to drugs of abuse may not habituate
to the same extent as that to food (Di Chiara, 1998; Di Chiara, 2002). Sensitization occurs following psy-
chostimulant administration directly into the VTA, which induces hypersensitivity to DA in the Acb
(Cador et al., 1995) and enhances the response to Pavlovian CSs associated with reward (Harmer & Phil-
lips, 1999; Taylor & Horger, 1999; Wyvell & Berridge, 2001). It is not yet clear to what extent sensitiza-
tion contributes to human addiction (Sax & Strakowski, 2001), but it has been suggested that a sensitized
response to drug-associated cues contributes to drug craving—that this “incentive motivational” system
becomes sensitized (Robinson & Berridge, 1993). In present animal models, however, drug sensitization
enhances responding for food, or responding to CSs for food (Taylor & Horger, 1999; Wyvell & Ber-
ridge, 2001; Olausson et al., 2003), but in human addiction, responding for non-drug reinforcement de-
clines relative to that for drug reinforcement (APA, 2000). Amphetamine sensitization also enhances the
subsequent development of habits (Nelson & Killcross, 2006). In any case, in animal models of drug-
seeking behaviour controlled by drug-associated stimuli (Everitt & Robbins, 2000), lesions of the AcbC
or disruption of its glutamatergic neurotransmission reduce drug seeking (Di Ciano & Everitt, 2001;
Hutcheson et al., 2001b), probably by reducing the motivational impact of the CSs. DA D3 receptors are
particularly concentrated in the Acb and amygdala (Sokoloff et al., 1990), and D3 receptor antagonists
(Vorel et al., 2002; Di Ciano et al., 2003) and partial agonists (Pilla et al., 1999; Cervo et al., 2003) re-
duce cue-controlled cocaine seeking or relapse to cocaine taking in animal models. Some manipulations
that reduce drug seeking or reinstatement of drug taking in animal models, such as DA D3 receptor an-
tagonists, do not reduce food seeking in a similar manner (Vorel et al., 2002; Di Ciano et al., 2003).
1.10.2 Habits and the dorsal striatum
The development of motor habits may depend on dorsal striatal plasticity (Packard & McGaugh, 1996),
which may in turn depend on DA receptors (Reynolds et al., 2001; Reynolds & Wickens, 2002). Expres-
sion of S–R habits requires the dorsal striatum (Packard & McGaugh, 1996; Yin et al., 2004), and the
balance between habits and goal-directed behaviour may also be regulated by the prelimbic and infralim-
bic cortex (Killcross & Coutureau, 2003), subdivisions of the rat PFC. Dorsal striatal DA release is also a
correlate of well-established cocaine seeking (Ito et al., 2002).
1.10.3 Action–outcome contingency knowledge, planning and value: the PFC and
amygdala
The PFC (specifically, prelimbic cortex) is required for rats to represent the contingencies between ac-
tions and their outcomes (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998; Corbit & Balleine, 2003), and acquisition of in-
strumental responses on a simple schedule is also disrupted synergistically by concurrent blockade of
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NMDA and DA D1 receptors in the PFC (Baldwin et al., 2002b). The PFC is also involved in extinction
(Myers & Davis, 2002)—the cessation of responding when a CS or response is no longer paired with re-
inforcement. Extinction is not “unlearning” but involves the learning of new, inhibitory (“CS → not-US”
or “CS → don’t respond”) associations (see Mackintosh, 1974; Delamater, 2004). Lesions of the ventral
medial PFC interfere with the extinction of Pavlovian conditioned freezing in the rat (Morgan et al.,
1993; Morgan & LeDoux, 1995; Morgan & LeDoux, 1999). The PFC interacts with the amygdala, an im-
portant site of CS–US association in this task (see Davis, 2000; LeDoux, 2000), and may suppress condi-
tioned freezing when it is no longer appropriate (see Garcia et al., 1999; Myers & Davis, 2002; Quirk et
al., 2003; Rosenkranz et al., 2003).
The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is part of the PFC with a particular role in the assessment of reinforcer
value; it has bidirectional connections to the amygdala, and both are heavily implicated in the retrieval of
the value of primary reinforcers based on information from CSs (see Cardinal et al., 2002a; Balleine et
al., 2003; Lindgren et al., 2003; Pickens et al., 2003; O’Doherty, 2004). The OFC may encode the eco-
nomic value of goods directly (e.g. Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006). In humans, the OFC and amygdala
are also activated during extinction of Pavlovian conditioning (Gottfried & Dolan, 2004). The amygdala
regulates the DA signal to the Acb (Everitt et al., 2000; Parkinson et al., 2000a; Hall et al., 2001; Cardi-
nal et al., 2002a; Phillips et al., 2003). Goal-directed action requires that action–outcome contingencies
interact with the incentive value of goals (Dickinson, 1994; Dickinson & Balleine, 1994); the connection
between the amygdala and the PFC (Pitkänen, 2000) may provide this functional link (Coutureau et al.,
2000; Arana et al., 2003; Gottfried et al., 2003; Holland & Gallagher, 2004). The retrieval of incentive
value about food reinforcers also requires the gustatory cortex, the insula (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998;
Balleine & Dickinson, 2000).
1.10.4 Hedonic assessment
Hedonic assessment of rewards themselves (“liking” or “pleasure”), does not depend on dopaminergic
processes (Pecina et al., 1997; Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Dickinson et al., 2000; Pecina et al., 2003).
Instead, it involves opioid mechanisms in the AcbSh and other systems in the pallidum and brainstem
(Berridge, 2000; Kelley & Berridge, 2002). Intra-Acb µ opioid agonists also affect food preference, in-
creasing the intake of highly palatable foodstuffs including fat, sweet foods, salt, and ethanol (Zhang et
al., 1998; Zhang & Kelley, 2000; Kelley et al., 2002; Zhang & Kelley, 2002; Will et al., 2003; Ward et
al., 2006). The effect can be two-way, with chronic ingestion of chocolate inducing adaptations in en-
dogenous Acb opioid systems (Kelley et al., 2003).
1.10.5 The hippocampus and the representation of context
Interest in the hippocampus as a memory store stemmed from early observations of human amnesia fol-
lowing medial temporal lobe resection (Scoville & Milner, 1957; Corkin et al., 1997) and many subse-
quent animal models (for recent reviews, see Squire, 1992; Murray & Mishkin, 1998; Baxter & Murray,
2001a; Baxter & Murray, 2001b; Clark et al., 2001b), together with the discovery of synaptic long-term
potentiation (LTP), a cellular mechanism of memory, in the hippocampus (Bliss & Lømo, 1973; Morris,
1994). Human anterograde amnesia has also resulted from damage to diencephalic structures, and it has
been suggested that a circuit involving the hippocampus, mammillary bodies, and anterior thalamic nuclei
is essential for episodic memory formation (Delay & Brion, 1969; Aggleton & Brown, 1999). There is
substantial contemporary debate on the exact type of memory supported by the hippocampus and adjacent
cortical regions, and the manner in which they do so (Gaffan & Harrison, 1989; Gaffan, 1992; Morris &
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Frey, 1997; Eichenbaum et al., 1999; Griffiths et al., 1999; Morris, 2001; Good, 2002; Day et al., 2003;
Fortin et al., 2004). However, there is good evidence that the hippocampus contributes to the representa-
tion of context.
The idea that the hippocampus plays a role in contextual representations developed from the original
discovery of cells in the rat hippocampus that increased their firing rate when the rat was at a particular
location in its environment—“place cells” (O’Keefe & Dostrovsky, 1971). O’Keefe & Nadel (1978) sug-
gested that the hippocampus functions as a “cognitive map”, informing the rat where it is in the world
(recently reviewed by Eichenbaum et al., 1999). Lesion studies support the idea that the hippocampus is
critical in navigation. For example, Morris et al. (1982) showed that rats with hippocampal lesions were
impaired at a task in which they had to learn the location of a hidden submerged platform in a tank full of
opaque liquid, now known as the Morris water maze. The deficit appears to depend on navigating relative
to a constellation of cues in the room, as hippocampal lesions do not impair the ability to head in a par-
ticular direction to a stimulus that bears a fixed relation to the platform (Pearce et al., 1998). Water maze
performance is damaged by dorsal, not ventral hippocampal lesions (Moser et al., 1995). Learning in the
water maze can be blocked by the glutamate NMDA receptor antagonist D-(–)-2-amino-5-
phosphonopentanoic acid (AP-5), which blocks LTP (Morris et al., 1986); similar effects follow NMDA
receptor subunit mutations. However, the effects of AP-5 are attenuated if the rats are trained in a differ-
ent water maze beforehand (Bannerman et al., 1995), so the role of the NMDA receptors may not be a
specifically spatial one. Human imaging studies also support the idea of a role in the hippocampus in
navigation (e.g. Maguire et al., 1997; Maguire et al., 1998; Maguire et al., 2000).
It has been argued that the hippocampus doesn’t encode a map in the conventional sense; rather, it ap-
pears that place cells encode the relationship between subsets of cues in the environment, independent of
other cues (Eichenbaum et al., 1999). Hippocampal neurons also encode nonspatial features (Wood et al.,
1999). Eichenbaum et al. (1999) suggest that the hippocampus can encode spatial information because
this is a special case of encoding the relations between stimuli. These relations are useful for navigation
when they are spatial relations, but the memories encoded by the hippocampus can be used for other pur-
poses. The use of a more abstract relationship is demonstrated by transitive inference. If a subject learns
that B > C (where “>” denotes “should be chosen over”) and C > D, then the logical property of transitiv-
ity should allow it to infer that B > D. Dusek & Eichenbaum (1997) have shown that fornix transection
and perirhinal/entorhinal cortex lesions, both of which partially disconnect the hippocampus, impair tran-
sitive inference in rats. Similarly, Eichenbaum and colleagues have demonstrated that the hippocampus
contributes to the memory for sequences of events in rats (Fortin et al., 2002; Ergorul & Eichenbaum,
2006).
Both the hypothesis that the hippocampus encodes spatial relationships (e.g. Eichenbaum et al., 1999),
and the hypothesis that it encodes visual scenes (Gaffan, 1992), predict that the hippocampus might be
involved in associating together the many visual and non-visual elements that make up a spatial environ-
ment, or context. Therefore, it might be expected that the hippocampus contributes to contextual condi-
tioning. In a prototypical task, if a rat receives tone–shock pairings in a distinct environment, it may sub-
sequently show “fearful” reactions to the tone (discrete CS conditioning) and also the environment (con-
textual conditioning). Lesions of the hippocampus have been shown to impair Pavlovian conditioning to a
contextual CS, but not to a discrete CS, in rats (Hirsh, 1974; Selden et al., 1991; Kim & Fanselow, 1992;
Phillips & LeDoux, 1992; Honey & Good, 1993; Jarrard, 1993; Kim et al., 1993; Phillips & LeDoux,
1994; Phillips & LeDoux, 1995; Chen et al., 1996; Maren & Fanselow, 1997; Anagnostaras et al., 1999;
Rudy et al., 2002), at least for some processes involving contextual representation (Good & Honey, 1991;
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Holland & Bouton, 1999; Good, 2002). Context-specific neuronal firing patterns develop in the hippo-
campus of rats required to discriminate different contexts (Smith & Mizumori, 2006). In some cases, dis-
crete CS conditioning has even been enhanced following hippocampal lesions (e.g. Ito et al., 2005),
which may reflect a reduction in contextual competition (see p. 8).
1.11 NEUROANATOMICALLY SPECIFIC STUDIES OF DELAYED OR
UNCERTAIN REINFORCEMENT
In recent years, a number of studies have examined the effects of focal excitotoxic or neurochemical le-
sions on choice and learning involving delayed or uncertain rewards, in additional to correlational studies
using functional imaging, microdialysis, and electrophysiology. These studies centre on interconnected
structures forming part of the limbic corticostriatal loop (Figure 7). Initial work focused on the Acb and
two of its cortical afferents, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC),
as structures potentially involved in regulating choice between alternative reinforcers, for three main rea-
sons.
First, these structures have been firmly implicated in reinforcement processes. The Acb, once sug-
gested to mediate the reinforcing efficacy of natural and artificial rewards (see Koob, 1992) (and also
Wise, 1981; 1982; 1985; 1994), is now thought not to be necessary for this, but instead to be a key site for
the motivational impact of impending rewards (reviewed by Robbins & Everitt, 1996; Salamone et al.,
1997; Everitt et al., 1999; Parkinson et al., 2000a; Cardinal et al., 2002a). Many of its afferents have also
been shown to be involved in reward-related learning, including the ACC (Bussey et al., 1997a; Bussey et
al., 1997b; Parkinson et al., 2000c; Cardinal et al., 2003a) and the mPFC (e.g. Balleine & Dickinson,
1998; Richardson & Gratton, 1998; Bechara et al., 1999; Tzschentke, 2000).
Second, these regions are important recipients of dopaminergic and serotonergic afferents (Fallon &
Loughlin, 1995; Halliday et al., 1995), and pharmacological manipulations of DA and 5-HT systems have
been shown to affect impulsive choice in rats, as described above.
Third, abnormalities of these regions have been detected in humans with ADHD, and in animal mod-
els of ADHD. Abnormal functioning of prefrontal cortical regions, including medial prefrontal and ante-
rior cingulate cortex, has been observed in ADHD patients (Ernst et al., 1998; Bush et al., 1999; Rubia et
al., 1999). In the SHR, differences in DA receptor density and gene expression have been observed within
the core and shell regions of the Acb (Papa et al., 1996; Carey et al., 1998; Papa et al., 1998; Sadile,
2000). Abnormalities of DA release have been detected in the Acb (de Villiers et al., 1995; Russell et al.,
1998; Russell, 2000) and PFC (Russell et al., 1995), in addition to possible dysfunction in the dorsal
striatum and amygdala (Russell et al., 1995; Papa et al., 2000).
These early studies, described below, indicated a role for the AcbC in choosing delayed rewards; sub-
sequent work has attempted to delineate the contribution of structures connected to it, and these will be
reviewed in turn.
1.11.1 Nucleus accumbens core (AcbC)
1.11.1.1 Choice involving delayed reinforcement
The Acb responds to anticipated rewards in a variety of species (Schultz et al., 1992; Miyazaki et al.,
1998; Martin & Ono, 2000; Schultz et al., 2000; Breiter et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2001; Cromwell &
Schultz, 2003; Bjork et al., 2004; Izawa et al., 2005). As discussed above, it is innervated by DA neurons
that respond to errors in reward prediction in a manner appropriate for a teaching signal (Schultz et al.,
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1997; Schultz, 1998; Schultz et al., 1998; Schultz & Dickinson, 2000; Schultz, 2006), interventional
studies have shown it to be a key site for the motivational impact of impending rewards (reviewed by
Robbins & Everitt, 1996; Salamone et al., 1997; Everitt et al., 1999; Parkinson et al., 2000a; Cardinal et
al., 2002a; Robbins et al., 2005), and Acb abnormalities have been observed in rat models of ADHD (de
Villiers et al., 1995; Papa et al., 1996; Carey et al., 1998; Papa et al., 1998; Russell et al., 1998; Russell,
2000; Sadile, 2000).
Causal experimental studies have shown that excitotoxic lesions of the AcbC produce impulsive
choice, reducing rats’ preference for large/delayed rewards, compared to small/immediate rewards
(Cardinal et al., 2001; 2003b). These studies used a task in which rats were offered regular choices be-
tween a one-pellet immediate reward and a four-pellet reward delayed from 0–60 s (Figure 15). No cues
were present during the delay, to avoid any potential confounds arising from conditioned reinforcement
effects (Cardinal et al., 2000), and subjects were trained preoperatively, assigned to matched groups, op-
erated upon, and retested postoperatively, to avoid any possible effects of the lesion on learning of the
task. AcbC-lesioned subjects (Figure 16) were rendered impulsive in their choices: they exhibited a pro-
found deficit in their ability to choose a delayed reward, and persisted in choosing impulsively even
though they were made to experience the larger, delayed alternative at regular intervals (Figure 17). This
effect was not due to an inflexible bias away from the lever producing the delayed reinforcer: AcbC-
lesioned rats still chose the large reinforcer more frequently at zero delay than at other delays, and re-
moval of the delays resulted in a rapid and significant increase in the rats’ preference for the large rein-
forcer. Thus, the pattern of choice reflected a reduced preference for the large reinforcer when it was de-
layed, suggesting that delays reduced the effectiveness or value of reinforcers much more in AcbC-
lesioned rats than in controls.
Although a few lesioned subjects avoided the large-reinforcer alternative postoperatively even when
the delay was zero, this was probably due to within-session generalization from trial blocks at which de-
lays were present (Evenden & Ryan, 1996; Cardinal et al., 2000), as prolonged training in the absence of
delays restored a near-absolute preference for the large reinforcer in the majority of subjects—who were
then much more impulsive than shams again when delays were re-introduced (Figure 18) (Cardinal et al.,
2003b). These results indicate that AcbC-lesioned rats were able to discriminate the two reinforcers, but
preferred immediate small rewards to larger delayed rewards.
Similar effects on preference are observed following lesions of the caudal lobus parolfactorius in the
chick, thought to be the avian counterpart of the Acb (Izawa et al., 2003).
Recently, AcbC lesions have also been found to impair performance on a task requiring rats to choose
between an uncertain immediate reward and a certain delayed reward (Pothuizen et al., 2005). One alter-
native required completion of a fixed-ratio-5 (FR-5) response for immediate delivery of a food pellet with
probability P = 0.25; the other required completion of an FR-5 response for delayed certain delivery of an
identical food pellet. AcbC lesions reduced rats’ preference for the delayed, certain alternative, following
sustained testing (Pothuizen et al., 2005). AcbC lesions also reduced efficiency (the number of responses
made per reward earned) in a differential-reinforcement-of-low-rates (DRL) schedule (Pothuizen et al.,
2005), in which animals must respond below a certain rate in order to obtain reward. This is much like the
effects of whole-Acb lesions (Reading & Dunnett, 1995), although the DRL task may also be susceptible
to changes in general levels of motor activity: AcbC-lesioned rats are hyperactive (Maldonado-Irizarry &
Kelley, 1995; Parkinson et al., 1999a; Cardinal et al., 2001), and hyperactivity would itself tend to reduce
DRL efficiency.
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Figure 15: Task schematic: choice be-
tween small, immediate and large, de-
layed rewards
Hungry rats regularly choose between two
levers. Responding on one lever leads to the
immediate delivery of a small food reward
(1 pellet); responding on the other leads to a
much larger food reward (4 pellets), but this
reward is delayed for between 0 and 60 sec-
onds. The figure shows the format of a sin-
gle trial; trials begin at regular intervals
(every 100 s), so choice of the small rein-
forcer is always suboptimal. Sessions con-
sist of 5 blocks. In each block, two single-
lever trials are given (one trial for each
lever), to ensure the animals sample the
options available at that time; these are fol-
lowed by ten choice trials. The delay to the
large reinforcer is varied systematically
across the session: delays for each block are
0, 10, 20, 40, and 60 s respectively. In the
so-called “signalled” or “cue” condition, a
stimulus light is illuminated during the de-
lay to the large reinforcer; this is absent in
the “unsignalled” or “no cue” condition,
used for lesion studies. From Cardinal et al.
(2000; 2001); based on a task by Evenden &
Ryan (1996).
Figure 16: Schematics of lesions of the
nucleus accumbens core (AcbC), anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC), and medial pre-
frontal cortex (mPFC)
Schematics of lesions of the AcbC (left),
ACC (middle), and mPFC (right). Black
shading indicates the extent of neuronal loss
common to all subjects; grey indicates the
area lesioned in at least one subject. Coronal
sections are +2.7 through +0.48 mm
(AcbC), +2.7 mm through –1.3 mm (ACC),
and +4.7 through +1.7 mm (mPFC) relative
to bregma. Outlines are taken from Paxinos
and Watson (1998). Figure from Cardinal et
al. (2001).
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Figure 17: Choice between immediate, small and large, delayed rewards in rats with lesions of the AcbC,
ACC, or mPFC
Effect of lesions of the AcbC (top), ACC (middle), or mPFC (bottom) on choice of delayed reward (● lesioned
group; ∆ corresponding sham group; error bars, SEM). The “no cue” condition (see Figure 15) was used throughout.
Panels a–c show the pattern of choice in the last 3 sessions preceding surgery; corresponding sham/lesion groups
were matched for performance. Subjects’ preference for the large reinforcer declined with delay, as is typical for
trained subjects performing this task (Evenden & Ryan, 1996; Cardinal et al., 2000). Panels d–f illustrate choice in
the first 7 postoperative sessions. The AcbC-lesioned group was markedly impaired (** p < .01), choosing the de-
layed reinforcer significantly less often than shams at every delay, including zero. However, both groups still exhib-
ited a within-session shift in preference. ACC lesions had no effect on choice. The mPFC-lesioned subjects exhib-
ited a “flatter” within-session preference shift than shams (# p < .05, group × delay interaction). Panels g–i illustrate
the effects of omitting all delays in alternating sessions (●/○, lesioned/sham groups with delays; ▲/∆, le-
sioned/sham groups without delays; error bars, SED for the three-way interaction). All groups remained sensitive to
the contingencies. Delay removal increased both the sham- and AcbC-lesioned groups’ preference for the larger
reward; ACC- and mPFC-lesioned rats were also as sensitive to removal of the delays as shams. From Cardinal et
al. (2001).
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Figure 18: Further testing of AcbC-lesioned rats in the delayed reinforcement choice task
Panel a illustrates the preference of AcbC-lesioned rats following extended training in the absence of any delays (a
further six sessions after completion of other behavioural tests; ● AcbC-lesioned group; ∆ shams; error bars, SEM).
Panels b–d show performance over consecutive blocks of sessions upon the reintroduction of delays (* p < .05, ** p
< .01, difference from shams). Panels e–h show data from the same sessions as A–D, but only include data from
those rats selected for ≥90% preference for the large reinforcer in every trial block on the last day of training with no
delays. The sham and lesioned groups were therefore matched in E. Panels F–H show that despite this matching,
preference for the large reinforcer in the AcbC group collapsed upon reintroduction of the delays. As these data ex-
hibit significant heterogeneity of variance, the highly conservative correction of Box (1954) was applied (see How-
ell, 1997, pp. 322/457/464); * p < .05 for the corrected between-group difference. The subjects were the same as
those reported in Cardinal et al. (2001); data from Cardinal et al. (2003b).
1.11.1.2 Processing of reward magnitude
Is the impulsive choice seen in AcbC-lesioned rats (Cardinal et al., 2001) due to an effect on subjects’
processing of reward delay, or of reward magnitude? As this task involves choice between reinforcers that
differed in both magnitude and delay, impulsive choice might arise as a result of altered sensitivity to re-
inforcer magnitude, or delay, or both (Ho et al., 1999) (Figure 19). Lesioned rats might have chosen the
immediate small reward because they did not perceive the large reward to be as large (relative to the
small reward) as sham-operated controls did, in which case the abnormally low magnitude of the large
reward would be insufficient to offset the normal effects of the delay. Alternatively, they might have per-
ceived the reward magnitudes normally, but been hypersensitive to the delay.
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Figure 19: Delay and magnitude discounting applied to choice
Differences in delay discounting and differences in magnitude discounting can both affect choice between a
smaller/sooner (SS) and a larger/later (LL) reward. In these theoretical curves, choice is calculated according to the
multiplicative hyperbolic model of Ho et al. (1999). Subjects calculate value according to the formula
max1
1 1
V
V
K d Q q
= ×+ ⋅ +  where V is overall value, d is delay, q is quantity, Vmax is the maximum possible value that a
reward can have, K is a temporal (delay) discounting parameter and Q is a quantity (magnitude) discounting pa-
rameter. Subjects then allocate preference (e.g. relative number of choices or relative response rate) in proportion to
the values of the two alternatives, i.e. A A
A B A B
pref V
pref pref V V
=+ + . (a) These curves show the effect of altering K
while holding Q constant. “Impulsive” subjects—those who are more likely to choose the SS reward over the LL
reward—have a higher value of K than “self-controlled” subjects; their Q parameters do not differ. (b) These curves
show the effect of altering Q while holding K constant. “Impulsive” subjects have a lower value of Q than “self-
controlled” subjects; their K values do not differ.
Models such as the multiplicative hyperbolic discounting model of Ho et al. (1999) have been derived
based on behavioural techniques allowing magnitude and delay discounting parameters to be determined
independently. Unfortunately, the behavioural technique used by Cardinal et al. (2001) cannot be ana-
lysed using this model. For example, sham subjects’ preferences approached 100% choice of the large
reinforcer at zero delays (Figure 18a), whereas in the model of Ho et al. (1999), relative preference be-
tween a one-pellet and a four-pellet reinforcer cannot exceed 80%. The behavioural result comes as no
surprise, for it is the well-known phenomenon of maximization on discrete-trial schedules (see Mackin-
tosh, 1974, pp. 190–195), but it implies that behaviour in this task cannot be quantified according to the
hyperbolic discounting model.
However, hypersensitivity to the effects of delay appears somewhat more likely than alterations in re-
ward magnitude processing as an explanation for the effects of AcbC lesions. As discussed above, AcbC
lesions also reduced preference for the large reinforcer somewhat at zero delay (Cardinal et al., 2001), but
this was probably due to a task artefact, namely within-session generalization from trials in which delays
were present (Cardinal et al., 2000). When delays were consistently absent, AcbC-lesioned rats preferred
the larger reward to the smaller (Cardinal et al., 2001; 2003b). Further evidence supports the assertion
that AcbC-lesioned rats can discriminate large from small rewards. Excitotoxic lesions of the whole Acb
do not prevent rats from detecting changes in reward value, induced either by altering the concentration of
a sucrose reward or by changing the deprivational state of the subject (Balleine & Killcross, 1994). Such
lesions also do not impair rats’ ability to respond faster when environmental cues predict the availability
of larger rewards (Brown & Bowman, 1995), and nor does inactivation of the Acb with local anaesthetic
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or blockade of α-amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazolpropionate (AMPA) glutamate receptors in the
Acb (Giertler et al., 2004); the effects of intra-Acb NMDA receptor antagonists have varied (Hauber et
al., 2000; Giertler et al., 2003). AcbC-lesioned rats can still discriminate large from small rewards
(Cardinal et al., 2003b; 2004). Similarly, DA depletion of the Acb does not affect the ability to discrimi-
nate large from small reinforcers (Salamone et al., 1994; Cousins et al., 1996; Salamone et al., 2001).
However, these studies do not address the question of whether AcbC lesions alter the quantitative as-
sessment of reward magnitude—e.g. whether such lesions alter Q in the model of Ho et al. (1999). Sys-
temic DA antagonists do not affect the perceived quantity of food as assessed in a psychophysical proce-
dure (Martin-Iverson et al., 1987), but this is uninformative as to the role of the AcbC specifically.
The observation that AcbC lesions reduce preference for delayed, certain rewards (Pothuizen et al.,
2005) as well as delayed, large rewards (Cardinal et al., 2001), is also consistent with the hypothesis that
AcbC-lesioned animals have an impaired tolerance for delays, and that the effects are not due simply to
effects on reward magnitude processing—though at present, the role of the AcbC in choosing uncertain
reinforcement is also unclear (discussed further below). Acb lesions have also produced delay-dependent
impairments in a delayed-matching-to-position task (Reading & Dunnett, 1991).
1.11.1.3 The matching law and reinforcer magnitude assessment
Semi-quantitative assessment of delay and magnitude discounting may be possible in delay-of-
reinforcement choice tasks using indifference-point methodology (Ho et al., 1999). Alternatively, relative
preference for two reinforcers may be inferred from the distribution of responses on concurrent variable
interval (VI) schedules of reinforcement. This literature stems from the discovery by Herrnstein (1961;
1970) of the “matching law”. Herrnstein (1961) trained pigeons to respond on two concurrent VI sched-
ules, and varied the relative availability of reinforcement on the two schedules while holding the overall
reinforcement rate constant. He observed that the proportion of the total behaviour allocated to each re-
sponse key approximately matched the proportion of reinforcers allocated to that key. This defines the
matching law:
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where R represents the behavioural response rate for each alternative, and r the reinforcement. Herrnstein
(1970) extended this relationship to take account of more than two alternatives, particularly including
“unmeasured” activities the animal may engage in, and derived a “general principle of response output”
(Herrnstein, 1970, p. 256):
1
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where R1 is the rate of the response being measured, r1 is the quantity of reinforcement for that response,
re is the reinforcement for all other responses, and k is a parameter determining the maximum response
rate. Although there are situations where the matching law is not useful—in particular, ratio schedules,
where the distribution of reinforcement necessarily follows the distribution of responding—a large body
of work has sought to define the effects of varying parameters of reinforcement (such as rate, probability,
delay, and magnitude) based on this principle (see de Villiers & Herrnstein, 1976).
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This technique has not been without problems; in many circumstances, subjects have been found to
“overmatch” (exhibit preferences that are exaggerated relative to the predictions of the matching law) or
“undermatch” (exhibit reduced relative preferences). This has led to further development of the mathe-
matical models (Baum, 1974; Baum, 1979), though it has been argued in some cases that this approach is
circular (Rachlin, 1971). Maximum response rates (k in the equation above) have been shown to vary
with the kind of reinforcement used (Belke, 1998), violating an assumption of Herrnstein’s law. Never-
theless, the matching law and its extensions do a good job of describing the relationship between rein-
forcement rate and behaviour on concurrent VI and concurrent-chain schedules (Williams, 1994).
This allows for the possibility of assessing the effects of AcbC lesions upon reinforcer magnitude per-
ception semi-quantitatively (Cardinal, 2001). Used with identical schedules delivering large and small
rewards, the matching technique could be used to assess whether or not AcbC-lesioned rats exhibited
relative indifference (“undermatching” compared to shams) between the reinforcers used by Cardinal et
al. (2001). This would provide evidence for reduced reinforcer magnitude discrimination following AcbC
lesions, or for an abnormality of the matching process itself, while normal performance (or overmatching)
would make this explanation less likely and therefore support the view that AcbC lesions produce a
steeper delay-of-reinforcement gradient. As yet, published data do not allow this question to be answered.
1.11.1.4 Learning with delayed reinforcement
If AcbC lesions do indeed induce hypersensitivity to delays of reinforcement, then the effects of AcbC
lesions might also extend to learning with delayed reinforcement, as well as choice involving delayed
reinforcers. In order to learn which actions are the correct ones that eventually lead to reinforcement,
some mechanism must “bridge” the delay between action and outcome. Action–outcome delays impair
instrumental learning in normal animals to some degree (Grice, 1948; Lattal & Gleeson, 1990; Dickinson
et al., 1992). If the AcbC is critical for learning with delayed reinforcement, then AcbC lesions should
induce a delay-dependent impairment in free-operant learning with action–outcome delays. This predic-
tion has not yet been tested.
1.11.1.5 Choice involving uncertain reward
Correlational studies have also suggested that the Acb may also be involved in the processing of uncertain
or probabilistic reinforcement. DA neurons that innervate the Acb may fire in a manner related to reward
probability (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Fiorillo et al., 2005; Niv et al., 2005; Tobler et al., 2005) and the mid-
brain, the site of the cell bodies of these neurons, responds to stimulus uncertainty in humans (Aron et al.,
2004). A greater blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) response is observed in the human Acb during
the selection of high-reward/high-risk options, compared to low-reward/low-risk outcomes, in a task
where the risk is of not winning (Ernst et al., 2004), with similar activation to high-reward/high-risk op-
tion selection in a task where the risk is of losing (Matthews et al., 2004); this latter activation was corre-
lated with personality measures of harm avoidance. Likewise, an increase in Acb activation (BOLD sig-
nal) preceded risk-taking decisions in a financial game with human subjects (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005).
However, to date no studies have examined the contribution of the AcbC to choice involving reward un-
certainty. In a recent interventional study, AcbC lesions reduced preference for delayed, certain rewards
(Pothuizen et al., 2005), but this does not specifically address the contribution of the AcbC to choosing
rewards based on their certainty, particularly as there is evidence suggesting that AcbC lesions impair the
processing of delayed reinforcement (Cardinal et al., 2001; Pothuizen et al., 2005).
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1.11.1.6 Relationship to neuromodulator function
The Acb is innervated by the a number of neuromodulator systems, including 5-HT (see Halliday et al.,
1995) and DA (Ungerstedt, 1971; Fallon & Loughlin, 1995). The DA projection to the Acb is prominent,
but although systemic D2-type DA receptor antagonists can induce impulsive choice involving delayed
reinforcement (Wade et al., 2000), this effect may not depend critically on DA in the Acb. Intra-Acb D1
and D2 receptor antagonists do not affect rats’ ability to wait for reward in a cued progressive delay task
(Wakabayashi et al., 2004), and DA depletion of the Acb using 6-OHDA appears not to affect delay dis-
counting directly, though it modifies the effect of systemic 5-HT1A receptor agonists on choice between
SS and LL rewards (Winstanley et al., 2005b). The Acb does not receive a substantial NA innervation
(Aston-Jones et al., 1995).
1.11.2 Nucleus accumbens shell (AcbSh)
In contrast to the effects of AcbC lesions on choice between delayed, certain and immediate, uncertain
rewards, AcbSh lesions have been shown to have effects neither on this task nor on DRL efficiency
(Pothuizen et al., 2005). The AcbSh responds to a variety of USs (Bassareo & Di Chiara, 1999; Ito et al.,
2000) and has a role in the hedonic assessment of rewards (Berridge, 2000; Kelley & Berridge, 2002). It
plays a role in latent inhibition (Pothuizen et al., 2005; 2006), and influences unlearned behaviours in-
cluding feeding (Kelley & Swanson, 1997; Stratford & Kelley, 1997; Basso & Kelley, 1999; Kelley,
1999) and locomotion (Swanson et al., 1997; Parkinson et al., 1999a). The AcbSh has also been shown to
be abnormal in animal models of ADHD (Papa et al., 1996; Carey et al., 1998; Papa et al., 1998; Sadile,
2000). However, these results suggest it does not contribute to choice involving delayed or uncertain re-
wards (Pothuizen et al., 2005).
1.11.3 Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)
Excitotoxic lesions of the ACC (Figure 16) have no effect on choice between SS and LL rewards in rats
(Cardinal et al., 2001) (Figure 17), indicating that the ACC is not required for normal choice of delayed
reinforcement. These results suggest that ACC dysfunction is not an important contributor to impulsive
choice, despite the involvement of the ACC in reward-related learning (Bussey et al., 1997a; Bussey et
al., 1997b; Parkinson et al., 2000c; Cardinal et al., 2003a) and findings of ACC abnormalities in ADHD
(Bush et al., 1999; Rubia et al., 1999). However, ACC lesions do impair choice between
small/sooner/low-effort and large/later/high-effort alternatives, reducing preference for the high-effort
option (Walton et al., 2002; 2003), indicating that the ACC is involved in promoting the selection of ef-
fortful alternatives. The DA innervation of the ACC does not appear important for this function (Walton
et al., 2005).
However, ACC lesions can make rats motorically impulsive, with simple disinhibition or “execution”
impulsivity. ACC-lesioned rats have been found to over-respond to unrewarded stimuli (Bussey et al.,
1997a; Parkinson et al., 2000c) and to respond prematurely in situations where they are required to wait
(Muir et al., 1996). They also exhibit discriminative deficits in Pavlovian conditioning tasks (Cardinal et
al., 2003a), though the full range of functions associated with the ACC (including error detection, atten-
tional control, and mood; see e.g. Devinsky et al., 1995; Volkow et al., 1997; Maas et al., 1998; Childress
et al., 1999; Bush et al., 2000; Garavan et al., 2000; Paus, 2001; Cardinal et al., 2002a; Vogt, 2005) is
beyond the scope of this thesis.
The contribution of the ACC to probabilistic choice is less clear. In both humans and rhesus monkeys,
the ACC responds to anticipated gain in tasks in which rewards of different magnitudes are available with
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varying probabilities. In the rhesus monkey, the ACC responds to some combination of reward size and
reward probability (Amiez et al., 2005a) and deactivation of the ACC impairs such choices (Amiez et al.,
2005b), but human studies would suggest that the ACC responds to the magnitude rather than the prob-
ability of expected gains (Rogers et al., 2004b). However, a nearby region of human medial PFC has been
observed to respond to reward probability (Knutson et al., 2005).
1.11.4 Prelimbic (PrL) and infralimbic (IL) cortex
The mPFC projects to the AcbC, is involved in reward-related learning (e.g. Balleine & Dickinson, 1998;
Richardson & Gratton, 1998; Bechara et al., 1999; Tzschentke, 2000), receives DA and 5-HT input (see
Fallon & Loughlin, 1995; Halliday et al., 1995), and has been observed to be abnormal in ADHD (Ernst
et al., 1998; Rubia et al., 1999). However, lesions of the rat mPFC, primarily PrL and infralimbic (IL)
cortex (Figure 16), had no delay-specific effects on choice between large/delayed and small/immediate
rewards (Cardinal et al., 2001) (Figure 17); the effects observed appeared to be task-specific, related to an
insensitivity to the contingencies or stimuli present in the task, perhaps as a result of a loss of temporal
discriminative stimulus control (Cardinal et al., 2003b). It is important to note that PrL may have more
functional homology to the primate dorsolateral PFC than to regions that are medial within human PFC
(Uylings et al., 2003). Aspirative lesions of the mPFC have previously been shown to induce a deficit in
timing ability in rats (Dietrich & Allen, 1998), with impaired temporal discrimination in the peak proce-
dure, an operant task that assesses the ability to time a stimulus (Catania, 1970; Roberts, 1981). Consis-
tent with the view that mPFC lesions did not affect the basic process of choosing between reinforcers of
different value, combined PrL/IL lesions did not affect choice between small/low-effort and large/high-
effort alternatives in the task of Walton et al. (2003).
1.11.5 Orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)
The OFC is a region of the PFC that projects to the AcbC and is strongly implicated in the assessment of
reward value. Mobini et al. (2002) recently found that lesions encompassing the OFC induced impulsive
choice in a discrete-trial SS/LL reward choice task very similar to that described above (Figure 20). As
before, results from this simple form of task do not indicate whether the impulsive choice was as a result
of altered sensitivity to reinforcer magnitude or delay. Although these lesions damaged prelimbic cortex
(PrL) in addition to the OFC (Mobini et al., 2002), the hypothesis that OFC damage was responsible for
the behavioural effect is strengthened by the finding that mPFC lesions encompassing PrL do not induce
impulsive choice (Cardinal et al., 2001). In contrast, Winstanley et al. (2004b) recently found that OFC
lesions induced the opposite effect—better self-control than shams (Figure 21)—in exactly the task de-
scribed above (Figure 15, p. 38). One possible reason for this discrepancy is that subjects in Winstanley et
al.’s study were trained before the OFC was destroyed and retested postoperatively, while Mobini et al.
trained and tested postoperatively. Another is that Mobini et al. (2002) offered rats a choice between a
one-pellet immediate reinforcer and a two-pellet delayed reinforcer, whereas Winstanley et al. (2004b)
used a one-pellet immediate reinforcer and a four-pellet delayed reinforcer. As discussed above, differ-
ences in subjects’ sensitivity to either the delay or the magnitude of reinforcement can play a role in de-
termining preference in this task (Ho et al., 1999; Mobini et al., 2002; Cardinal et al., 2003b) and it may
be that OFC lesions affect both, increasing both the delay discounting parameter K and the magnitude
discounting parameter Q (Mobini et al., 2002). An increase in K would imply steeper delay discounting;
an increase in Q would imply an increase in sensitivity to the ratio of the magnitudes of the two rein-
forcers, and could mask (or potentially reverse) the increase in impulsivity produced by the increase in K.
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There is direct support for this hypothesis: OFC lesions appear to increase K, the rate of delay discount-
ing, as well as increasing the magnitude sensitivity parameter Q (Kheramin et al., 2002; Kheramin et al.,
2003). The same effect of increases in both K and Q has been observed with DA-depleting OFC lesions
(Kheramin et al., 2004). This emphasizes the necessity for quantitative analysis of delay and magnitude
sensitivity (Ho et al., 1999) or the use of multiple, very different paradigms to provide independent meas-
urements of sensitivity to delay and magnitude (Cardinal et al., 2003b). It also reminds us of an important
clinical point: faced with steep delay discounting in a task involving choice between SS and LL rewards,
increasing the ratio of the large to the small reward may ameliorate the impulsivity.
As discussed above, it has been suggested that hyperbolic discounting is explicable as the overall ef-
fect of two or more different systems, such as an explicit (declarative) system that exhibits minimal or
exponential discounting, plus phenomena that make rewards more salient and promote their choice when
they are immediately available. Recently, such a two-factor model was used in the analysis of a functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study of choice involving rewards differing in magnitude and delays,
with delays ranging from less than a day to 6 weeks (McClure et al., 2004): lateral prefrontal and intrapa-
rietal cortical regions were activated independently of the delay, and were suggested to be part of a sys-
tem that evaluates both immediate and delayed rewards according to a “rational” (meaning non-
hyperbolic) temporal discounting system, while limbic regions including the ventral striatum and medial
OFC were preferentially activated by the relatively immediate rewards, and were suggested to be part of a
Figure 20: Choice between immediate, small and large, delayed rewards in rats with lesions of the orbitofron-
tal cortex (OFC)
In this study, rats received excitotoxic lesions of the OFC or sham lesions before being trained on a delayed rein-
forcement choice task similar to that described earlier, but involving choice between a one-pellet small reward and a
two-pellet large reward. Delays to the large reinforcer varied across, rather than within, sessions. (Left) OFC-
lesioned rats were more impulsive than shams, choosing the larger/later reward less often. (Right) Lesion schemat-
ics and representative photomicrographs. From Mobini et al. (2002).
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system that promotes the choice of imminent rewards without consideration of delayed alternatives.
These limbic regions were more likely to be activated than the “delay-independent” areas on trials in
which an earlier reward was chosen. This would sit neatly with studies showing that OFC lesions reduce
impulsive choice (Winstanley et al., 2004b); however, it does not square so easily with rodent evidence
showing that destruction of the AcbC (a major part of the ventral striatum) or the OFC enhances delay
discounting, meaning that delayed alternatives are less likely to be chosen (Cardinal et al., 2001;
Kheramin et al., 2002; Mobini et al., 2002; Kheramin et al., 2003).
The PFC, which projects heavily to the AcbC (Brog et al., 1993), is also involved in decision making
under conditions of uncertainty. Humans with OFC or ventromedial PFC damage are impaired in the
Iowa gambling task (Bechara et al., 1994; 1996; 1997), in which subjects must learn to differentiate be-
tween low-reward, low-risk card decks that yield a net positive outcome and high-reward, high-risk decks
that yield a net negative outcome, though the precise locus and nature of the deficit seen in this task is
debated (Manes et al., 2002; Clark et al., 2003; Fellows & Farah, 2005). OFC neurons respond to reward
expectancy (see Hikosaka & Watanabe, 2000). Choice between small, likely rewards and large, unlikely
rewards increases blood flow and BOLD signal in orbital and inferior PFC (Rogers et al., 1999b; Ernst et
al., 2004; Rogers et al., 2004b), and OFC damage also impairs performance of a task requiring human
subjects to choose between two possible outcomes and to bet on their choice, with lesioned subjects de-
ciding slowly and failing to choose the optimal, most likely outcome (Rogers et al., 1999a). Excitotoxic
lesions of the OFC make rats less likely than sham-operated controls to choose a large, uncertain reward
over a small, certain reward (Mobini et al., 2002); OFC-lesioned rats had lower indifference odds (higher
indifference probabilities; steeper uncertainty discounting) and exhibited risk-averse choice. As discussed
above, there is direct evidence that excitotoxic OFC lesions and OFC DA depletion do alter sensitivity to
the relative magnitudes of the two rewards (Kheramin et al., 2004; Kheramin et al., 2005), but the effect
Figure 21: Choice between immediate, small and large, delayed rewards in rats with lesions of the basolateral
amygdala (BLA) or OFC
Rats were trained on the delayed reinforcement choice task (involving choice between a one-pellet immediate rein-
forcer and a four-pellet large reinforcer, and within-session changes in the delay to the large reinforcer; Figure 15)
before matched groups of subjects (a) received excitotoxic lesions of the BLA, or the OFC, or sham lesions; (b)
shows their postoperative performance, in which BLA-lesioned subjects were more impulsive (more likely to
choose a single immediate pellet over a four-pellet delayed reward) and OFC-lesioned subjects were less impulsive
than sham-operated controls (* p < .05, difference from shams). (c) When all delays were removed from the task,
BLA- and OFC-lesioned subjects chose identically to shams, preferring the four-pellet reward to the one-pellet re-
ward. Redrawn from Winstanley et al. (2004b).
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of steepening uncertainty discounting (of increasing the odds discounting parameter H) is present in addi-
tion to the effects on reinforcer magnitude sensitivity (Kheramin et al., 2003).
A recent fMRI study also examined human regional cerebral BOLD responses to decision making in a
task that explicitly distinguished “ambiguity” from “risk” (Hsu et al., 2005). “Ambiguity” referred to the
situation in which the probability of a successful outcome was unknown—such as having to bet on
whether the next card drawn from a twenty-card deck containing red or blue cards would be red or blue,
with no further information. “Risk” referred to the situation in which the probability of a successful out-
come was known, but not zero or one—such as having to bet on the colour of the next card drawn from a
deck containing ten red and ten blue cards. This task produces behaviour that is economically self-
contradictory. Subjects prefer to bet on red from the risky deck than on red from the ambiguous deck, but
also prefer to bet on blue from the risky deck than on blue from the ambiguous deck (Becker & Brown-
son, 1964; MacCrimmon, 1968). These preferences are mutually inconsistent under simple probability
theory—termed the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961)—and imply an inherent aversion to ambiguity. In
these tasks, the OFC, amygdala, and dorsomedial PFC were more active under conditions of ambiguity
than risk, while dorsal striatal activity showed the opposite pattern (risk > ambiguity). While normal hu-
mans exhibited aversion to ambiguity, and also aversion to risk (in other tasks in which the card propor-
tion was varied), humans with OFC lesions were averse neither to risk nor ambiguity—behaviourally ab-
normal, but consistent with expected utility theory (Hsu et al., 2005).
1.11.6 Insula
A further cortical region that may be involved in decisions involving uncertainty is the insula, or insular
cortex. Anterior insula activation has been observed to precede risk-averse choice in humans (Kuhnen &
Knutson, 2005), in a task in which Acb activation preceded risk-prone choice. The authors suggest that in
tasks such as these, the Acb represents predictions of gain (Knutson et al., 2001), while the insula repre-
sents predictions of loss (see also Paulus et al., 2003); activation in both structures is related to personal-
ity measures of harm avoidance (Paulus et al., 2003; Matthews et al., 2004).
1.11.7 Basolateral amygdala (BLA)
The basolateral amygdala (BLA) also projects to the AcbC, and has extensive reciprocal connections with
the OFC. Excitotoxic lesions of the BLA promote impulsive choice in a task involving choice between an
immediate one-pellet reward and a delayed four-pellet reward (Winstanley et al., 2004b) (Figure 21),
similar to the effects of AcbC lesions (Cardinal et al., 2001) but opposite to those of OFC lesions in the
same task (Winstanley et al., 2004b) (Figure 21). Although this study is notable for finding opposite
effects of BLA and OFC lesions, which is unusual (see also Izquierdo & Murray, 2005), the explanation
for this effect is unclear. One obvious possibility, given the effects of OFC lesions to increase both the
delay discounting parameter K and the magnitude sensitivity parameter Q (in the model of Ho et al.,
1999), is that BLA lesions and AcbC lesions simply increase K without affecting Q (cf. Figure 19, p. 41).
There is indirect evidence for this in the case of AcbC lesions, discussed above; for the BLA, this
hypothesis remains untested. Some studies have demonstrated deficits following amygdala inactivation
when reward size is suddenly changed (Salinas et al., 1993; Coleman-Mesches et al., 1996; Salinas &
McGaugh, 1996; Salinas et al., 1997; Liao & Chuang, 2003), though changing the size of a reward for
performing the same task has obvious emotional significance and the amygdala is well known to be
involved in affective representation (see Aggleton, 2000; Cardinal et al., 2002a). One study has found
deficits in memory for reinforcer magnitude following amygdala lesions, even if this was not a primary
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deficit in reinforcer magnitude discrimination (Kesner & Williams, 1995). None of these bear directly on
the question of whether relative reinforcer magnitude discrimination (as measured by Q) is altered by
BLA lesions.
A recent study has also suggested the involvement of the BLA in promoting the selection of effortful
alternatives. Floresco & Ghods-Sharifi (2006) showed that BLA inactivation with the local anaesthetic
bupivacaine impaired rats’ ability to choose a large/high-effort alternative over a small/low-effort
alternative. This is much like the effect of ACC lesions discussed above (Walton et al., 2002; 2003), and
indeed, a reversible BLA–ACC disconnection lesion also impaired selection of large/high-effort alterna-
tives (Floresco & Ghods-Sharifi, 2006), suggesting that direct information transfer between the BLA and
the ACC is important in this task.
1.11.8 Subthalamic nucleus (STN)
The subthalamic nucleus (STN) is a component of the basal ganglia that receives projections both from
the globus pallidus (pallidum) and the cerebral cortex (Alexander & Crutcher, 1990; Hamani et al., 2004)
and projects to basal ganglia relay structures (including the globus pallidus, the rodent homologue of the
external part of the primate globus pallidus) and output structures of the basal ganglia, including the ento-
peduncular nucleus and the substantia nigra pars reticulata (Heimer et al., 1995; Hamani et al., 2004),
which project on to thalamus and thence to cortex. Lesions of the STN decreased impulsive choice in a
task involving choice of a single immediate food pellet or four pellets delivered after a delay (Winstanley
et al., 2005a), a task in which OFC lesions had the same effect (Winstanley et al., 2004b). STN lesions
also impaired autoshaping (Winstanley et al., 2005a), meaning locomotor approach to appetitive Pavlov-
ian CSs (Brown & Jenkins, 1968; Williams & Williams, 1969). However, this is unlikely to explain the
effect of STN lesions to promote choice of LL rewards—not least because AcbC lesions also impair auto-
shaping (Parkinson et al., 2000c; Cardinal et al., 2002b) but reduce choice of LL rewards (Cardinal et al.,
2001), while ACC lesions impair autoshaping (Bussey et al., 1997a; Parkinson et al., 2000c; Cardinal et
al., 2003a) but do not affect choice between SS/LL rewards (Cardinal et al., 2001), but more simply be-
cause there was no explicit CS in this task differentially associated with the two rewards, and approach to
which would promote choice of the SS reward. Furthermore, STN lesions tend to increase premature re-
sponding, often thought of as an index of motor impulsivity (Baunez & Robbins, 1997; Baunez et al.,
2001). It is not known whether STN lesions affect reward magnitude discrimination or uncertainty dis-
counting.
1.11.9 Hippocampus (H)
Finally, a role of the hippocampus in learning with delayed reinforcement might be suspected. As dis-
cussed earlier, contextual conditioning is important in learning with delays, and there is good evidence
that the hippocampus contributes to the representation of context. Context-specific representations de-
velop in the hippocampus (Smith & Mizumori, 2006), and lesions of the hippocampal formation (H) have
been shown to impair Pavlovian conditioning to a contextual CS, but not to a discrete CS, in rats (Hirsh,
1974; Selden et al., 1991; Kim & Fanselow, 1992; Phillips & LeDoux, 1992; Honey & Good, 1993; Jar-
rard, 1993; Kim et al., 1993; Phillips & LeDoux, 1994; Phillips & LeDoux, 1995; Chen et al., 1996;
Maren & Fanselow, 1997; Anagnostaras et al., 1999; Rudy et al., 2002), at least for some processes in-
volving contextual representation (Good & Honey, 1991; Holland & Bouton, 1999; Good, 2002). In some
cases, discrete CS conditioning has even been enhanced (e.g. Ito et al., 2005). Since context–outcome
associations are thought to hinder instrumental learning with delayed reinforcement through contextual
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competition (Dickinson et al., 1992; Dickinson & Balleine, 1994), it follows that if H lesions impair the
formation of associations involving the context, such lesions might reduce contextual competition and
hence facilitate instrumental conditioning when there is an action–outcome delay.
Despite this clear prediction, the contribution of the hippocampus to learning with delayed reinforce-
ment, or to self-controlled choice, has not previously been investigated in detail. One previous study
found that aspirative lesions of the dorsal hippocampus did not affect appetitive instrumental conditioning
with delayed reinforcement (Port et al., 1993), but this study was poorly designed to address this question
in a number of ways; amongst its flaws, the study used aspirative rather than excitotoxic lesions, used a
task in which alterations in response rates affected the instrumental contingency, and tested subject at a
single delay with no zero-delay control condition.
The only study to date to address the influence of the hippocampus on choice involving delayed or un-
certain reward was that of Rawlins et al. (1985), who examined choice between certain and uncertain re-
wards. Normal rats preferred immediate certain reward to immediate uncertain reward, and also preferred
delayed certain reward to immediate uncertain reward; however, rats with hippocampal or medial septal
lesions were less tolerant of the delay (or more tolerant of the uncertainty), preferring immediate uncer-
tain reward to delayed certain reward. However, this study does not answer the question of whether hip-
pocampal lesions affect the processing of reward delay or reward uncertainty specifically.
1.12 OUTLINE OF EXPERIMENTAL WORK IN THIS THESIS
This thesis has three principal objectives: first, to establish whether the role of the AcbC in choosing
large, delayed rewards reflects an underlying deficit in the processing of reward delay or of reward mag-
nitude; second, to investigate the role of the AcbC in decisions involving uncertain reward; and third, to
establish the role of the hippocampus in the processing of delayed reward. Chapter 2 will examine the
role of the AcbC in free-operant learning with delayed reward, performance of a previously learned free-
operant response for delayed reward, and the quantitative allocation of behaviour to match obtained re-
ward magnitudes. Chapter 3 will examine the role of the hippocampus in learning with delayed reward,
performance of a previously learned free-operant response for delayed reward, and choice between SS
and LL reward alternatives. Chapter 4 will return to the AcbC, examining its role in choice between
small/certain and large/unlikely rewards.
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Chapter 2: Nucleus accumbens core
lesions retard instrumental learning and
performance with delayed reinforcement
in the rat, but do not impair reinforcer
magnitude discrimination
2.1 ABSTRACT
Background: Delays between actions and their outcomes severely hinder reinforcement learning systems, but little
is known of the neural mechanism by which animals overcome this problem and bridge such delays. The nucleus
accumbens core (AcbC), part of the ventral striatum, is required for normal preference for a large, delayed reward
over a small, immediate reward (self-controlled choice) in rats, but the reason for this is unclear. These experiments
investigated the role of the AcbC in learning a free-operant instrumental response using delayed reinforcement, per-
formance of a previously learned response for delayed reinforcement, and assessment of the relative magnitudes of
two different rewards.
Results: Groups of rats with excitotoxic or sham lesions of the AcbC acquired an instrumental response with differ-
ent delays (0, 10, or 20 s) between the lever-press response and reinforcer delivery. A second (inactive) lever was
also present, but responding on it was never reinforced. As expected, the delays retarded learning in normal rats.
AcbC lesions did not hinder learning in the absence of delays, but AcbC-lesioned rats were impaired in learning
when there was a delay, relative to sham-operated controls. All groups eventually acquired the response and dis-
criminated the active lever from the inactive lever to some degree. Rats were subsequently trained to discriminate
reinforcers of different magnitudes. AcbC-lesioned rats were more sensitive to differences in reinforcer magnitude
than sham-operated controls, suggesting that the deficit in self-controlled choice previously observed in such rats
was a consequence of reduced preference for delayed rewards relative to immediate rewards, not of reduced prefer-
ence for large rewards relative to small rewards. AcbC lesions also impaired the performance of a previously learned
instrumental response in a delay-dependent fashion.
Conclusions: These results demonstrate that the AcbC contributes to instrumental learning and performance by
bridging delays between subjects’ actions and the ensuing outcomes that reinforce behaviour.
2.2 BACKGROUND
Animals learn to control their environment through instrumental (operant) conditioning. When an animal
acts to obtain reward or reinforcement, there is often a delay between its action and the outcome; thus,
animals must learn instrumental action–outcome contingencies using delayed reinforcement. Although
such delays impair learning, animals can nevertheless bridge substantial delays to acquire instrumental
responses (Dickinson et al., 1992). Little is known of the neural basis of this process. However, abnor-
malities in learning from delayed reinforcement may be of considerable clinical significance (Rahman et
al., 2001). Impulsivity is part of the syndrome of many psychiatric disorders, including mania, drug ad-
diction, antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, and ADHD (APA, 2000). Impul-
sive choice, one aspect of impulsivity (Evenden, 1999b), is exemplified by the tendency to choose small
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rewards that are available immediately instead of larger rewards that are only available after a delay
(Ainslie, 1975; 2001), and may reflect dysfunction of reinforcement learning systems mediating the ef-
fects of delayed rewards (Ainslie, 1975; Sagvolden & Sergeant, 1998).
The nucleus accumbens (Acb) responds to anticipated rewards in humans, other primates, and rats
(Schultz et al., 1992; Miyazaki et al., 1998; Martin & Ono, 2000; Schultz et al., 2000; Breiter et al., 2001;
Knutson et al., 2001; Cromwell & Schultz, 2003; Bjork et al., 2004), and is innervated by dopamine (DA)
neurons that respond to errors in reward prediction in a manner appropriate for a teaching signal (Schultz
et al., 1997; Schultz, 1998; Schultz et al., 1998; Schultz & Dickinson, 2000; Schultz, 2006). The Acb
may therefore represent a reinforcement learning system specialized for learning with delayed reinforce-
ment (Houk et al., 1995; Wickens & Kötter, 1995). If this is the case, then damage to the Acb should not
interfere with reinforcement learning in all circumstances, but should produce selective impairments in
learning when reinforcement is delayed. This prediction has not previously been tested. However, lesions
of the AcbC cause rats to prefer small immediate rewards (a single food pellet delivered immediately) to
large delayed rewards (four pellets delivered after a delay); that is, AcbC-lesioned rats exhibit impulsive
choice (Cardinal et al., 2001; 2002a). The reason for this is not clear. It might be that AcbC-lesioned rats
exhibit steeper temporal discounting, such that the subjective utility (value) of future rewards declines
more rapidly than normal as the reward is progressively delayed (Cardinal et al., 2003b; 2004). It might
also be that AcbC-lesioned rats are less good at representing the contingency between actions and their
outcomes when the outcomes are delayed, so that they choose impulsively because they are less certain or
less aware that their choosing the delayed reward does in fact lead to that reward being delivered
(Cardinal et al., 2003b; 2004). Both explanations would reflect a problem in dealing with delayed rein-
forcement in AcbC-lesioned rats. However, there might be a simpler explanation for the impulsive choice
exhibited by AcbC-lesioned rats: they might perceive the size (magnitude) of rewards differently. For
example, if they do not perceive the delayed reward to be as large, relative to the immediate reward, as
normal rats did, then they might choose impulsively despite processing the delays to reward normally,
simply because the delayed reinforcer is not subjectively large enough to compensate for the normal ef-
fects of the delay (Ho et al., 1999; Cardinal et al., 2003b; 2004).
To investigate whether the AcbC is a reinforcement learning system specialized for delayed rein-
forcement, the ability of AcbC-lesioned rats to detect instrumental contingencies across a delay was first
determined. The ability of AcbC-lesioned rats to acquire instrumental responding with delayed rein-
forcement was compared to that of sham-operated controls; each subject was allowed to respond freely on
two levers, one of which produced reinforcement after a delay of 0, 10, or 20 s (Figure 22). AcbC lesions
only retarded instrumental learning when reinforcement was delayed, demonstrating a role for the AcbC
in bridging action–outcome delays during learning. Subsequently, to establish whether AcbC-lesioned
rats perceive reward magnitude abnormally, these subjects’ sensitivity to reinforcer magnitude was as-
sessed by measuring their relative preference for two different reinforcers using concurrent interval
schedules of reinforcement. Reinforcer magnitude discrimination in AcbC-lesioned rats in this task was at
least as good as in sham-operated controls, consistent with previous evidence of reinforcer magnitude
discrimination following lesions of the whole Acb (e.g. Balleine & Killcross, 1994; Brown & Bowman,
1995). Together, these results suggest that the impulsive choice seen in AcbC-lesioned rats (Cardinal et
al., 2001) is due to a problem in processing delayed reward, not in processing the magnitudes of the re-
ward alternatives. Finally, to establish whether the AcbC is required for the performance of an instru-
mental response for delayed reinforcement, as well as for the learning of such a response, naïve rats were
trained to respond for delayed reinforcement (Figure 22) before destroying the AcbC. Such lesions also
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impaired performance of a previously learned instrumental response only when reinforcement was de-
layed, indicating that the AcbC makes an enduring contribution to bridging delays between subjects’ ac-
tions and the ensuing outcomes.
Figure 22: Task schematic: free-operant
instrumental responding on an FR-1
schedule with delayed reinforcement
Subjects are offered two levers; one (the
active lever) delivers a single food pellet for
every press (an FR-1 schedule) and the
other (the inactive lever) has no pro-
grammed consequence. Food can either be
delivered (a) immediately or (b) after a de-
lay following responses on the active lever.
The levers remain available throughout the
session (hence, free-operant responding:
animals are free to perform the operant at
any time). Events of interest are lever
presses, delivery of food pellets, and collec-
tion of food by the rat (when it pokes its
nose into the food alcove following food
delivery). To obtain food, the hungry rat
must discriminate the active from the inac-
tive lever, which is more difficult when the
outcome is delayed. In these examples, the
rat’s response patterns (active and inactive
lever presses, and collection of food) are
fictional, while food delivery is contingent
upon active lever pressing.
2.3 METHODS
2.3.1 Overview of experiments
2.3.1.1 Experiment 1A: Effects of AcbC lesions on acquisition of instrumental responding with delayed
reinforcement
Fifty naïve rats received excitotoxic lesions of the AcbC (n = 26) or sham lesions (n = 24). Two died postopera-
tively. Subjects were next trained in a task in which they had continuous access to two identical levers; one lever
delivered a single food pellet each time it was pressed, and the other lever had no effect. For some rats, the food
pellet was delivered immediately after the lever press (0 s condition; n = 8 AcbC-lesioned rats and 8 shams). For
others, each pellet was delayed by either 10 s (8 AcbC, 8 sham) or 20 s (8 AcbC, 8 sham). Subjects were trained for
14 sessions.
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2.3.1.2 Experiment 1B: Effects of AcbC lesions on the ability to match response distribution to
reinforcer magnitude distribution
After the same rats had their locomotor activity assessed, they moved on to a task testing their ability to judge dif-
ferences in the magnitude of two reinforcers. They were again offered two levers, but this time both levers delivered
reinforcement on a VI schedule, which provides reinforcement in an intermittent and temporally unpredictable
fashion. Reinforcers consisted of either 1 or 4 sucrose pellets. Over sessions, the levers’ roles changed so that the
ratio of the sizes of the reinforcers available on the two levers was 4:1, 1:1, or 1:4. Subjects’ responding was meas-
ured to establish their ability to judge the relative differences in reinforcer magnitudes and to allocate their responses
according to the matching law (Herrnstein, 1961; Herrnstein, 1970; Williams, 1994). Finally, they were killed and
perfused for histology.
2.3.1.3 Experiment 2: Effects of AcbC lesions on performance of a previously learned instrumental
response for delayed reinforcement
A further 48 naïve rats were trained to acquire an instrumental response as before, with delays to reinforcement of 0
s (n = 16), 10 s (n = 16), or 20 s (n = 16). One rat spontaneously fell ill with a colonic volvulus and was killed. Once
the subjects had been trained for 14 sessions, they were allocated to receive either AcbC lesions or sham surgery (0
s: 8 AcbC, 7 sham; 10 s: 8 AcbC, 8 sham; 20 s: 8 AcbC, 8 sham). Sham and AcbC groups were matched for per-
formance preoperatively: within each delay condition, rats were ranked by their rates of responding on the active
lever at the end of training, and rats with equivalent levels of performance were randomized to receive sham or
AcbC lesion surgery. They were then retested postoperatively on the same task for a further 18 sessions (giving 32
sessions in total), with each rat experiencing the same delay as it had preoperatively. These rats then had their loco-
motor activity assessed, and were killed and perfused for histology.
2.3.2 Subjects and housing conditions
Subjects were male Lister hooded rats (Harlan-Olac UK Ltd) housed in a temperature-controlled room (minimum
22°C) under a 12:12 h reversed light–dark cycle (lights off 07:30 to 19:30). Subjects were approximately 15 weeks
old on arrival at the laboratory and were given a minimum of a week to acclimatize, with free access to food, before
experiments began. Experiments took place between 09:00 and 21:00, with individual subjects being tested at a con-
sistent time of day. Subjects had free access to water. During behavioural testing, they were maintained at 85–90%
of their free-feeding mass using a restricted feeding regimen. Feeding occurred in the home cages at the end of the
experimental day. All procedures were subject to UK Home Office approval (Project Licences PPL 80/1324 and
80/1767) under the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986.
2.3.3 Excitotoxic lesions of the nucleus accumbens core
Subjects were anaesthetized with Avertin (2% w/v 2,2,2-tribromoethanol, 1% w/v 2-methylbutan-2-ol, and 8% v/v
ethanol in phosphate-buffered saline, sterilized by filtration, 10 ml/kg i.p.) and placed in a Kopf or Stoelting stere-
otaxic frame (David Kopf Instruments, Tujunga, California, USA; Stoelting Co., Wood Dale, Illinois, USA) fitted
with atraumatic ear bars (Figure 23). The skull was exposed and a dental drill was used to remove the bone directly
above the injection and cannulation sites. The dura mater was broken with the tip of a hypodermic needle, avoiding
damage to underlying venous sinuses. Excitotoxic lesions of the AcbC were made by injecting 0.5 µl of 0.09 M
quinolinic acid (Sigma, UK) through a glass micropipette at coordinates 1.2 mm anterior to bregma, ±1.8 mm from
the midline, and 7.1 mm below the skull surface at bregma; the incisor bar was 3.3 mm below the interaural line
(Paxinos & Watson, 1998). The toxin had been dissolved in 0.1 M phosphate buffer (composition 0.07 M Na2HPO4,
0.028 M NaH2PO4 in double-distilled water, sterilized by filtration) and adjusted with NaOH to a final pH of 7.2–
7.4. Toxin was injected over 3 min and the micropipette was left in place for 2 min following injections. Sham
lesions were made in the same manner except that vehicle was infused. At the end of the operation, animals were
given 15 ml/kg of sterile 5% w/v glucose, 0.9% w/v sodium chloride intraperitoneally. They were given a week to
recover, with free access to food, and were handled regularly. Any instances of postoperative constipation were
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with free access to food, and were handled regularly. Any instances of postoperative constipation were treated with
liquid paraffin orally and rectally. At the end of this period, food restriction commenced or was resumed.
Figure 23: Stereotaxic frame
From Carlson (1991).
2.3.4 Behavioural apparatus
Behavioural testing was conducted in one of two types of operant chamber of identical configuration (from Med
Associates Inc, Georgia, Vermont, USA, or Paul Fray Ltd, Cambridge, UK; Figure 24). Each chamber was fitted
with a 2.8 W overhead house light and two retractable levers on either side of an alcove fitted with an infrared pho-
todiode to detect head entry. Sucrose pellets (45 mg, Rodent Diet Formula P, Noyes, Lancaster, New Hampshire,
USA) could be delivered into the alcove. The chambers were enclosed within sound-attenuating boxes fitted with
fans to provide air circulation. The apparatus was controlled by software written by RNC in C++ (Stroustrup, 1986)
using the Whisker control system (Cardinal, 2000; Cardinal & Aitken, 2001).
2.3.5 Overview of the Whisker control system
Whisker (Cardinal, 2000; Cardinal & Aitken, 2001) is a research control system written in C++ (Stroustrup, 1986).
It uses a client–server architecture, in which a server program controls all external input/output hardware (includ-
ing, if necessary, sound and video devices) and provides a text-based interface to multiple simultaneous client pro-
grams via the transmission control protocol/internet protocol (TCP/IP) system. The server runs on 32-bit Microsoft
Windows platforms as a real-time process. It polls hardware at 1 kHz and provides an event-driven environment to
the clients, which implement behavioural tasks. The multimedia edition of the server has a memory footprint of ap-
proximately 11 Mb and runs to ~45,000 lines of code.
2.3.6 Instrumental conditioning with delayed reinforcement
A variety of free-operant schedules may be used to assess instrumental acquisition with delayed reinforcement
(Dickinson et al., 1992). The simplest possible free-operant schedule was used in the present experiments: each re-
sponse scheduled a reinforcer after the programmed delay (Figure 22, p.53). In such a schedule, if the subject re-
sponds during the delay, the experienced response–reinforcer delay will not match the programmed delay (as the
second response is temporally close to the first reinforcer). However, this schedule has the advantage that the re-
sponse–reinforcer contingency is constant (every response does in fact cause the delivery of reinforcement) and the
reinforcement rate is not constrained (Dickinson et al., 1992). So that responding could be attributed to the instru-
mental response–reinforcer contingency, rather than the effects of general activity or reinforcement itself, respond-
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ing on the active lever was compared to responding on a control lever that had no programmed consequence. Differ-
ent groups of lesioned and sham-operated subjects were trained using different delays; the delay was consistent for
every subject. Delays of 0, 10, and 20 s were used. The schedule was implemented in the SimpleSchedules program
(Cardinal, 2002b).
Alternative free-operant schedules for this purpose exist, such as one in which the first response sets up rein-
forcement, and a subsequent response made before the reinforcer is delivered postpones reinforcement, in order to
keep the delay between the last response and the reinforcer constant (known as a tandem fixed-ratio-1 differential-
reinforcement-of-other-behaviour or FR-1-DRO schedule). However, the tandem FR-1-DRO schedule constrains the
maximum rate of reinforcement, which also decreases as the delay being used increases. Furthermore, it does not
hold constant the probability of reinforcement given a response, and it introduces two opposing contingencies: some
responses make reinforcement more likely, while others (those during the delay) make it less likely (Dickinson et
al., 1992). Therefore, this schedule was not used. Similarly, the acquisition of instrumental responding with delayed
reinforcement may be assessed with discrete-trial tasks. For example, two levers could be presented in trials occur-
ring at fixed intervals, the levers could be retracted when a response had been made, and responding on one lever
could be reinforced after a delay, taking care to avoid a differential Pavlovian contingency between presentation or
retraction of one lever and reinforcement, since responding might then be due to Pavlovian conditioning
(autoshaping; Brown & Jenkins, 1968; Williams & Williams, 1969) rather than the instrumental contingency. How-
ever, this discrete-trial schedule would also divide up the session explicitly into response–food delays and food–re-
sponse (intertrial) times, a process that might aid learning and/or be affected by the lesion. Furthermore, there is
prior evidence that AcbC lesions impair rats’ ability to choose a delayed reward over an immediate reward in the
a
Figure 24: Operant chamber
(a) Sketch of the operant chambers used in several tasks.
(b) Photograph of such an operant chamber (Med Asso-
ciates variety). (c) Close-up of a rat in the chamber.
From Cardinal (2001). Although one is on in these pho-
tographs, stimulus lights were not used in the present
experiment.
b c
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discrete-trial situation (Cardinal et al., 2001). Therefore, to address the more general question of whether the AcbC
is required to acquire instrumental responding with delayed reinforcement, a free-operant schedule was chosen in-
stead; this may mimic best the real-life problem of relating actions to their outcomes with no explicit demarcation of
when a response had been made or when a response was permissible.
Immediately after subjects were placed in the operant chamber, the sessions began. The houselight was illumi-
nated, and remained on for each 30-min session. Two levers were extended into the chamber. All lever responses
were first “debounced” to 10 ms (i.e. if a response occurred within 10 ms of a previous valid response it was attrib-
uted to mechanical bounce and ignored). Other than this, all lever presses and nosepokes into the food alcove were
recorded. Responding on the left (active) lever caused a single pellet to be delivered following a delay, under an FR-
1 schedule (Figure 22). To attribute acquisition of a lever-press response to the instrumental contingency, it is also
necessary to control for the effects of reinforcer delivery itself (Dickinson et al., 1992); therefore, responding on the
active lever was compared to responding on the right (inactive) lever, which had no programmed consequence. To
minimize any potential contribution of conditioned reinforcement to the task, no explicit signals were associated
with pellet delivery other than the noise of the pellet dispenser apparatus.
2.3.7 Locomotor activity in a novel environment
Since general activity levels might influence instrumental responding, locomotor activity was also measured, using
wire mesh cages, 25 (W) × 40 (D) × 18 (H) cm, equipped with two horizontal photocell beams situated 1 cm from
the floor that enabled movements along the long axis of the cage to be registered. The apparatus was controlled by
software written by RNC in Arachnid (Paul Fray Ltd, Cambridge), a real-time extension to BBC BASIC V running
on an Acorn Archimedes series computer. Subjects were placed in these cages, which were initially unfamiliar to
them, and their activity was recorded for 2 h. All animals were tested in the food-deprived state. Locomotor hyper-
activity and reduced weight gain have previously been part of the phenotype of AcbC-lesioned rats, though without
alterations in the consumption of the reinforcer used in the present experiments (Maldonado-Irizarry & Kelley,
1995; Parkinson et al., 1999a; Cardinal et al., 2001).
2.3.8 Matching of response distribution to reinforcer magnitude distribution on a
concurrent schedule
Subjects were trained in 30-min sessions to respond on both levers separately under interval schedules of reinforce-
ment. The two levers were designated A and B; these were counterbalanced left/right (thus, for half the subjects in
each group, lever A was the lever reinforced previously in the delay task; for the other half, it was the lever previ-
ously unreinforced). As before, responses were debounced to 10 ms. Training and testing proceeded according to
Table 4. Random-interval-x-second (RI-x) schedules were implemented by having a clock tick once a second; each
tick set up reinforcement with a probability p = 1/x. Once reinforcement had been set up for a schedule, the next re-
sponse caused reinforcement to be delivered. Multiple pellets were delivered 0.5 s apart. For concurrent RI sched-
ules, a 2 s changeover delay (COD) was imposed to discourage frequent switching between schedules (Shull & Plis-
koff, 1967; Herrnstein, 1970; Williams, 1994; Shahan & Lattal, 1998). The COD was implemented as follows: if a
subject pressed lever B, it could only be reinforced if more than 2 s had elapsed since it last pressed lever A (and
vice versa). The RI schedules could still set up reinforcement during the COD, but the subject could not earn that
reinforcement until the COD had elapsed. The schedule was implemented in the SimpleSchedules program
(Cardinal, 2002b).
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Day Condition fA Lever A Lever B
1 One-lever training — RI-2s, 1-pellet reinforcer absent
2 One-lever training — absent RI-2s, 1-pellet reinforcer
3 One-lever training — RI-15s, 1-pellet reinforcer absent
4 One-lever training — absent RI-15s, 1-pellet reinforcer
5 One-lever training — RI-30s, 1-pellet reinforcer absent
6 One-lever training — absent RI-30s, 1-pellet reinforcer
7 Two-lever training 0.5 RI-30s, 1-pellet reinforcer RI-30s, 1-pellet reinforcer
8–11 1:1 magnitude 0.5 RI-60s, 1-pellet reinforcer RI-60s, 1-pellet reinforcer
12–19 4:1 magnitude 0.8 RI-60s, 4-pellet reinforcer RI-60s, 1-pellet reinforcer
20–27 1:4 magnitude 0.2 RI-60s, 1-pellet reinforcer RI-60s, 4-pellet reinforcer
Table 4: Training and testing schedule for reinforcer magnitude matching task
In Experiment 1B, Subjects were trained to respond on two levers (designated A and B) separately and then
concurrently under interval schedules of reinforcement. In sessions 8–27, their preference for reinforcers of
different magnitudes was assessed. The third column, labelled “fA”, indicates the fraction of responses that
would be allocated to lever A [i.e. A/(A+B)] were the subject to obey the matching law (Herrnstein, 1961).
All concurrent (two-lever) schedules were subject to a 2 s changeover delay (COD), described in the Meth-
ods.
2.3.9 Histology
Rats were deeply anaesthetized with pentobarbitone sodium (200 mg/ml, minimum of 1.5 ml i.p.) and perfused
transcardially with 0.01 M phosphate-buffered saline (PBS) followed by 4% paraformaldehyde in PBS. Their brains
were removed and postfixed in paraformaldehyde before being dehydrated in 20% sucrose for cryoprotection. The
brains were sectioned coronally at 60 µm thickness on a freezing microtome and every third section mounted on
chromium potassium sulphate/gelatin-coated glass microscope slides and allowed to dry. Sections were passed
through a series of ethanol solutions of descending concentration (3 minutes in each of 100%, 95%, and 70% v/v
ethanol in water) and stained for ~5 min with cresyl violet. The stain comprises 0.05% w/v aqueous cresyl violet
(Raymond A. Lamb Ltd, Eastbourne, UK), 2 mM acetic acid, and 5 mM formic acid in water. Following staining,
sections were rinsed in water and 70% ethanol before being differentiated in 95% ethanol. Finally, they were dehy-
drated and delipidated in 100% ethanol and Histoclear (National Diagnostics, UK) before being cover-slipped using
DePeX mounting medium (BDH, UK) and allowed to dry. The sections were used to verify cannula and lesion
placement and assess the extent of lesion-induced neuronal loss. Lesions were detectable as the absence of visible
neurons (cell bodies of the order of 100 µm in diameter with a characteristic shape and appearance), often associated
with a degree of tissue collapse (sometimes with consequent ventricular expansion when the lesion was adjacent to a
ventricle) and gliosis (visible as the presence of smaller, densely staining cells).
2.3.10 Data analysis
Data collected by the chamber control programs were imported into a relational database (Microsoft Access 97) for
case selection and analysed with SPSS 11, according to principles developed in Aitken & Cardinal (2006) and Car-
dinal & Aitken (2006). Figures were created with SigmaPlot 2001/v7 and Adobe Illustrator 8. All graphs show
group means and error bars are ±1 standard error of the mean (SEM) unless otherwise stated. Count data (lever
presses and locomotor activity counts), for which variance increases with the mean, were subjected to a square-root
transformation prior to any analysis (Howell, 1997). Homogeneity of variance was verified using Levene’s test
(Levene, 1960). General linear models are described as dependent variable = A2 × Bcov × (C5 × Dcov × S) where A is
a between-subjects factor with two levels, B is a between-subjects covariate, C is a within-subjects factor with five
levels, and D is a within-subjects covariate; S denotes subjects in designs involving within-subjects factors (Keppel,
1982). For repeated measures analyses, Mauchly’s test of sphericity of the covariance matrix was applied (Mauchly,
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1940) and the degrees of freedom corrected to more conservative values using the Huynh–Feldt epsilon ε?  for any
terms involving factors in which the sphericity assumption was violated (Huynh & Feldt, 1970).
2.4 RESULTS
In Experiment 1, rats received excitotoxic lesions of the AcbC or sham lesions, and were then tested on
an instrumental free-operant acquisition task with delayed reinforcement (Experiment 1A; see Methods)
and subsequently a reinforcer magnitude discrimination task (Experiment 1B). In Experiment 2, naïve rats
were trained on the free-operant task for delayed reinforcement; AcbC lesions were then made and the
rats were retested.
2.4.1 Histology
In Experiment 1, there were two postoperative deaths. Histological analysis revealed that the lesions were
incomplete or encroached significantly on neighbouring structures in four subjects. These subjects were
excluded; final group numbers were therefore 8 (sham, 0 s delay) 2, 6 (AcbC, 0 s delay)3, 8 (sham, 10 s
delay)4, 7 (AcbC, 10 s delay)5, 8 (sham, 20 s delay)6, and 7 (AcbC, 20 s delay)7. In Experiment 2, one rat
spontaneously fell ill with a colonic volvulus during preoperative training and was killed, and there were
three postoperative deaths. Lesions were incomplete or too extensive in seven subjects; final group num-
bers were therefore 7 (sham, 0 s delay)8, 5 (AcbC, 0 s delay)9, 8 (sham, 10 s delay)10, 4 (AcbC, 10 s de-
lay)11, 8 (sham, 20 s delay)12, and 5 (AcbC, 20 s delay)13.
Lesions of the AcbC encompassed most of the core subregion; neuronal loss and associated gliosis
extended in an anteroposterior direction from approximately 2.7 mm to 0.5 mm anterior to bregma, and
did not extend ventrally or caudally into the ventral pallidum or olfactory tubercle. Damage to the ven-
tromedial caudate–putamen was occasionally seen; damage to AcbSh was restricted to the lateral edge of
the dorsal shell. Schematics of the lesions are shown in Figure 25. Photomicrographs of one lesion are
shown in Figure 26, and are similar to lesions with identical parameters that have been presented before
(Parkinson et al., 1999a; Cardinal, 2001).
                                                     
2 Experiment 1, sham, 0 s delay: final subjects O1, O2, O3, O4, O5, O6, O7, O8 (n = 8).
3 Experiment 1, AcbC, 0 s delay: final subjects O10, O13, O15, O16, O17, O18 (n = 6).
4 Experiment 1, sham, 10 s delay: final subjects O19, O20, O21, O22, O23, O24, O25, O26 (n = 8).
5 Experiment 1, AcbC, 10 s delay: final subjects O27, O29, O30, O31, O32, O33, O34 (n = 7).
6 Experiment 1, sham, 20 s delay: final subjects O35, O36, O37, O38, O39, O40, O41, O42 (n = 8).
7 Experiment 1, AcbC, 20 s delay: final subjects O44, O45, O46, O47, O48, O49, O50 (n = 7).
8 Experiment 2, sham, 0 s delay: final subjects Q4, Q6, Q8, Q9, Q13, Q15, Q16 (n = 7).
9 Experiment 2, AcbC, 0 s delay: final subjects Q1, Q2, Q7, Q10, Q14 (n = 5).
10 Experiment 2, sham, 10 s delay: final subjects Q18, Q20, Q21, Q23, Q24, Q26, Q31, Q32 (n = 8).
11 Experiment 2, AcbC, 10 s delay: final subjects Q22, Q27, Q28, Q30 (n = 4).
12 Experiment 2, sham, 20 s delay: final subjects Q33, Q34, Q39, Q41, Q43, Q44, Q45, Q46 (n = 8).
13 Experiment 2, AcbC, 20 s delay: final subjects Q35, Q37, Q38, Q40, Q47 (n = 5).
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Figure 25: Schematic of lesions of the AcbC
Black shading indicates the extent of neuronal loss common to all subjects; grey indicates the area lesioned in at
least one subject. Coronal sections are (from top to bottom) +2.7, +2.2, +1.7, +1.2, and +0.7 mm relative to bregma.
Diagrams are modified from Paxinos & Watson (1998). Panels a–c correspond to Experiment 1, in which lesions
were made before training; panels d–f correspond to Experiment 2, in which lesions were made after initial training.
Panels a & d show groups trained with no delays; panels b & e show groups trained with 10 s delays; panels c & f
show groups trained with 20 s delays.
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Figure 26: Photomicrographs of lesions of the AcbC
Lesions of the AcbC: photomicrographs of sections ~1.2mm anterior to bregma, stained with cresyl violet. (a)
Sham-operated rat, low-magnification view, right hemisphere (medial to the left). LV, lateral ventricle; CPu, cau-
date/putamen; AcbSh, nucleus accumbens shell; AcbC, nucleus accumbens core; ac, anterior commissure. The box
marks the area magnified in (b). (b) Sham-operated rat, high-magnification view. Cresyl violet is basic and stains for
Nissl substance, primarily nucleic acids (DNA and RNA); it therefore stains cytoplasmic rough endoplasmic reticu-
lum, nuclei, and nucleoli. Individual neuronal nuclei are visible (circles ~10 µm in diameter). (c) AcbC-lesioned rat,
low-magnification view. Dotted lines show the approximate extent of the lesion. There is some tissue collapse
within the lesion and the lateral ventricle is slightly expanded. The box marks the area magnified in (d). (d) AcbC-
lesioned rat, high-magnification view. In the region of the lesion, neurons have been replaced by smaller, densely
staining cells, indicating gliosis. (e) Coronal diagram of the rat brain at the same anteroposterior level (Paxinos &
Watson, 1998), with scale. The light grey box indicates approximately the region shown in (a) and (c); the dark grey
box indicates approximately the region shown in (b) and (e).
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2.4.2 Acquisition of instrumental responding (Experiment 1A)
The imposition of response–reinforcer delays retarded the acquisition of free-operant lever pressing, in
sham-operated rats and in AcbC-lesioned rats (Figure 27). AcbC-lesioned rats responded slightly more
than shams on both the active and inactive levers in the absence of response–reinforcers delays, but when
such delays were present, AcbC lesions retarded acquisition relative to sham-operated controls (Figure
28).
An overall analysis of variance (ANOVA) using the model lesion2 × delay3 × (session14 × lever2 × S)
revealed multiple significant interactions, including lever × delay × lesion (F2,38 = 5.17, p = .01) and ses-
sion × lever × delay (F6.0,229.1 = 5.47, ε?  = .464, p < .001), justifying sub-analysis. All six groups learned to
respond more on the active lever than the inactive lever (p ≤ .002, main effect of lever or session × lever
interaction for each group alone).
For sham-operated rats, delays reduced the rate of acquisition of the active lever response and reduced
the asymptotic level of responding attained (Figure 27a; delay: F2,21 = 11.7, p < .001; ε?  = .276, p < .001;
session × delay: F7.2,75.3 = 2.46, ε?  = .276, p = .024). The presence of a delay also increased responding on
the inactive lever slightly (delay: F2,21 = 4.06, p = .032), though not systematically (the 10 s group dif-
fered from the 0 s group, p = .036, but no other groups differed, p ≥ .153).
There was a further, delay-dependent impairment in AcbC-lesioned rats, who responded more than
shams at 0 s delay but substantially less than shams at 10 s and 20 s delay. As in the case of sham-
operated controls, delays reduced the rate of acquisition and the maximum level of responding attained in
AcbC-lesioned rats (Figure 27b; delay: F2,17 = 54.6, p < .001; delay × session: F6.9,58.7 = 2.64, ε?  = .266, p
= .02). Responding on the inactive lever was not significantly affected by the delays (maximum F15.8,134.2
= 1.65, ε?  = .607, p = .066). At 0 s delay, AcbC-lesioned subjects responded more than shams on the ac-
tive lever (Figure 28a; lesion: F1,12 = 5.30, p = .04) and the inactive lever (lesion: F1,12 = 9.12, p = .011).
However, at 10 s delay, AcbC-lesioned rats responded significantly less than shams on the active lever
(Figure 28b; lesion: F1,13 = 9.04, p = .01); there was no difference in responding on the inactive lever (F <
1, NS). At 20 s delay, again, AcbC-lesioned rats responded significantly less than shams on the active
lever (Figure 28c; lesion: F1,13 = 9.87, p = .008) and there was no difference in responding on the inactive
lever (F < 1, NS).
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Figure 27: Effects of delays to reinforcement on acquisition of free-operant responding under an FR-1 sched-
ule
Data plotted to show the effects of delays. All groups discriminated between the active and the inactive lever, and
delays retarded acquisition of the active lever response in both groups. (a) Responding of sham-operated control
rats, under all three response–reinforcer delay conditions. (b) Responding of AcbC-lesioned rats under all delay
conditions. The next figure replots these data to show the effect of the lesion more clearly.
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Figure 28: Effect of AcbC lesions on ac-
quisition of free-operant responding with
delayed reinforcement
Data plotted to show the effects of AcbC
lesions (same data as in the previous figure).
There was a delay-dependent impairment in
AcbC-lesioned rats, who learned less well
than shams only when reinforcement was
delayed. (a) With a delay of 0 s, AcbC-
lesioned rats learned just as well as shams;
in fact, they responded more on the active
lever than shams did. (b) With a 10 s delay,
AcbC-lesioned rats were impaired at learn-
ing compared to shams. (c) With a 20 s de-
lay, the impairment in AcbC-lesioned rats
was larger still.
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2.4.3 Experienced response–delivery and response–collection delays (Experiment 1A)
For every reinforcer delivered, the active lever response most closely preceding it in time was identified,
and the time between that response and delivery of the reinforcer (the “response–delivery delay”) was
calculated. This time can therefore be equal to or less than the programmed delay, and is only relevant for
subjects experiencing non-zero programmed response–reinforcer delays. The response-to-reinforcer-
collection (“response–collection”) delays were also calculated: for every reinforcer delivered, the re-
sponse most closely preceding it and the nosepoke most closely following it were identified, and the time
between these two events calculated. This time can be shorter or longer than the programmed delay, and
is relevant for all subjects.
AcbC-lesioned rats experienced the same response–delivery delays as shams when the programmed
delay was 10 s, but experienced longer response–delivery delays when the programmed delay was 20 s
(Figure 29a). Similarly, AcbC-lesioned rats experienced the same response–collection delays as shams
when the programmed delay was 0 s, slightly but not significantly longer response–collection delays
when the programmed delay was 10 s, and significantly longer response–collection delays when the pro-
grammed delay was 20 s (Figure 29b). These differences in the mean delay experienced by each rat were
reflected in differences in the distribution of response–delivery and response–collection delays when the
programmed delay was non-zero (Figure 29c,d). Since AcbC-lesioned rats experienced slightly longer
delays than sham-operated rats, it was necessary to take this into account when establishing the effect of
delays on learning, as follows.
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Figure 29: Programmed and experienced delays to
reinforcement in AcbC-lesioned and sham-operated
rats
AcbC-lesioned rats experienced slightly longer re-
sponse–delivery delays (the delay between the most
recent active lever press and pellet delivery) than
shams in the 20 s condition, and slightly longer re-
sponse–collection delays (the delay between the most
recent active lever press and pellet collection) in the 10
s and 20 s conditions. (a) Mean experienced response–
delivery delays (one value calculated per subject).
When the programmed delay was 0 s, reinforcers were
delivered immediately so no data are shown. There
was a lesion × programmed delay interaction (F1,26 =
12.0, p = .002): when the programmed delay was 10 s,
the experienced delays did not differ between groups
(F < 1, NS), but when the programmed delay was 20 s,
AcbC-lesioned rats experienced longer response–de-
livery delays (one-way ANOVA, F1,13 = 19.0, ** p =
.001). (b) Mean experienced response–collection de-
lays (one value calculated per subject). There was a
lesion × programmed delay interaction (F2,38 = 7.14, p
= .002): AcbC-lesioned rats did not experience signifi-
cantly different delays when the programmed delay
was 0 s (F < 1, NS) or 10 s (F1,13 = 4.52, p = .053), but
experienced significantly longer response–collection
delays when the programmed delay was 20 s (F1,13 =
15.4, ** p = .002). (c) Distribution of experienced re-
sponse–delivery delays. All experienced delays for a
given subject were aggregated across all sessions, and
the proportion falling into different 2 s ranges were
calculated to give one value per range per subject; the
graphs show means ± SEMs of these values. The in-
terval notation “[a, b)” indicates that a given delay x
falls in the range a ≤ x < b. There were no differences
in the distribution of delays experienced by AcbC-
lesioned and sham rats in the 10 s condition (lesion
and lesion × range, Fs < 1, NS), but in the 20 s condi-
tion AcbC-lesioned rats experienced slightly fewer
short delays and slightly more long delays (lesion ×
range, F2.1,27.7 = 6.60, ε?  = .213, p = .004). (d) Distri-
bution of experienced response–collection delays, dis-
played in the same manner as (c). There were no dif-
ferences in the distribution of delays experienced by
AcbC-lesioned and sham rats in the 0 s condition (le-
sion and lesion × range, Fs < 1, NS). In the 10 s con-
dition, AcbC-lesioned rats experienced a slightly
higher proportion of long response–collection delays
and a slightly lower proportion of short response–col-
lection delays (lesion, F1,13 = 6.36, p = .036, though the
lesion × range interaction was not significant, F2.6,34.3 =
1.74, ε?  = .139, p = .181). Similarly, in the 20 s condi-
tion, AcbC-lesioned rats experienced a slightly higher
proportion of long response–collection delays and a
slightly lower proportion of short response–collection
delays than shams (lesion × range, F4.2,54.8 = 6.65, ε?  =
.222, p < .001).
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2.4.4 Effect of delays on learning (Experiment 1A)
There was a systematic relationship between the acquisition rate and the programmed delay of reinforce-
ment, and this was altered in AcbC-lesioned rats. Figure 30a replots the rates of responding on the active
lever on session 10 of acquisition (cf. Dickinson et al., 1992). Despite the comparatively low power of
such an analysis, lever pressing was analysed for this session only using the model lesion2 × delay3. This
revealed a significant lesion × delay interaction (F2,38 = 12.6, p < .001), which was analysed further. In-
creasing delays significantly reduced the rate of responding in this session for shams (F2,21 = 17.3, p <
.001) and AcbC-lesioned rats (F2,17 = 54.4, p < .001). AcbC-lesioned rats responded more than shams at
zero delay (F1,12 = 8.52, p = .013) but less than shams at 10 s delay (F1,13 = 4.71, p = .049) and at 20 s de-
lay (F1,13 = 17.3, p = .001).
Since the AcbC group experienced slightly longer response–delivery and response–collection delays
than shams when the programmed delay was non-zero (Figure 29), it was important to establish whether
this effect alone was responsible for the retardation of learning, or whether delays retarded learning in
AcbC-lesioned rats over and above any effect to increase the experienced delay. The mean experienced
response–collection delay was calculated for each subject, up to and including session 10. The square-
root-transformed number of responses on the active lever in session 10 was then analysed using a general
linear model of the form lesion2 × experienced delaycov. Unlike a standard analysis of covariance (AN-
COVA), the factor × covariate interaction term was included in the model. This confirmed that the lesion
retarded the acquisition of responding in AcbC-lesioned rats, compared to controls, in a delay-dependent
manner, over and above the differences in experienced delay (Figure 30b; lesion × experienced delay:
F1,40 = 12.4, p = .001).
Figure 30: Learning as a function of programmed
and experienced delays to reinforcement in AcbC-
lesioned and sham-operated rats
The imposition of response–reinforcer delays system-
atically retarded the acquisition of free-operant instru-
mental responding, and this relationship was altered in
AcbC-lesioned rats, even allowing for differences in
experienced response–collection delays. (a) The rate of
responding on the active lever in session 10 is plotted
against the programmed response–reinforcer delay.
AcbC-lesioned rats responded more than shams at zero
delay (* p = .013), but less than shams at 10 s (* p =
.049) and 20 s delay (*** p = .001). (b) Responding on
the active lever in session 10 plotted against the expe-
rienced response-to-reinforcer collection delays for
sessions 1–10 (vertical error bars: SEM of the square-
root-transformed number of responses in session 10;
horizontal error bars: SEM of the experienced re-
sponse–collection delay, calculated up to and includ-
ing that session). The gradients of the two lines dif-
fered significantly (### p = .001; see text), indicating
that the relationship between experienced delays and
responding was altered in AcbC-lesioned rats.
2.4.5 Experienced delays and learning on the inactive lever (Experiment 1A)
No such delay-dependent effects were observed for the inactive lever. Experienced inactive-response–
delivery delays (calculated across all sessions in the same manner as for the active lever) were much
longer and more variable than corresponding delays for the active lever, because subjects responded on
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and more variable than corresponding delays for the active lever, because subjects responded on the inac-
tive lever so little. Means ± SEMs were 250 ± 19 s (sham, 0 s), 214 ± 29 s (AcbC, 0 s), 167 ± 23 s (sham,
10 s), 176 ± 33 s (AcbC, 10 s), 229 ± 65 s (sham, 20 s), and 131 ± 37 s (AcbC, 20 s). ANOVA of these
data revealed no effects of lesion or programmed delay and no interaction (maximum F1,38 = 1.69, NS).
Experienced inactive-response–collection delays were 252 ± 19 s (sham, 0 s), 217 ± 29 s (AcbC, 0 s), 169
± 23 s (sham, 10 s), 179 ± 33 s (AcbC, 10 s), 231 ± 65 s (sham, 20 s), and 136 ± 37 s (AcbC, 20 s). Again,
ANOVA revealed no effects of lesion or programmed delay and no interaction (maximum F1,38 = 1.61,
NS). When the square-root-transformed number of responses on the inactive lever in session 10 was ana-
lysed with the experienced delays up to that point as a predictor, using the model lesion2 × experienced
inactive-response–collection delaycov just as for the active lever analysis, there was no lesion × experi-
enced delay interaction (F < 1, NS).
2.4.6 Discrimination of relative reinforcer magnitude (Experiment 1B)
Relative preference for two reinforcers may be inferred from the distribution of responses on concurrent
VI schedules of reinforcement (Herrnstein, 1961; Herrnstein, 1970; Williams, 1994). According to
Herrnstein’s matching law (Herrnstein, 1961), if subjects respond on two concurrent schedules A and B
delivering reinforcement at rates rA and rB respectively, they should allocate their response rates RA and
RB such that RA/(RA+RB) = rA/(rA+rB). Overmatching is said to occur if subjects prefer the schedule with
the higher reinforcement rate more than predicted by the matching law; undermatching is the opposite.
Both sham-operated and AcbC-lesioned rats were sensitive to the distribution of reinforcement that they
received on two concurrent RI schedules, altering their response allocation accordingly. Subjects pre-
ferred the lever on which they received a greater proportion of reinforcement. In general, subjects did not
conform to the matching law, but exhibited substantial undermatching; this is common (Williams, 1994).
AcbC-lesioned rats exhibited better matching (less undermatching) than shams (Figure 31), suggesting
that their sensitivity to the relative magnitudes of the two reinforcers was as good as, or better than,
shams’.
To analyse these data, the proportion of pellets delivered by lever A (see Methods, p. 57), and the pro-
portion of responses allocated to lever A, were calculated for each subject for the last session in each of
the three programmed reinforcement distribution contingencies (session 11, programmed reinforcement
proportion 0.5; session 19, programmed proportion 0.8; session 27, programmed proportion 0.2; see Ta-
ble 4, p. 58). The analysis used a model of the form response proportion = lesion2 × (experienced rein-
forcer distributioncov × S); the factor × covariate term was included in the model. Analysis of sham and
AcbC groups separately demonstrated that both groups altered their response allocation according to the
distribution of reinforcement, i.e. that both groups discriminated the two reinforcers on the basis of their
magnitude (effects of reinforcer distribution; sham: F1,47 = 16.6, p < .001; AcbC: F1,39 = 97.2, p < .001).
There was also a significant lesion × reinforcer distribution interaction (F1,86 = 5.5, p = .021), indicating
that the two groups’ matching behaviour differed, with the AcbC-lesioned rats showing better sensitivity
to the relative reinforcer magnitude than the shams (Figure 31). These statistical conclusions were not
altered by including counterbalancing terms accounting for whether lever A was the left or right lever (the
left having been the active lever previously in Experiment 1A), or whether a given rat had been trained
with 0, 10, or 20 s delays in Experiment 1A.
Chapter 2: Effects of AcbC lesions on responding for delayed reinforcement 69
Figure 31: Discrimination of reinforcer
magnitude: matching of relative response
rate to relative reinforcement rate in AcbC-
lesioned and sham-operated rats
AcbC-lesioned rats exhibited better sensitivity
to the difference between 1 and 4 food pellets
than shams did. Subjects responded on two
concurrent RI-60-s schedules, designated A and
B, and the reinforcer magnitude for each sched-
ule was varied. Data from the last session of
each condition are plotted (sessions 11, 19, and
27; see Table 4, p. 58); programmed reinforce-
ment ratios were 0.2 (1 food pellet on schedule
A and 4 pellets on schedule B), 0.5 (1:1 pel-
lets), and 0.8 (4:1 pellets). The abscissa (hori-
zontal axis) shows experienced reinforcement
ratios (mean ± SEM); the ordinate (vertical
axis) shows response allocation (mean ± SEM).
Both groups exhibited substantial undermatch-
ing (deviation away from the predictions of the
matching law and towards indifference). How-
ever, neither group was indifferent to the rein-
forcement ratio: the sham and AcbC groups
both adjusted their response allocation towards
the lever delivering the reinforcer with the
greater magnitude (*** p < .001). Matching
was better in AcbC-lesioned rats than in shams
(lines of different gradient, # p = .021), sug-
gesting that AcbC-lesioned rats were more sen-
sitive to the difference between 1 and 4 food
pellets.
2.4.7 Switching behaviour during concurrent schedule performance (Experiment 1B)
Because switching behaviour has the potential to influence behaviour on concurrent schedules (e.g. Sha-
han & Lattal, 1998), switching probabilities were also analysed. AcbC-lesioned rats were less likely than
shams to switch between levers when responding on two identical concurrent RI schedules with a COD of
2 s. Responses on the left and right levers were sequenced for sessions 8–11 (concurrent RI-60s sched-
ules, each delivering a one-pellet reinforcer; see Methods, p. 57, and Table 4, p. 58), and the probabilities
of switching from one type of response to another, or repeating the same type of response, were calcu-
lated. The switch probabilities were analysed by one-way ANOVA; this revealed an effect of lesion (F1,42
= 8.88, p = .005). Mean switch probabilities (± SEMs) were 0.41 ± 0.02 (AcbC) and 0.49 ± 0.01 (sham).
2.4.8 Effects of AcbC lesions on performance of a previously learned instrumental
response for delayed reinforcement (Experiment 2)
Due to mechanical faults, data from four subjects in session 10 (preoperative) and data from one subject
in session 22 (postoperative) were not collected. Both sessions were removed from analysis completely,
and data points for those sessions are plotted using the mean and SEM of the remaining unaffected sub-
jects (but not analysed).
Preoperatively, the groups remained matched following later histological selection. Analysis of the last
3 preoperative sessions, using the model lesion intent2 × delay3 × (session3 × lever2 × S), indicated that
responding was affected by the delays to reinforcement (delay: F2,31 = 5.46, p = .009; delay × lever: F2,31
= 19.5, p < .001), but there were no differences between the groups due to receive AcbC and sham lesions
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(terms involving lesion intent: maximum F was for session × lever × lesion intent, F2,62 = 1.844, NS). As
expected, delays reduced the rate of responding on the active lever (F2,31 = 15.6, p < .001) and increased
responding on the inactive lever (F2,31 = 8.12, p = .001) preoperatively.
AcbC lesions selectively impaired performance of instrumental responding only when there was a re-
sponse–reinforcer delay. There was no effect of the lesion on responding under the 0 s delay condition,
but in the presence of delays, AcbC lesions impaired performance on the active lever (Figure 32; Figure
33). These conclusions were reached statistically as follows.
Subjects’ responding on the relevant lever in the last preoperative session (session 14) was used as a
covariate to increase the power of the analysis (Howell, 1997). As expected, there were no significant
differences in the covariates themselves between groups due to receive AcbC or sham surgery (terms in-
volving lesion intent for the active lever: Fs < 1, NS; for the inactive lever, lesion intent: F1,31 = 2.99, p =
.094; lesion intent × delay: F < 1, NS). Analysis of the postoperative sessions, using the model lesion2 ×
delay3 × (session17 × lever2 × session-14-active-lever-responsescov × S), revealed a near-significant lesion
× delay × session × lever interaction (F22.4,335.5 = 1.555, ε?  = .699, p = .054). Furthermore, analysis of
postoperative responding on the active lever, using the model lesion2 × delay3 × (session17 × session-14-
active-lever-responsescov × S), revealed a session × delay × lesion interaction (F17.3,259.5 = 1.98, ε?  = .541,
p = .013) and a delay × lesion interaction (F2,30 = 3.739, p = .036), indicating that the lesion affected re-
sponding on the active lever in a delay-dependent manner. In an identical analysis of responding on the
inactive lever (using inactive lever responding on session 14 as the covariate), no terms involving lesion
were significant (maximum F: lesion, F1,30 = 1.96, p = .172), indicating that the lesion did not affect re-
sponding on the inactive lever.
Postoperatively, response–reinforcer delays continued systematically to decrease responding on the
active lever, both in shams (Figure 32a; delay: F2,20 = 11.78, p < .001; session × delay: F12.4,124.1 = 2.36, ε?
= .388, p = .008) and in AcbC-lesioned rats (Figure 32b; delay: F2,11 = 13.9, p = .001). Shams continued
to discriminate between the active and inactive lever at all delays (lever: all groups p ≤ .002; lever × ses-
sion: all groups p ≤ .003). AcbC-lesioned rats continued to discriminate at 0 s and 10 s (lever: p ≤ .011;
lever × session: p ≤ .036), but AcbC-lesioned subjects in the 20 s condition failed to discriminate between
the active and inactive levers postoperatively (lever: F1,4 = 1.866, p = .244; lever × session: F < 1, NS).
Lesioned subjects responded as much as shams at 0 s delay, but substantially less than shams at 10 s
and 20 s delay (Figure 33). Again, analysis was conducted using responding on the relevant lever in ses-
sion 14 (the last preoperative session) as a covariate. At 0 s, the lesion did not affect responding on the
active lever (lesion: F < 1, NS; lesion × session: F16,144 = 1.34, NS). However, at 10 s, AcbC-lesioned rats
responded significantly less than shams on the active lever (lesion: F1,9 = 7.08, p = .026; lesion × session:
F15.0,135.3 = 3.04, ε?  = .94, p < .001). Similarly, at 20 s, AcbC-lesioned rats responded less than shams on
the active lever (lesion: F1,10 = 6.282, p = .031). There were no differences on responding on the inactive
lever at any delay (Fs ≤ 1.31, NS).
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Figure 32: Postoperative performance under an FR-1 schedule for delayed reinforcement
Data plotted to show the effects of delays. All groups discriminated between the active and the inactive lever, and
delays retarded acquisition of the active lever response in both groups. Postoperatively, shams’ performance was
unaltered, as was that of AcbC-lesioned rats in the 0 s delay condition. However, active lever responding was im-
paired postoperatively in AcbC-lesioned rats in the 10 s and 20 s conditions. (a) Responding of sham-operated con-
trol rats, under all three response–reinforcer delay conditions. The vertical black line indicates the time of surgery,
between testing sessions 14 and 15. (b) Responding of AcbC-lesioned rats under all delay conditions. The next fig-
ure replots these data to show the effect of the lesion more clearly.
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Figure 33: Effect
of AcbC lesions on
performance of
free-operant re-
sponding for de-
layed reinforce-
ment
Data plotted to
show the effects of
AcbC lesions (same
data as in the pre-
vious figure). There
was a delay-
dependent impair-
ment in AcbC-
lesioned rats, who
were impaired by
the lesion only
when reinforcement
was delayed. (a)
With a delay of 0 s,
AcbC-lesioned rats
performed just as
well as shams post-
operatively. The
vertical black line
indicates the time
of surgery, between
testing sessions 14
and 15. (b) With a
10 s delay, AcbC-
lesioned rats were
impaired post-
operatively com-
pared to shams. (c)
With a 20 s delay,
the postoperative
impairment in
AcbC-lesioned rats
was larger still, to
the extent that their
discrimination be-
tween active and
inactive levers was
no longer signifi-
cant.
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2.4.9 Experienced response–delivery and response–collection delays (Experiment 2)
As in Experiment 1, AcbC-lesioned rats experienced the same response–delivery delays as shams when
the programmed delay was 10 s, but experienced longer response–delivery delays when the programmed
delay was 20 s (Figure 34a). Similarly, AcbC-lesioned rats experienced the same response–collection de-
lays as shams when the programmed delay was 0 s, slightly but not significantly longer response–collec-
tion delays when the programmed delay was 10 s, and significantly longer response–collection delays
when the programmed delay was 20 s (Figure 34b).
Figure 34: Programmed and experienced delays to reinforcement following AcbC lesions made after initial
training
AcbC-lesioned rats experienced slightly longer response–delivery and response–collection delays than shams in the
20 s condition. Lesions were made after initial training; postoperative experienced delays are plotted. (Compare
Figure 29, p. 66, in which rats had no preoperative experience of the task.) (a) Mean experienced response–delivery
delays (one value calculated per subject). When the programmed delay was 0 s, reinforcers were delivered immedi-
ately so no data are shown. There were main effects of lesion (F1,21 = 9.14) and delay (F1,21 = 87.5, p < .001) but no
lesion × delay interaction (F1,21 = 1.91, NS). When the programmed delay was 10 s, the experienced delays did not
quite differ significantly between groups (F1,10 = 4.61, p = .057), but when the programmed delay was 20 s, AcbC-
lesioned rats experienced longer response–delivery delays (F1,11 = 6.29, * p = .029). (b) Mean experienced re-
sponse–collection delays (one value calculated per subject). There was a lesion × delay interaction (F2,31 = 3.85, p =
.032), as well as main effects of lesion (F1,31 = 11.9, p = .002) and delay (F2,31 = 171, p < .001). AcbC-lesioned rats
did not experience significantly different delays when the programmed delay was 0 s (F1,10 = 1.74, NS) or 10 s (F1,10
= 1.49, NS), but experienced significantly longer response–collection delays when the programmed delay was 20 s
(F1,11 = 13.7, ** p = .003).
2.4.10 Relationship between experienced delays and performance (Experiment 2)
There was a systematic relationship between the postoperative response rate and the programmed delay of
reinforcement, and this was altered in AcbC-lesioned rats. Figure 35a replots the rates of lever pressing
on session 24, the 10th postoperative session (compare Figure 30, p. 67). An analysis using the model le-
sion2 × programmed delay3 revealed a significant lesion × delay interaction (F2,31 = 5.09, p = .012). In this
session, there was no significant effect of delays on shams’ performance (F2,20 = 2.15, p = .143), though
there was for AcbC-lesioned rats (F2,11 = 9.01, p = .005). There were no significant differences in re-
sponding on this session between shams and AcbC-lesioned rats in the 0 s condition (F1,10 = 3.10, p =
.109) or the 10 s condition (F < 1, NS), but AcbC-lesioned rats responded less at 20 s delay (F1,11 = 6.74,
p = .025).
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Since the AcbC group experienced slightly longer response–delivery and response–collection delays
than shams when the programmed delay was non-zero (Figure 34), as before, the rate of responding in
session 24 was analysed as a function of the delays experienced postoperatively. The mean experienced
response–collection delay was calculated for postoperative sessions up to and including session 24; the
square-root-transformed number of lever presses in session 24 was then analysed using a general linear
model of the form lesion2 × experienced delaycov, with the factor × covariate interaction term included in
the model. This confirmed that the lesion affected responding in AcbC-lesioned rats, compared to con-
trols, in a delay-dependent manner, over and above the postoperative differences in experienced delay
(Figure 35b; lesion × experienced delay: F1,33 = 6.53, p = .015).
Figure 35: Performance as a function of delays to reinforcement in animals trained preoperatively before
sham or AcbC lesions were made
Response–reinforcer delays systematically lowered the rate of free-operant instrumental responding, and this rela-
tionship was altered in AcbC-lesioned rats, even allowing for differences in response–collection delays experienced
postoperatively. Lesions were made after initial training; postoperative experienced delays and response rates are
plotted. (Compare Figure 30, p. 67, in which rats had no preoperative experience of the task.) (a) The rate of re-
sponding on the active lever in session 24 (the 10th postoperative session; compare Figure 30) is plotted against the
programmed response–reinforcer delay. AcbC-lesioned rats responded significantly less than shams in the 20 s de-
lay condition (* p = .025). (b) Responding on the active lever in session 24 (the 10th postoperative session) plotted
against the experienced response-to-reinforcer-collection delays for postoperative sessions up to and including ses-
sion 24 (vertical error bars: SEM of the square-root-transformed number of responses in session 24; horizontal error
bars: SEM of the experienced response–collection delay). The gradients of the two lines differed significantly (# p =
.015; see text), indicating that the relationship between experienced delays and responding was altered in AcbC-
lesioned rats, compared to sham-operated controls.
2.4.11 Locomotor activity and body mass
AcbC-lesioned animals were hyperactive compared to sham-operated controls, and gained less mass then
shams across the experiments (Figure 36), consistent with previous results (Maldonado-Irizarry & Kelley,
1995; Parkinson et al., 1999a; Cardinal et al., 2001).
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Figure 36: Locomotor activity in a novel
environment and body mass in AcbC-
lesioned and sham-operated rats
AcbC-lesioned rats were significantly hy-
peractive compared to sham-operated con-
trols, and gained less weight, in both Ex-
periments 1 & 2. (a) Locomotor activity in
Experiment 1. Analysis using the model
lesion2 × (bin12 × S) revealed effects of le-
sion (F1,42 = 5.12, * p = .029), reflecting
hyperactivity in the AcbC group, with addi-
tional effects of bin (F5.7,237.9 = 13.3, ε?  =
.515, p < .001), reflecting habituation, and a
lesion × bin interaction (F5.7,237.9 = 2.52, ε?  =
.515, # p = .024). (b) Locomotor activity in
Experiment 2. The same patterns were ob-
served (data from five subjects were not
recorded due to a mechanical error; lesion:
F1,37 = 9.155, ** p = .004; bin: F9.3,345.2 =
13.5, ε?  = .848, p < .001; lesion × bin:
F9.3,345.2 = 3.18, ε?  = .848, ## p = .001). (c)
Preoperative and final body mass in both
experiments. Preoperatively, masses did not
differ between groups (Experiment 1: F < 1,
NS; Experiment 2: F1,42 = 1.008, NS), but in
both cases, AcbC-lesioned subjects gained
less mass than controls (Experiment 1: le-
sion × time: F1,41 = 95.9, ### p < .001;
group difference at second time point: F1,42
= 88.4, *** p < .001; Experiment 2: lesion ×
time: F1,42 = 13.53, ## p = .001; group dif-
ference at second time point: F1,42 = 7.37, **
p = .01).
2.5 DISCUSSION
These results establish that the AcbC contributes to learning of actions when the outcome is delayed. Le-
sions of the AcbC did not impair instrumental learning when the reinforcer was delivered immediately,
but substantially impaired learning with delayed reinforcement, indicating that the AcbC “bridges” ac-
tion–outcome delays during learning. Lesions made after learning also impaired performance of the in-
strumental response in a delay-dependent fashion, indicating that the AcbC also contributes to the per-
formance of actions for delayed reinforcement. Finally, the lesions did not impair the perception of rela-
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tive reward magnitude as assessed by responding on identical concurrent interval schedules for rein-
forcers of different magnitude, suggesting that the impulsive choice previously exhibited by AcbC-
lesioned rats (Cardinal et al., 2001) is attributable to deficits in dealing with delays to reinforcement.
2.5.1 Effect of delays on instrumental learning in normal animals
As discussed in Chapter 1, delays have long been known to retard instrumental learning (Grice, 1948;
Dickinson et al., 1992). Despite this, normal rats have been shown to acquire free-operant responding
with programmed response–reinforcer delays of up to 32 s, or even 64 s if the subjects are pre-exposed to
the learning environment (Dickinson et al., 1992). Delays do reduce the asymptotic level of responding
(Dickinson et al., 1992), though the reason for this phenomenon is not clear. It may be that when subjects
learn a response with a substantial response–reinforcer delay, they never succeed in representing the in-
strumental action–outcome contingency fully. Alternatively, they may value the delayed reinforcer
slightly less; finally, the delay may also retard the acquisition of a procedural stimulus–response habit and
this might account for the decrease in asymptotic responding. It is not presently known to what degree
responses acquired with a response–reinforcer delay are governed by declarative processes (the action–
outcome contingency plus a representation of the instrumental incentive value of the outcome) or
procedural mechanisms (stimulus–response habits), both of which are known to influence instrumental
responding (Dickinson, 1994; Dickinson & Balleine, 1994); it is similarly not known whether the balance
of these two controlling mechanisms differs from that governing responses learned without such a delay.
2.5.2 Effect of AcbC lesions on instrumental learning and performance with or without
delays
In the absence of response–reinforcer delays, AcbC-lesioned rats acquired an instrumental response nor-
mally, responding even more than sham-operated controls. In contrast, blockade of NMDA glutamate
receptors in the AcbC has been shown to retard instrumental learning for food under a VR-2 schedule [in
which P(reinforcer│response) ≈ 0.5] (Kelley et al., 1997), as has inhibition or over-stimulation of PKA
within the Acb (Baldwin et al., 2002a). Concurrent blockade of NMDA and DA D1 receptors in the AcbC
synergistically prevents learning of a VR-2 schedule (Smith-Roe & Kelley, 2000). Once the response has
been learned, subsequent performance on this schedule is not impaired by NMDA receptor blockade
within the AcbC (Kelley et al., 1997). Furthermore, infusion of a PKA inhibitor (Baldwin et al., 2002a)
or a protein synthesis inhibitor (Hernandez et al., 2002) into the AcbC after instrumental training sessions
impairs subsequent performance, implying that PKA activity and protein synthesis in the AcbC contribute
to the consolidation of instrumental behaviour. Thus, manipulation of Acb neurotransmission can affect
instrumental learning. However, it is also clear that excitotoxic destruction of the AcbC or even the entire
Acb does not impair simple instrumental conditioning to any substantial degree. Rats with Acb or AcbC
lesions acquire lever-press responses on sequences of RR schedules [in which P(reinforcer│response)
typically declines from around 1 to 0.05 over training] at near-normal levels (Corbit et al., 2001; de
Borchgrave et al., 2002). In such ratio schedules, where several responses are required to obtain rein-
forcement, there is no delay between the final response and reinforcement, but there are delays between
earlier responses and eventual reinforcement. It is therefore of interest that when differences between
AcbC-lesioned rats and shams have been observed, AcbC-lesioned animals have been found to respond
somewhat less than shams on such schedules late in training, when the ratio requirement is high (Corbit et
al., 2001; de Borchgrave et al., 2002), consistent with the present results. However, lesioned rats are fully
sensitive to changes in the instrumental contingency (Balleine & Killcross, 1994; Corbit et al., 2001; de
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Borchgrave et al., 2002). The present results indicate that when AcbC-lesioned rats are exposed to a FR-1
schedule for food [P(reinforcer│response) = 1] in the absence of response–reinforcer delays, they acquire
the response at normal rates.
In contrast, when a delay was imposed between responding and reinforcement, AcbC-lesioned rats
were impaired relative to sham-operated controls, in a systematic and delay-dependent fashion. The ob-
servation that learning was not affected at zero delay rules out a number of explanations of this effect. For
example, it cannot be that AcbC-lesioned rats are in some way less motivated for the food per se, since
they responded normally (in fact, more than shams) when the food was not delayed. Thus although the
Acb and its dopaminergic innervation are clearly very important in motivating behaviour (e.g. Ikemoto &
Panksepp, 1999; Cardinal et al., 2002a; Salamone & Correa, 2002; Salamone et al., 2003), this is not on
its own a sufficient explanation for the present results. An explanation in terms of a rate-dependent im-
pairment is also not tenable, since the AcbC-lesioned rats were capable (in the zero-delay condition) of
responding at a level greater than they exhibited in the non-zero-delay conditions. Depletion of Acb DA
also impairs rats’ ability to work on high-effort schedules, where many, or very forceful, responses are
required to obtain a given amount of food (Salamone & Correa, 2002; Salamone et al., 2003). However,
in the present experiments the ratio requirement (one response per reinforcer) and the force required per
press were both held constant across delays, so this effect cannot explain the present results. Similarly,
although AcbC lesions are known to impair the control over behaviour by Pavlovian CSs (Everitt et al.,
1991; Parkinson et al., 1999a; Parkinson et al., 2000c; Hall et al., 2001; Cardinal et al., 2002a; 2002b),
there was no Pavlovian stimulus that was differentially associated with delayed as opposed to immediate
reinforcement in this task, so this cannot explain the present results.
The present results also indicated that when there were programmed delays to reinforcement, AcbC-
lesioned animals experienced longer response–reinforcer collection delays, partly due to their failure to
collect the reinforcer as promptly as shams. These additional experienced delays probably retarded
learning. However, in addition to this effect, there was a further deficit exhibited by AcbC-lesioned rats:
even allowing for the longer response–collection delays that they experienced, their instrumental learning
was impaired more by delays than that of sham-operated controls. Deficits in learning with delayed rein-
forcement may account for some of the variability in the effect of AcbC lesions or local pharmacological
manipulations on instrumental learning across different schedules.
The fact that pre-exposure to the context improves instrumental learning in normal rats (Dickinson et
al., 1992) suggests one possible mechanism by which AcbC lesions might retard learning when delays are
present. When a reinforcer arrives, it may be associated either with a preceding response, or with the
context. Therefore, in normal animals, pre-exposure to the context may retard the formation of context–
reinforcer associations by latent inhibition, or it might serve to retard the formation of associations
between irrelevant behaviours and reinforcement. Similarly, non-reinforced exposure to the context forces
the subjects to experience a zero-response, zero-reinforcer situation, i.e. P(outcome│no action) = 0.
When they are then exposed to the instrumental contingency, such that P(outcome│action) > 0, this prior
experience may enhance their ability to detect the instrumental contingency ∆P = P(outcome│action) –
P(outcome│no action). In one aversive Pavlovian conditioning procedure in which a CS was paired with
electric shock, AcbC lesions have been shown to impair conditioning to discrete CSs, but simultaneously
to enhance conditioning to contextual (background) CSs (Parkinson et al., 1999b), though not all behav-
ioural paradigms show this effect (Levita et al., 2002; Jongen-Relo et al., 2003). It is therefore possible
that enhanced formation of context–reinforcer associations may explain the retardation of response–rein-
forcer learning in AcbC-lesioned rats in the presence of delays.
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The instrumental task used requires animals either to associate their response with the delayed food
outcome (an action–outcome association that can be used for goal-directed behaviour), or to strengthen a
stimulus–response association (habit) when the reinforcer eventually arrives (Dickinson, 1994; Dickinson
& Balleine, 1994). Both mechanisms require the animal to maintain a representation of their past action
so it can be reinforced (as a habit) or associated with food when the food finally arrives. This mnemonic
requirement is not obviated even if the animal learns to predict the arrival of food using discriminative
stimuli, and uses these stimuli to reinforce its responding (conditioned reinforcement): in either case,
since the action precedes reinforcement, some trace of past actions or stimuli must persist to be affected
by the eventual delivery of food.
A delay-dependent impairment was also seen when AcbC lesions were made after training. This indi-
cates that the AcbC does not only contribute to the learning of a response when there is an action–out-
come delay: it also contributes to the performance of a previously learned response. Again, AcbC-
lesioned rats were only impaired when that previously learned response was for delayed (and not immedi-
ate) reinforcement. Of course, learning of an instrumental response depends upon the animal being able to
perform that response; preventing an animal from pressing a lever (a performance deficit) would clearly
impair its ability to learn an instrumental response on that lever to obtain food. In the present set of ex-
periments, it is clear that AcbC-lesioned rats were just as able to perform the response itself (to press the
active lever and to discriminate it physically from the inactive lever) as controls, as shown by their nor-
mal performance in the zero-delay condition, so it is not clear whether the delay-dependent impairments
in learning and performance can be attributed to the same process. Again, since responding was unaf-
fected in the zero-delay condition, many alternative interpretations (such as a lack of motivation to work
for the food) are ruled out. It may be that AcbC-lesioned rats are impaired at representing a declarative
instrumental action–outcome contingency when the outcome is delayed, or in forming or executing a pro-
cedural stimulus–response habit when the reinforcing event does not follow the response immediately. It
may also be that they represent the action–outcome contingency normally but value the food less because
it is delayed, and that this affects responding in a free-operant situation even though there is no alternative
reinforcer available.
2.5.3 Discrimination of reinforcer magnitude in AcbC-lesioned rats
Excitotoxic lesions of the whole Acb do not prevent rats from detecting changes in reward value (induced
either by altering the concentration of a sucrose reward or by changing the deprivational state of the sub-
ject) (Balleine & Killcross, 1994). Such lesions also do not impair rats’ ability to respond faster when en-
vironmental cues predict the availability of larger rewards (Brown & Bowman, 1995), and nor does inac-
tivation of the Acb with local anaesthetic or blockade of AMPA glutamate receptors in the Acb (Giertler
et al., 2004); the effects of intra-Acb NMDA receptor antagonists have varied (Hauber et al., 2000;
Giertler et al., 2003; 2005). AcbC-lesioned rats can still discriminate large from small rewards (Cardinal
et al., 2003b; 2004). Similarly, DA depletion of the Acb does not affect the ability to discriminate large
from small reinforcers (Salamone et al., 1994; Cousins et al., 1996; Salamone et al., 2001), and systemic
DA antagonists do not affect the perceived quantity of food as assessed in a psychophysical procedure
(Martin-Iverson et al., 1987). The present study extends these findings by demonstrating that excitotoxic
AcbC lesions do not impair rats’ ability to allocate their responses across two schedules in proportion to
the experienced reinforcement rate, even when the two schedules are identical except in the magnitude of
the reinforcements they provide, thus demonstrating their sensitivity to reinforcer magnitude is quantita-
tively no worse than shams’. In this experiment, there was substantial undermatching, but this is common
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(Davison & McCarthy, 1988; Williams, 1994) (see also Leon & Gallistel, 1998; Weatherly et al., 2004);
differential cues signalling the two rewards might have improved matching but were not used in the pres-
ent experiments since it is known that AcbC lesions can themselves affect rats’ sensitivity to cues signal-
ling reinforcement (Everitt et al., 1991; Parkinson et al., 1999a; Parkinson et al., 2000c; Hall et al., 2001;
Cardinal et al., 2002a; 2002b). Given that AcbC-lesioned subjects showed a reduced probability of
switching between two identical RI schedules, it may be the case that an enhanced sensitivity to the COD
accounts for the better matching exhibited by the AcbC-lesioned rats (Shahan & Lattal, 1998). Alterna-
tively, the lesion may have enhanced reinforcer magnitude discrimination or improved the process by
which behaviour allocation is matched to environmental contingencies. In summary, the present results
suggest that AcbC damage leads to pathological impulsive choice (preferring a small, immediate rein-
forcer to a large, delayed reinforcer; Cardinal et al., 2001) not through any relative lack of value of large
reinforcers, but through a specific deficit in responding for delayed reinforcement.
2.5.4 Contribution of the AcbC to reinforcement learning
The term “reinforcement learning” simply means learning to act on the basis of reinforcement received; it
is a term used in artificial intelligence research (Minsky, 1961) that does not specify the mechanism of
such learning (Russell & Norvig, 1995; Haykin, 1999). The present results indicate that the AcbC is a
reinforcement learning structure that is critical for instrumental conditioning when outcomes are delayed,
consistent with electrophysiological and functional neuroimaging evidence indicating that the ventral
striatum responds to recent past actions (Schultz et al., 2000; Cromwell & Schultz, 2003) and to predicted
future rewards (Schultz et al., 1992; Miyazaki et al., 1998; Martin & Ono, 2000; Schultz et al., 2000;
Breiter et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2001; Cromwell & Schultz, 2003; Bjork et al., 2004), and with com-
putational models suggesting a role for the striatum in predicting future primary reinforcement (Houk et
al., 1995; Wickens & Kötter, 1995). However, when reward is certain and delivered immediately, the
AcbC is not necessary for the acquisition of instrumental responding. The delay-dependent role of the
AcbC indicates that it plays a role in allowing actions to be reinforced by bridging action–outcome delays
through a representation of past acts or future rewards. Acb lesions have also produced delay-dependent
impairments in a delayed-matching-to-position task (Dunnett, 1990; Reading & Dunnett, 1991); their ef-
fects on the delayed-matching-to-sample paradigm have also been studied, but a more profound and de-
lay-independent deficit was observed, likely due to differences in the specific task used (Burk & Mair,
2001). Finally, the AcbC is not alone in containing neurons that respond to past actions and future re-
wards. The dorsal striatum is another such structure (Schultz et al., 2000; Takikawa et al., 2002; Crom-
well & Schultz, 2003; Kawagoe et al., 2004); expression of stimulus–response habits requires the dorsal
striatum (Packard & McGaugh, 1996; Yin et al., 2004), and the rate at which rats learn an arbitrary re-
sponse that delivers electrical stimulation to the substantia nigra is correlated with the degree of potentia-
tion of synapses made by cortical afferents onto striatal neurons, a potentiation that requires DA receptors
(Reynolds et al., 2001; Reynolds & Wickens, 2002). The prelimbic area of rat PFC is important for the
detection of instrumental contingencies and contributes to goal-directed, rather than habitual, action
(Balleine & Dickinson, 1998; Corbit & Balleine, 2003). Similarly, the OFC and BLA encode reinforce-
ment information and project to the AcbC, and lesions of these structures can produce impulsive choice
(see Kheramin et al., 2002; Mobini et al., 2002; Cardinal et al., 2004; Winstanley et al., 2004b). It is not
yet known whether lesions of these structures also impair learning with delayed reinforcement.
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2.6 CONCLUSIONS
These experiments have demonstrated that excitotoxic lesions of the AcbC do not prevent rats from
learning a simple instrumental response when the reinforcing outcome follows their action immediately.
However, AcbC lesions impair rats’ ability to learn the same instrumental response when the outcome is
delayed. The lesions also impair performance of an instrumental response that was learned preoperatively,
but again only when response–reinforcer delays are present. These results suggest that the AcbC makes a
specific contribution to reinforcement learning and instrumental performance when reinforcing outcomes
do not arrive immediately but are delayed. AcbC dysfunction, which is known to promote impulsive
choice, appears to cause rats to be temporally short-sighted, learning preferentially about the proximal
consequences of their actions and preferring immediate over delayed rewards.
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Chapter 3: Hippocampal lesions
facilitate instrumental learning with
delayed reinforcement but induce
impulsive choice in rats
3.1 ABSTRACT
Background: Animals must frequently act to influence the world even when the reinforcing outcomes of their ac-
tions are delayed. Learning with action–outcome delays is a complex problem, and little is known of the neural
mechanisms that bridge such delays. When outcomes are delayed, they may be attributed to (or associated with) the
action that caused them, or mistakenly attributed to other stimuli, such as the environmental context. Consequently,
animals that are poor at forming context–outcome associations might learn action–outcome associations better with
delayed reinforcement than normal animals. The hippocampus contributes to the representation of environmental
context, being required for aspects of contextual conditioning. It was therefore hypothesized that animals with hip-
pocampal lesions would be better than normal animals at learning to act on the basis of delayed reinforcement.
These experiments tested the ability of H-lesioned rats to learn a free-operant instrumental response using delayed
reinforcement, and what is potentially a related ability—the ability to exhibit self-controlled choice, or to sacrifice
an immediate, small reward in order to obtain a delayed but larger reward.
Results: Rats with sham or excitotoxic hippocampal lesions acquired an instrumental response with different delays
(0, 10, or 20 s) between the response and reinforcer delivery. These delays retarded learning in normal rats. H-
lesioned rats responded slightly less than sham-operated controls in the absence of delays, but they became better at
learning (relative to shams) as the delays increased; delays impaired learning less in H-lesioned rats than in shams.
In contrast, lesioned rats exhibited impulsive choice, preferring an immediate, small reward to a delayed, larger re-
ward, even though they preferred the large reward when it was not delayed.
Conclusions: These results support the view that the hippocampus hinders action–outcome learning with delayed
outcomes, perhaps because it promotes the formation of context–outcome associations instead. However, although
lesioned rats were better at learning with delayed reinforcement, they were worse at choosing it, suggesting that self-
controlled choice and learning with delayed reinforcement tax different psychological processes.
3.2 BACKGROUND
When one event or stimulus in the world reliably precedes and predicts another, animals readily learn the
predictive relationship, exemplified by Pavlovian conditioning (Pavlov, 1927). Similarly, when an ani-
mal’s own actions cause (and thus predict) some outcome, animals learn this relationship (an aspect of
instrumental or operant conditioning). Frequently, however, antecedent and consequent events are sepa-
rated in time. When animals act to obtain reinforcement, the final outcomes do not always follow the ac-
tions immediately; thus, animals must learn instrumental action–outcome contingencies using delayed
reinforcement. Delays can hamper both Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning (Dickinson, 1980;
Mackintosh, 1983; Dickinson, 1994; Gallistel, 1994; Hall, 1994): for example, although animals can
bridge substantial delays to acquire instrumental responses, instrumental conditioning has long been ob-
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served to be systematically impaired as the outcome is delayed (Skinner, 1938; Perin, 1943; Grice, 1948;
Harker, 1956; Lattal & Gleeson, 1990; Dickinson et al., 1992). Furthermore, individual variation in the
ability to use delayed reinforcement may determine one aspect of impulsivity: an animal able to forgo
short-term poor rewards in order to obtain delayed but better rewards may be termed self-controlled,
whereas an animal that cannot tolerate delays to reward may be said to exhibit impulsive choice (Ainslie,
1975; Evenden, 1999b; Evenden, 1999a; Ainslie, 2001).
There are several psychological reasons why action–outcome delays might impair learning or per-
formance of an instrumental response (Ainslie, 1975; Cardinal et al., 2004). Instrumental responding is
controlled by several processes (Dickinson, 1994; Dickinson & Balleine, 1994; Cardinal et al., 2002a);
for example, rats work for outcomes that they value, using knowledge of the action–outcome contingen-
cies in force to produce goal-directed actions. They also develop direct stimulus–response (S–R) associa-
tions, or habits. Action–outcome delays might, therefore, reduce the instrumental incentive value of the
goal: valuing the goal less, animals may work less for it. Similarly, delays may hinder animals’ ability to
perceive the action–outcome contingency. Delayed rewards may also be less effective at reinforcing S–R
habits. It is presently not known whether responses acquired with delayed reinforcement are governed by
a different balance of habits and goal-directed actions than responses acquired with immediate reinforce-
ment. However, one important factor in learning to act using delayed reinforcement may be the role of the
environmental context. The animal’s task is to attribute the outcome to its actions; instead, it may errone-
ously associate the outcome with the context, since the context is a cue that is temporally closer to the
outcome than the action. The longer the delay, the more this contextual competition comes to impair the
learning of the action–outcome contingency. Instrumental conditioning with delayed reinforcement can
be enhanced if rats are exposed to the relevant contextual cues prior to instrumental training, and this en-
hancement is lessened if “free” (non-contingent) rewards are given during the contextual pre-exposure
periods (Dickinson et al., 1992; Dickinson & Balleine, 1994). These results are consistent with the theory
that during the action–outcome delay, contextual cues compete with the action to become associated with
the outcome; pre-exposing the animals to the context with no consequences reduces this contextual com-
petition, by making the context a bad predictor of the outcome (perhaps via latent inhibition or learned
irrelevance), and this in turn makes the action–outcome contingency more salient and easier to learn
(Dickinson et al., 1992; Dickinson & Balleine, 1994).
Little is known of the neural basis of instrumental learning with delayed reinforcement (Cardinal et
al., 2004). However, there is good evidence that the hippocampus contributes to the representation of
context. Lesions of the hippocampal formation (H) have been shown to impair Pavlovian conditioning to
a contextual CS, but not to a discrete CS, in rats (Hirsh, 1974; Selden et al., 1991; Kim & Fanselow,
1992; Phillips & LeDoux, 1992; Honey & Good, 1993; Jarrard, 1993; Kim et al., 1993; Phillips &
LeDoux, 1994; Phillips & LeDoux, 1995; Chen et al., 1996; Maren & Fanselow, 1997; Anagnostaras et
al., 1999; Rudy et al., 2002), at least for some processes involving contextual representation (Good &
Honey, 1991; Holland & Bouton, 1999; Good, 2002). Since context–outcome associations are thought to
hinder instrumental learning with delayed reinforcement (contextual competition) (Dickinson et al., 1992;
Dickinson & Balleine, 1994), it follows that if H lesions impair the formation of associations involving
the context, such lesions might reduce contextual competition and hence facilitate instrumental condi-
tioning when there is an action–outcome delay.
To investigate whether the hippocampus contributes to learning with delayed reinforcement, the pres-
ent experiments examined the ability of rats with excitotoxic lesions of the hippocampus to acquire in-
strumental responding with delayed reward, comparing them to sham-operated controls. Each subject was
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allowed to respond freely on two levers, one of which produced reinforcement after a delay of 0, 10, or 20
s (Figure 22, p. 53). H-lesioned rats were slightly impaired at learning the lever-press response in the ab-
sence of delays. Delays retarded learning in sham-operated controls, but the delays did not impair the H-
lesioned rats to the same extent. Thus, as the delays were increased, H-lesioned rats became better at
learning relative to controls, suggesting that the presence of delays had less of an effect on H-lesioned
rats. To establish whether this relative improvement in learning with delayed reinforcement would also
manifest itself as improved self-control, a different group of rats were also trained on a task in which they
had to choose between an immediate, small reward and a delayed, large reward (Figure 15, p. 38) and
made excitotoxic hippocampal lesions, before retesting the rats postoperatively. Good learning with de-
layed reinforcement did not translate to self-controlled choice. H lesions severely impaired rats’ ability to
choose the larger reward when it was delayed, but not when the delay preceding delivery of the large re-
ward was removed, demonstrating that hippocampal lesions induce impulsive choice.
3.3 METHODS
3.3.1 Overview of experiments
3.3.1.1 Experiment 1: Effects of hippocampal lesions on acquisition of instrumental responding with
delayed reinforcement
Forty-eight rats received excitotoxic lesions of the hippocampus (n = 32) or sham lesions (n = 16). Five died post-
operatively. Subject were next trained in a task in which they had continuous access to two identical levers; one
lever delivered a single food pellet each time it was pressed, and the other lever had no effect. For some rats, the
food pellet was delivered immediately after the lever press (0 s condition; 9 H-lesioned rats and 5 shams). For oth-
ers, each pellet was delayed by either 10 s (9 H, 6 sham) or 20 s (9 H, 5 sham). Subjects were trained for 14 ses-
sions. They then had their locomotor activity assessed, and finally they were killed and perfused for histology.
3.3.1.2 Experiment 2: Effects of hippocampal lesions on choice involving delayed reinforcement
Twenty-four naïve rats were first trained to press levers for food and to nosepoke to initiate lever presentations in
discrete trials. Subjects were then trained on a choice-of-delayed-reinforcement task (described below) for 19 ses-
sions. After this, they were assigned to matched groups (as described below) to receive lesions of the hippocampus
(H, n = 16) or sham lesions (sham, n = 8). Following recovery, they were retested on the basic task for 7 sessions to
obtain a baseline measure of performance. After this, 4 sessions were given in which all delays were omitted in al-
ternate sessions (DNDN design; D = delays present, N = no delays). Half of the subjects began this test with the
delays present, and half with no delays (counterbalanced across groups). As a deficit was observed during testing
(before histological data were available), further behavioural tests were given to elucidate the nature of the deficit.
All subjects were given a further 6 sessions with no delays, in an attempt to re-equalize the two groups’ performance
and ensure that all animals would come to prefer the lever producing the large reinforcer. Delays were then re-
introduced for a further 6 sessions. All subjects then underwent a food consumption test and had their locomotor
activity assessed; finally, they were killed and perfused for histology.
3.3.2 Subjects and housing conditions
Subjects were male Lister hooded rats (Harlan-Olac UK Ltd) housed in a temperature-controlled room (minimum
22°C) under a 12:12 h reversed light–dark cycle (lights off 07:30 to 19:30). Subjects were approximately 15 weeks
old on arrival at the laboratory and were given a minimum of a week to acclimatize, with free access to food, before
experiments began. Experiments took place between 09:00 and 21:00, with individual subjects being tested at a con-
sistent time of day. Subjects had free access to water, and were housed either in groups of four (Experiment 1) or in
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pairs (Experiment 2). During behavioural testing, they were maintained at 85–90% of their free-feeding mass using
a restricted feeding regimen. Feeding occurred in the home cages at the end of the experimental day. All procedures
were subject to UK Home Office approval (Project Licence 80/1767) under the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act
1986.
3.3.3 Excitotoxic lesions of the hippocampus
Subjects were anaesthetized with Avertin (2% w/v 2,2,2-tribromoethanol, 1% w/v 2-methylbutan-2-ol, and 8% v/v
ethanol in PBS, sterilized by filtration, 10 ml/kg intraperitoneally) and placed in a Kopf or Stoelting stereotaxic
frame (David Kopf Instruments, Tujunga, California, USA; Stoelting Co., Wood Dale, Illinois, USA) fitted with
atraumatic ear bars. The skull was exposed and a dental drill was used to remove the bone directly above the injec-
tion and cannulation sites. The dura mater was broken with the tip of a hypodermic needle, avoiding damage to un-
derlying venous sinuses. Excitotoxic hippocampal lesions targeted both the dorsal hippocampus and the ventral hip-
pocampus. Lesions were made by injecting 0.09 M N-methyl-D-aspartic acid (NMDA; Sigma, UK) (Jarrard & Mel-
drum, 1993) through a glass micropipette (tip diameter 50–100 µm), using the coordinates, volumes, and timings
shown in Table 5. The toxin had been dissolved in 0.1 M phosphate buffer (composition 0.07 M Na2HPO4, 0.028 M
NaH2PO4 in double-distilled water, sterilized by filtration) and adjusted with NaOH to a final pH of 7.2–7.4. Sham
lesions were made in the same manner except that vehicle was infused. At the end of the operation, animals were
given 15 ml/kg of sterile 5% w/v glucose, 0.9% w/v sodium chloride intraperitoneally. Lesioned animals were
given 0.2 ml of 5 mg/ml diazepam (Roche Products Ltd, UK) i.m. to prevent seizures. They were given two weeks
to recover, with free access to food, and were handled regularly. Any instances of postoperative constipation were
treated with liquid paraffin orally and rectally. At the end of this period, food restriction commenced or was re-
sumed.
Region within
hippocampus
Sites per
hemisphere
AP ML DV Volume in-
jected per site
Duration of
each infusion
Time allowed for diffusion
after each infusion
Dorsal 2 –2.8 ±1.6 –3.3 0.4 µl 4 min 3 min
–4.2 ±2.6 –3.0 0.4 µl 4 min 3 min
Ventral 4 –4.8 ±4.8 –6.0 0.2 µl 2 min 3 min
–5.3 ±4.6 –4.2 0.2 µl 2 min 3 min
–5.3 ±4.6 –6.0 0.2 µl 2 min 3 min
–5.8 ±4.6 –4.2 0.2 µl 2 min 3 min
Table 5: Parameters for excitotoxic hippocampal lesions
Excitotoxic lesions of the entire hippocampus were made by injecting 0.09 M NMDA at the coordinates
shown (see Methods). Along the anteroposterior (AP), mediolateral (ML), and dorsoventral (DV) axes,
positive coordinates are in the anterior, left, and superior directions respectively. All coordinates are in
mm. DV coordinates are measured from the dura above the injection site.
3.3.4 Behavioural apparatus
Behavioural testing was conducted in one of two types of operant chamber of identical configuration (from Med
Associates Inc., Georgia, Vermont, USA, or Paul Fray Ltd, Cambridge, UK). Each chamber was fitted with a 2.8 W
overhead house light and two retractable levers on either side of an alcove fitted with an infrared photodiode to de-
tect head entry and a 2.8 W lightbulb (“traylight”). Sucrose pellets (45 mg, Rodent Diet Formula P, Noyes, Lancas-
ter, New Hampshire, USA) could be delivered into the alcove. The chambers were enclosed within sound-
attenuating boxes fitted with fans to provide air circulation. The apparatus was controlled by software written by
RNC in C++ (Stroustrup, 1986) using the Whisker control system (Cardinal, 2000; Cardinal & Aitken, 2001).
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3.3.5 Instrumental conditioning with delayed reinforcement (Experiment 1)
A variety of free-operant schedules may be used to assess instrumental acquisition with delayed reinforcement
(Dickinson et al., 1992). The simplest possible free-operant schedule was used in the present experiments (Cardinal
& Cheung, 2005) (Chapter 2): each response scheduled a reinforcer after the programmed delay (Figure 22, p. 53).
In such a schedule, if the subject responds during the delay, the experienced response–reinforcer delay will not
match the programmed delay (as the second response is temporally close to the first reinforcer). However, this
schedule has the advantage that the response–reinforcer contingency is constant (every response does in fact cause
the delivery of reinforcement) and the reinforcement rate is not constrained (Dickinson et al., 1992). So that re-
sponding could be attributed to the instrumental response–reinforcer contingency, rather than the effects of general
activity or reinforcement itself, responding on the active lever was compared to responding on a control lever that
had no programmed consequence. Different groups of lesioned and sham-operated subjects were trained using dif-
ferent delays; the delay was consistent for every subject. Delays of 0, 10, and 20 s were used.
Immediately after subjects were placed in the operant chamber, the sessions began. The houselight was illumi-
nated, and remained on for each 30-min session. Two levers were extended into the chamber. All lever responses
were first debounced to 10 ms (i.e. if a response occurred within 10 ms of a previous valid response it was attributed
to mechanical bounce and ignored). Other than this, all lever presses and nosepokes into the food alcove were re-
corded. Responding on the left (active) lever caused a single pellet to be delivered following a delay, under an FR-1
schedule (Figure 22, p. 53). To attribute acquisition of a lever-press response to the instrumental contingency, it is
also necessary to control for the effects of reinforcer delivery itself (Dickinson et al., 1992); therefore, responding
on the active lever was compared to responding on the right (inactive) lever, which had no programmed conse-
quence. To minimize any potential contribution of conditioned reinforcement to the task, no explicit signals were
associated with pellet delivery other than the noise of the pellet dispenser apparatus. The schedule was implemented
in the SimpleSchedules program (Cardinal, 2002b).
3.3.6 Lever and nosepoke training prior to the delayed reinforcement choice task
(Experiment 2)
Subjects were first trained under an FR-1 schedule (where every lever press leads to the immediate delivery of a
pellet) with only one lever present, to a criterion of a total of 50 presses on that lever across 30-min sessions, first for
the left lever and then for the right. Subjects were then trained on a simplified version of the full task. The session
began with the levers retracted and the operant chamber in darkness. Trials began every 40 s with the illumination of
the houselight and the traylight. The subject was required to make a nosepoke response within 10 s, or the trial was
aborted and the chamber returned to darkness (scored as an omission). If the subject nosepoked within the time
limit, the traylight was extinguished and a single lever was presented (left/right at random). Subjects were required
to respond on the lever within 10 s or the lever was retracted and the chamber darkened (scored as an omission).
Upon pressing the lever, the houselight was switched off, a single pellet was delivered immediately and the traylight
was illuminated until either the pellet was collected or 10 s had elapsed, whereupon the chamber was darkened, and
the trial was counted as successful. Rats were trained to a criterion of 60 successful trials in one hour (the maximum
possible with trials lasting 40 s being 90). The schedule was implemented in the ImpulsiveChoice program
(Cardinal, 2002a).
3.3.7 Choice between small, immediate and large, delayed rewards (Experiment 2)
The task was based on Evenden & Ryan’s (1996) procedure and has been described before (Cardinal et al., 2000;
2001; Winstanley et al., 2004b). The session began in darkness with the levers retracted; this was designated the
intertrial state. Trials began at 100-s intervals; the format of a single trial is shown in Figure 15 (p. 38). Each trial
began with the illumination of the houselight and the traylight. The rat was required to make a nosepoke response,
ensuring that it was centrally located at the start of the trial (latency to poke was designated the initiation latency). If
the rat did not respond within 10 s of the start of the trial, the operant chamber was reset to the intertrial state until
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the next trial began and the trial was scored as an omission. If the rat was already nosepoking when the trial began,
the next stage followed immediately. Upon a successful nosepoke, the traylight was extinguished and one or both
levers were extended. One lever was designated the Delayed lever, the other the Immediate lever (counterbalanced
left/right). The latency to choose a lever was recorded. (If the rat did not respond within 10 s of lever presentation,
the chamber was reset to the intertrial state until the next trial and the trial was scored as an omission.) When a lever
was chosen, both levers were retracted and the houselight was switched off. Choice of the Immediate lever caused
the immediate delivery of one pellet; choice of the Delayed lever caused the delivery of 4 pellets following a delay.
When reinforcement was delivered, the traylight was switched on. Multiple pellets were delivered 0.5 s apart. If the
rat collected the pellets before the next trial began, then the traylight was switched off and time from delivery of the
first pellet until a nosepoke occurred was recorded as the collection latency. If the rat did not collect the food within
10 s of its delivery, the operant chamber entered the intertrial state, though collection latencies were still recorded up
to the start of the next trial. The chamber was then in the intertrial state and remained so until the next trial. There
was no mechanism to remove uneaten pellets, but failure to collect the reward was an extremely rare event.
The delay was varied systematically across the session. A session consisted of 5 blocks, each comprising two
trials on which only one lever was presented (one trial for each lever, in randomized order) followed by ten free-
choice trials. Preferences were calculated for each block from only those trials on which the subject responded. De-
lays for each block were 0, 10, 20, 40 and 60 s respectively. As trials began every 100 s, the total session length was
100 minutes; subjects received one session per day. The schedule was implemented in the ImpulsiveChoice program
(Cardinal, 2002a).
Preoperatively, subjects were trained on this task for 19 sessions. To allocate subjects into matched groups for
surgery, their degree of sensitivity to the effects of delays within each session was assessed for the last three preop-
erative sessions, by calculating the slope of the linear regression of percentage choice of the large delayed reinforcer
against delay for each subject. Rats were ranked by this measure, and rats with equivalent levels of performance
were randomized to receive sham or H lesion surgery: the ranked list was divided into ordered triplets, and from
each triplet one subject was assigned to the sham group and the other two to the H group, at random.
3.3.8 Locomotor activity in a novel environment
Locomotor activity was measured in wire mesh cages, 25 (W) × 40 (D) × 18 (H) cm, equipped with water bottles
and two horizontal infrared photocell beams situated 1 cm from the floor that enabled movements along the long
axis of the cage to be registered. The apparatus was controlled by software written by RNC in Arachnid (Paul Fray
Ltd, Cambridge), a real-time extension to BBC BASIC V running on an Acorn Archimedes series computer. Sub-
jects were placed in these cages, which were initially unfamiliar to them, and their activity was recorded for 2 h. All
animals were tested in the food-deprived state.
3.3.9 Food consumption tests
Food consumption was assessed using four tests, conducted in subjects’ home cages (always with only one rat pres-
ent) on separate days under conditions of food deprivation. (1) Subjects were given free access to the 45-mg sucrose
pellets used as reinforcers (Rodent Diet Formula P, Noyes, Lancaster, New Hampshire, USA) for 30 minutes; the
amount eaten was recorded. (2) This test was repeated with the chow used as the maintenance diet. (3) The time
taken to consume 50 sucrose pellets was recorded. (4) The time taken to consume an equivalent mass of chow (2.25
g) was recorded.
3.3.10 Histology
Rats were deeply anaesthetized with pentobarbitone sodium (200 mg/ml, minimum of 1.5 ml i.p.) and perfused
transcardially with 0.01 M PBS followed by 4% paraformaldehyde in PBS. Their brains were removed and postfixed
in paraformaldehyde before being dehydrated in 20% sucrose for cryoprotection. The brains were sectioned co-
ronally at 60 µm thickness on a freezing microtome and every third section mounted on chromium potassium sul-
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phate/gelatin-coated glass microscope slides and allowed to dry. Sections were passed through a series of ethanol
solutions of descending concentration (3 minutes in each of 100%, 95%, and 70% v/v ethanol in water) and stained
for ~5 min with cresyl violet. This stain comprises 0.05% w/v aqueous cresyl violet (Raymond A. Lamb Ltd, East-
bourne, UK), 2 mM acetic acid, and 5 mM formic acid in water. Following staining, sections were rinsed in water
and 70% ethanol before being differentiated in 95% ethanol. Finally, they were dehydrated and delipidated in 100%
ethanol and Histoclear (National Diagnostics, UK) before being cover-slipped using DePeX mounting medium
(BDH, UK) and allowed to dry. The sections were used to verify lesion placement and assess the extent of lesion-
induced neuronal loss. Lesions were detectable as the absence of visible neurons (cell bodies of the order of 100 µm
in diameter with a characteristic shape), often associated with a degree of tissue collapse (sometimes with conse-
quent ventricular expansion when the lesion was adjacent to a ventricle) and gliosis (visible as the presence of
smaller, densely staining cells).
3.3.11 Data analysis
Data collected by the chamber control programs were imported into a relational database (Microsoft Access 97) for
case selection and analysed with SPSS 11. Figures were created with SigmaPlot 2001/v7 and Adobe Illustrator 8.
All graphs show group means and error bars are ±1 standard error of the mean (SEM) unless otherwise stated. Count
data (lever presses and locomotor activity counts), for which variance increases with the mean, were subjected to a
square-root transformation prior to any analysis (Howell, 1997). Homogeneity of variance was verified using
Levene’s test (Levene, 1960). General linear models are described as dependent variable = A2 × Bcov × (C5 × Dcov ×
S) where A is a between-subjects factor with two levels, B is a between-subjects covariate, C is a within-subjects
factor with five levels, and D is a within-subjects covariate; S denotes subjects in designs involving within-subjects
factors (Keppel, 1982). For repeated measures analyses, Mauchly’s test of sphericity of the covariance matrix was
applied (Mauchly, 1940) and the degrees of freedom corrected to more conservative values using the Huynh–Feldt
epsilon ε?  for any terms involving factors in which the sphericity assumption was violated (Huynh & Feldt, 1970).
3.4 RESULTS
3.4.1 Histology
In Experiment 1, there were five postoperative deaths. No rats were excluded after histological analysis;
final group sizes were 9 (H, 0 s delay)14, 5 (sham, 0 s delay)15, 9 (H, 10 s delay)16, 6 (sham, 10 s delay)17, 9
(H, 20 s delay)18, and 5 (sham, 20 s delay)19. In Experiment 2, there was one postoperative death (H
group), and one rat (sham group) fell ill five sessions after surgery and was killed. Histological analysis
revealed that the lesions were incomplete or encroached significantly on neighbouring structures in 3
subjects. These subjects were excluded; final group sizes were therefore 7 (sham)20 and 12 (H)21.
A diagram of the rat hippocampus was shown in Figure 12 (p. 28). Lesions of the hippocampus en-
compassed much of the dorsal and ventral hippocampal pyramidal cell (cornu ammonis CA1–CA3)
fields, the dentate gyrus, the subiculum, and the fimbriae. Neuronal loss and associated gliosis extended
in an anteroposterior direction from approximately –0.8 mm to –7.8 mm relative to bregma (negative co-
ordinates are posterior). Damage to the dorsal and ventral hippocampal commissure was occasionally
                                                     
14 Experiment 1, H, 0 s delay: final subjects T2, T3, T4, T5, T6, T7, T8, T9, T15 (n = 9).
15 Experiment 1, sham, 0 s delay: final subjects T10, T11, T12, T13, T14 (n = 5).
16 Experiment 1, H, 10 s delay: final subjects T17, T18, T19, T20, T21, T22, T23, T24, T32 (n = 9).
17 Experiment 1, sham, 10 s delay: final subjects T25, T26, T27, T28, T29, T30 (n = 6).
18 Experiment 1, H, 20 s delay: final subjects T16, T31, T35, T36, T37, T38, T40, T47, T48 (n = 9).
19 Experiment 1, sham, 20 s delay: final subjects T41, T42, T43, T45, T46 (n = 5).
20 Experiment 2, sham: final subjects S1, S2, S7, S10, S13, S15, S17 (n = 7).
21 Experiment 2, H: final subjects S3, S5, S6, S9, S11, S18, S19, S20, S21, S22, S23, S24 (n = 12).
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seen, but damage to the overlying cortex was minimal. Schematics of the lesions are shown in Figure 37,
and photomicrographs of a representative lesion are shown in Figure 38.
Figure 37: Schematic of lesions of the hippocampus
Black shading indicates the extent of neuronal loss common to all subjects (and also the third and lateral ventricles);
grey indicates the area lesioned in at least one subject. Coronal sections are (from top to bottom) –1.8, –2.8, –3.8,
–4.8, –5.8, and –6.8 mm relative to bregma. Diagrams are modified from Paxinos & Watson (1998). Panels a–c
show schematics for Experiment 1 (acquisition of a free-operant instrumental response with delayed reinforcement;
0 s, 10 s, and 20 s groups, respectively) while d shows schematics for Experiment 2 (choice between small, immedi-
ate and large, delayed reinforcement).
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Figure 38: Photomicrographs of lesions of the hippocampus
Lesions of the hippocampus: photomicrographs of sections ~4.7 mm posterior to bregma, stained with cresyl violet.
(a) Sham-operated rat, dorsal hippocampus, right hemisphere (medial to the left). CA1, cornu ammonis field 1;
CA3, cornu ammonis field 3; DG, dentate gyrus; cc, corpus callosum; PtA, parietal association cortex. (b) H-
lesioned rat; same area as (a). There is tissue collapse within the lesion and the ventricle is greatly expanded. (c)
Sham-operated rat, ventral hippocampus. AHiPM, amygdalohippocampal area, posteromedial part; cp, cerebral pe-
duncle. (d) H-lesioned rat, same area as (c). (e) Coronal diagram of the rat brain at 4.8 mm posterior to bregma
(Paxinos & Watson, 1998), with scale. The upper grey box indicates approximately the region shown in (a) and (b);
the lower grey box indicates approximately the region shown in (c) and (d).
3.4.2 Acquisition of instrumental responding (Experiment 1)
As expected, response–reinforcer delays retarded the acquisition of instrumental responding in sham-
operated rats (Figure 39a). However, this impairment was lessened in H-lesioned rats (Figure 39b). H-
lesioned rats responded less than shams in the absence of a response–reinforcer delay (Figure 40a), but
responded as well as shams when delays were imposed (Figure 40b,c); H-lesioned rats were even facili-
tated numerically relative to shams in the 20 s delay condition (Figure 40c), though this difference was
not statistically significant on its own. These conclusions were reached statistically as follows.
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An overall ANOVA, using the model lesion2 × delay3 × (session14 × lever2 × S), revealed a lesion ×
lever × delay interaction (F2,37 = 4.16, p = .023), justifying sub-analyses, in addition to effects of delay
(F2,37 = 17.9, p < .001), lever (F1,37 = 435, p < .001), delay × lever (F2,37 = 4.16, p < .001), session
(F5.35,198.0 = 38.7, ε?  = .412, p < .001), delay × session (F10.7,198.0 = 3.03, p = .001), session × lever
(F4.99,184.6 = 17.5, ε?  = .384, p < .001), and delay × session × lever (F10.0,184.6 = 2.30, ε?  = .384, p = .015).
The differences between the groups were in their responding on the active lever (active lever, lesion ×
delay: F2,37 = 3.71, p = .034) rather than on the inactive lever (inactive lever, terms involving lesion:
maximum F2,37 = 1.146, NS). All six groups learned to discriminate between the two levers, responding
more on the active lever than on the inactive lever (p < .05, main effect of lever for each group).
Delays reduced the rate of acquisition and the final level of responding on the active lever for sham-
operated rats (Figure 39a; delay, F2,13 = 58.7, p < .001; delay × session, F10.8,70.4 = 2.67, ε?  = .417, p =
.007). Delays also increased responding on the inactive lever somewhat (Figure 39a; delay: F2,13 = 5.26, p
= .021; delay × session, F13.1,85.2 = 1.22, ε?  = .504, NS). Similarly, in H-lesioned rats, delays reduced re-
sponding on the active lever (Figure 39b; delay: F2,24 = 12.3, p < .001; delay × session: F7.8,93.1 = 2.76, ε?
= .298, p = .009), although they did not significantly affect responding on the inactive lever (delay: F2,24 =
1.91, NS; delay × session: F12.3,147.9 = 1.37, ε?  = .474, NS).
At 0 s delay, H-lesioned rats responded significantly less than shams on the active lever (Figure 40a;
lesion: F1,12 = 6.11, p = .029). There were no differences in responding on the inactive lever (Fs < 1, NS).
At 10 s delay, there were no differences between sham-operated and H-lesioned rats in responding on
either the active or the inactive lever (Fs < 1.35, p ≥ .266). At 20 s delay, there were also no significant
differences on either lever (active lever: lesion F1,12 = 2.485, p = .141, lesion × session F < 1, NS; inactive
lever: Fs < 1, NS), although the H-lesioned rats responded numerically more than shams on the active
lever throughout.
Inspection of Figure 39 also suggested that delays had less of an impact on the final (asymptotic) rates
of responding in H-lesioned rats than in shams. The sessions were divided by eye into an “acquisition”
phase (sessions 1–6) and a “stable” phase (sessions 7–14). Responding on the active lever in the stable
phase was analysed; this revealed a lesion × delay interaction (F2,37 = 3.44, p = .043), with delays mark-
edly reducing stable rates of responding in shams (F2,13 = 42.3, p < .001) but less so in H-lesioned rats
(F2,24 = 3.11, p = .063).
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Figure 39: Effects of delays to reinforcement on acquisition of free-operant responding under an FR-1 sched-
ule
Data plotted to show the effects of delays. All groups discriminated between the active and the inactive lever, and
delays retarded acquisition of the active lever response in both groups. (a) Responding of sham-operated control
rats, under all three response–reinforcer delay conditions. (b) Responding of H-lesioned rats under all delay condi-
tions. The next figure replots these data to show the effect of the lesion more clearly.
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Figure 40: Effect of hippocampal (H) le-
sions on acquisition of free-operant re-
sponding with delayed reinforcement
Data plotted to show the effects of hippo-
campal lesions (same data as in the previous
figure). There was a delay-dependent im-
pairment in H-lesioned rats (significant le-
sion × delay interaction, see text), who
learned less well than shams only when re-
inforcement was not delayed. (a) With a
delay of 0 s, H-lesioned rats responded less
on the active lever than shams did. (b) With
a 10 s delay, H-lesioned rats responded the
same as shams. (c) With a 20 s delay, H-
lesioned rats responded more than shams on
the active lever, though this difference was
not statistically significant on its own.
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3.4.3 Experienced response–delivery and response–collection delays (Experiment 1)
For every reinforcer delivered, the active lever response most closely preceding it in time was identified,
and the time between that response and delivery of the reinforcer (the “response–delivery delay”) was
calculated. This time can therefore be equal to or less than the programmed delay, and is only relevant for
subjects experiencing non-zero programmed response–reinforcer delays. The response-to-reinforcer-
collection (“response–collection”) delays were also calculated: for every reinforcer delivered, the re-
sponse most closely preceding it and the nosepoke most closely following it were identified, and the time
between these two events calculated. This time can be shorter or longer than the programmed delay, and
is relevant for all subjects.
H-lesioned rats experienced slightly shorter response–delivery delays than shams when the pro-
grammed delay was 10 s or 20 s (Figure 41a): there was a lesion × programmed delay interaction (F1,25 =
6.28, p = .019), and simple effects of the lesion when the programmed delay was 10 s (F1,13 = 8.49, p =
.012) and when it was 20 s (F1,12 = 9.50, p = .009).
H-lesioned rats also experienced slightly shorter response–collection delays across all programmed
delays (Figure 41b) (lesion: F1,37 = 4.21, p = .047), though the difference was not significant at any one
programmed delay (lesion × programmed delay: F2,37 = 2.35, p = .109; simple effects of the lesion at dif-
ferent programmed delays: maximum F1,12 = 3.08, p = .105).
These differences in the mean delay experienced by each rat were reflected in differences in the distri-
bution of response–delivery and response–collection delays when the programmed delay was non-zero
(Figure 41c,d). All experienced delays for a given subject were aggregated across all sessions, and the
proportion falling into different 2-s ranges were calculated to give one value per range per subject. For
response–delivery delays, H-lesioned rats experienced slightly fewer long delays and slightly more short
delays in the 10 s condition (lesion × range, F3.6,47.0 = 3.40, ε?  = .723, p = .019) and in the 20 s condition
(lesion × range, F1.4,16.6 = 6.54, ε?  = .138, p = .014). For response–collection delays, there were no differ-
ences in the distribution of delays experienced by H-lesioned and sham rats in the 0 s condition (lesion
and lesion × range, Fs < 1, NS). In the 10 s condition, H-lesioned rats experienced a slightly lower pro-
portion of long response–collection delays and a slightly higher proportion of short response–collection
delays (lesion × range, F4.4,57.6 = 3.60, ε?  = .233, p = .009). Similarly, in the 20 s condition, H-lesioned
rats experienced a slightly lower proportion of long response–collection delays and a slightly higher pro-
portion of short response–collection delays than shams (lesion × range, F3.1,37.5 = 7.02, ε?  = .164, p =
.001).
Since H-lesioned rats experienced slightly shorter delays than sham-operated rats, it was necessary to
take this into account when establishing the effect of delays on learning, as follows.
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Figure 41: Programmed and experienced delays to reinforcement in H-lesioned and sham-operated rats
H-lesioned rats experienced slightly shorter response–delivery delays (the delay between the most recent lever press
and pellet delivery) than shams, and slightly shorter response–collection delays (the delay between the most recent
lever press and pellet collection). (a) Mean experienced response–delivery delays (one value calculated per subject).
When the programmed delay was 0 s, reinforcers were delivered immediately so no data are shown. H-lesioned rats
experienced shorter response–delivery delays when the programmed delay was 10 s (* p = .012) or 20 s (** p =
.009). (b) Mean experienced response–collection delays (one value calculated per subject). H-lesioned rats experi-
enced slightly shorter delays overall (* p = .047, main effect of lesion), but the experienced delays did not differ
significantly at any given programmed delay. (c) Distribution of experienced response–delivery delays. All experi-
enced delays for a given subject were aggregated across all sessions, and the proportion falling into different 2-s
ranges were calculated to give one value per range per subject; the graphs show means ± SEMs of these values. The
interval notation “[a, b)” indicates that a given delay x falls in the range a ≤ x < b. H-lesioned rats experienced
slightly fewer long delays and slightly more short delays in the 10 s condition (p = .019) and in the 20 s condition (p
= .014). (d) Distribution of experienced response–collection delays, displayed in the same manner as (c). There were
no differences in the distribution of delays experienced by H-lesioned and sham rats in the 0 s condition. In the 10 s
condition, H-lesioned rats experienced a slightly lower proportion of long delays and a slightly higher proportion of
short delays (p = .009), and similarly in the 20 s condition (p = .001).
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3.4.4 Effect of delays on learning (Experiment 1)
There was a systematic relationship between the acquisition rate and the programmed delay of reinforce-
ment, and this was altered in H-lesioned rats, who were less impaired by delays (compared to their per-
formance at zero delay) than shams were. Figure 42a replots the rates of lever pressing on session 6, at the
end of the initial “acquisition” phase. Despite the comparatively low power of such an analysis, lever
pressing was analysed for this session only, using the model lesion2 × delay3. This revealed a significant
lesion × delay interaction (F2,37 = 8.67, p = .001), which was analysed further. Increasing delays signifi-
cantly reduced the rate of responding in this session for shams (F2,13 = 31.4, p < .001) and H-lesioned rats
(F2,24 = 8.88, p = .001). H-lesioned rats responded less than shams at zero delay (F1,12 = 8.08, p = .015),
were not significantly different from shams at 10 s delay (F1,13 = 1.848, p = .197), and responded more
than shams at 20 s delay (F1,12 = 6.23, p = .028).
Since the H group experienced slightly shorter response–delivery and response–collection delays than
shams when the programmed delay was non-zero (Figure 41), it is important to establish whether this ef-
fect alone was responsible for the lesser effect of delays on learning, or whether the effect of delays in H-
lesioned rats was lessened over and above any effect to decrease the experienced delay. The mean experi-
enced response–collection delay was calculated for each subject up to and including session 6. The
square-root transformed number of lever presses in session 6 was then analysed using a general linear
model of the form lesion2 × experienced delaycov × S; unlike a standard analysis of covariance, the factor
× covariate interaction term was included in the model. This confirmed that the detrimental effects of de-
lay upon learning were reduced in H-lesioned rats, compared to controls, over and above the differences
in experienced delay (Figure 42b; lesion × experienced delay: F1,39 = 10.8, p = .002).
Figure 42: Learning as a function of programmed and
experienced delays to reinforcement in H-lesioned and
sham-operated rats
The imposition of response–reinforcer delays systemati-
cally retarded the acquisition of free-operant instrumental
responding, but this effect was lessened in H-lesioned rats,
even allowing for differences in experienced response–
collection delays. (a) The rate of lever pressing in session
6 is plotted against the programmed response–reinforcer
delay. There was a lesion × delay interaction (### p =
.001): H-lesioned rats responded less than shams at zero
delay (* p = .015), were not significantly different from
shams at 10 s delay (p = .197), and responded more than
shams at 20 s (* p = .028). (b) Responding in session 6
plotted against the experienced response-to-reinforcer
collection delays for sessions 1–6 (vertical error bars:
SEM of the square-root-transformed number of responses
in session 6; horizontal error bars: SEM of the
experienced response–collection delay, calculated up to
and including that session). The gradients of the two lines
differed significantly (## p = .002; see text), indicating
that the relationship between experienced delays and
responding was altered in H-lesioned rats.
3.4.5 Experienced delays and learning on the inactive lever (Experiment 1)
No such delay-dependent lesion effects were observed for the inactive lever. Experienced inactive-
response–delivery delays (calculated across all sessions in the same manner as for the active lever) were
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much longer and more variable than corresponding delays for the active lever, because subjects responded
on the inactive lever so little. Means ± SEMs were 271 ± 31 s (sham, 0 s), 241 ± 23 s (H, 0 s), 201 ± 45 s
(sham, 10 s), 184 ± 45 s (H, 10 s), 127 ± 21 s (sham, 20 s), and 171 ± 36 s (H, 20 s). ANOVA of these
data showed that these experienced inactive-response–delivery delays depended upon the programmed
active-response–delivery delay (delay: F2,37 = 3.80, p = .032) but there was no effect of the lesion and no
lesion × delay interaction (Fs < 1, NS). Experienced inactive-response–collection delays were 272 ± 31 s
(sham, 0 s), 242 ± 23 s (H, 0 s), 204 ± 45 s (sham, 10 s), 186 ± 45 s (H, 10 s), 130 ± 21 s (sham, 20 s), and
174 ± 35 s (H, 20 s). Again, ANOVA that these experienced delays depended upon the programmed ac-
tive-response–delivery delays (delay: F2,37 = 3.68, p = .035) but there was no effect of the lesion and no
lesion × delay interaction (Fs < 1, NS). When the square-root-transformed number of responses on the
inactive lever in session 6 was analysed with the experienced delays up to that point as a predictor, using
the model lesion2 × experienced inactive-response–collection delaycov just as for the active lever analysis,
there was no lesion × experienced delay interaction; neither was there an effect of lesion or experienced
delay (maximum F2,37 = 1.54, NS).
3.4.6 Choice between an immediate, small reward and a large, delayed reward
(Experiment 2)
Preoperatively, subjects preferred the larger reinforcer less when it was delayed, and the groups remained
matched following later histological selection (Figure 43a). Choice ratios (percent choice of the large,
delayed reinforcer, calculated for all free-choice trials on which subjects responded) from the last 3 pre-
operative sessions were analysed using the model lesion intent2 × (delay5 × S). While there was a strong
effect of delay (F2.2,36.9 = 22.9, p < .001), no terms involving lesion intent were significant (Fs < 1, NS).
The choice patterns of the two groups diverged following surgery, with the H-lesioned rats choosing
the large, delayed reinforcer less than sham-operated controls (Figure 43b). Comparison of choice in the
last 3 preoperative sessions (Figure 43a) to that in the first 7 postoperative sessions (Figure 43b), using
the model lesion2 × (pre/post2 × delay5 × S) revealed a lesion × pre/post interaction (F1,17 = 6.50, p =
.021). However, at this point, analysis of postoperative choice patterns on their own (Figure 43b) did not
reveal a significant difference between the two groups (lesion: F1,17 = 3.46, p = .08; delay × lesion: F < 1,
NS); as it did not take account of preoperative choice patterns, this analysis was less powerful. Later, H-
lesioned rats diverged further from sham-operated controls and the difference between the two became
significant even without taking account of preoperative information (see below). Both groups remained
sensitive to the delay postoperatively (sham, effect of delay: F2.1,12.8 = 4.59, ε?  = .531, p = .03; lesion, ef-
fect of delay: F1.5,16.5 = 7.05, ε?  = .374, p = .01).
There were no differences between H-lesioned and sham-operated rats in any other measures col-
lected, including the rate of omissions, the latency to initiate trials, the latency to choose a lever, the la-
tency to collect food, and the rate of nosepoking in the food alcove during delays to reinforcement. Data
from the 7 baseline postoperative sessions (sessions 20–26) were analysed. Omissions were very infre-
quent (overall, rats failed to initiate and/or press a lever on 0.2% of trials) and there were no group dif-
ferences in the rates of omission (F < 1, NS). Initiation latencies did not differ between groups (lesion: F
< 1, NS; lesion × delay, F2.8,48.0 = 1.027, ε?  = .706, NS). Neither did choice latencies: an analysis using the
model lesion2 × (delay5 × lever2 × S) revealed no significant terms involving lesion (Fs < 1.06, NS). Food
collection latencies were analysed using the model lesion2 × (choice2 × delay5 × S). Predictably, rats were
slower to collect the food following choice of the large, delayed reinforcer as the delays got longer
(choice × delay: F2.4,38.5 = 19.8, ε?  = .602, p < .001; effect of delay following choice of the small, immedi-
Chapter 3: Hippocampal lesions on learning and choice with delayed reinforcement 97
ate reinforcer: F2.5,39.7 = 1.63, ε?  = .62, NS; effect of delay following choice of the large, delayed rein-
forcer: F2.2,35.8 = 18.4, ε?  = .559, p < .001) but this was not influenced by the lesion (terms involving le-
sion, maximum F1,16 = 1.93, NS). The proportion of the delay spent nosepoking did not alter as a function
of the delay, and was not affected by the lesion (only applicable to trials on which the large reinforcer was
chosen with a non-zero delay; delay, F1.3,22.3 = 2.38, ε?  = .437, p = .131; lesion × delay, F1.3,22.3 = 1.53, ε?
= .437, NS; lesion: F < 1, NS).
Figure 43: Effects of hippocampal lesions on choice between immediate, small rewards and large, delayed
rewards
(a) Pattern of choice in the last three sessions before surgery; the sham and lesion groups were matched for perform-
ance. Rats’ preference for the large reinforcer declined with delay (p < .001). (b) Choice in the first seven postop-
erative sessions. Although there was a change in behaviour in the lesioned group (lesion × pre/postop., p = .021),
the difference between the two groups was not significant in its own right for these sessions (p = .08). (c) Effects of
omitting all delays in alternating sessions (error bar, 2 SED for the three-way interaction). H-lesioned rats remained
sensitive to the contingencies, altering their behaviour in response to delay omission, as shams did. (d) Last of six
further consecutive sessions in which delays were omitted. Both groups preferred the large reinforcer strongly when
it was not delayed, with no differences between sham and H-lesioned rats. (e) First three sessions following reintro-
duction of delays. H-lesioned rats were impulsive, choosing the large, delayed reinforcer less often than shams (* p
= .027). (f) Next three sessions following reintroduction of delays. H-lesioned rats remained impulsive (** p =
.007), and generalization between trial blocks occurred, reducing their preference for the large reinforcer in the zero-
delay block as well (see text).
3.4.7 Effects of removing and reintroducing delays to the large reinforcer (Experiment 2)
Both H-lesioned and sham-operated rats were sensitive to the removal of delays in alternating sessions,
increasing their preference for the large reinforcer during sessions when it was not delayed (Figure 43c).
Choice ratios from these sessions were analysed using the model lesion2 × (delays/no delays2 × trial
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block5 × S). This revealed a delays/no delays × block interaction (F2.5,42.6 = 15.3, ε?  = .626, p < .001).
Additionally, there was a main effect of lesion (F1,17 = 7.23, p = .016), indicating a greater overall prefer-
ence for the smaller reinforcer in H-lesioned rats compared to controls across these sessions, but there
were no other significant terms involving lesion (Fs < 1.05, NS). In sessions when delays were present,
both H-lesioned and sham-operated rats showed a within-session shift in preference as the delay increased
(sham, effect of delay: F4,24 = 4.79, p = .006; H-lesioned, effect of delay: F2.6,28.1 = 20.21, ε?  = .638, p <
.001), and H-lesioned rats chose the smaller, immediate reinforcer more often (lesion: F1,17 = 5.91, p =
.026). In sessions when delays were not present, neither group showed a within-session shift in preference
(shams: F4,24 = 2.46, p = .073; H-lesioned: F2.1,23.5 = 1.63, ε?  = .534, NS), though again the H-lesioned rats
showed a stronger preference for the smaller reinforcer (F1,17 = 6.61, p = .02).
These analyses suggested that the H-lesioned rats’ preference for the larger reward was less than that
of shams even when it was not delayed. However, an alternative possibility is that the H-lesioned rats
were loath to choose the large reinforcer when it was delayed, and that this generalized to affect prefer-
ence even when it was not delayed (Cardinal et al., 2001; 2003b). Consequently, subjects were given a
further six sessions with no delays present; preference on the last of these sessions is shown in Figure
43d. H-lesioned rats showed a strong preference for the large reinforcer when it was not delayed, just as
shams did, with mean choice ratios >94% in all conditions. In this session, there were no group differ-
ences (Fs < 1, NS) and no within-session shift in preference (Fs < 1, overall and for H-lesioned and
sham-operated groups individually).
When delays were reintroduced (sessions 37–42), preference for the larger, delayed reinforcer de-
clined much more sharply in H-lesioned rats than in shams (Figure 43e,f). Preference for the large rein-
forcer declined first at long delays, then progressively at shorter delays, such that even responding in the
zero-delay block was affected. In sessions 37–39, H-lesioned rats chose the large reinforcer less often
than shams (lesion: F1,17 = 5.90, p = .027; lesion × delay: F1.9,32.7 = 1.16, ε?  = .482, NS), with this differ-
ence being significant for 10 s and 20 s delays (p < .05) but not 0 s (p = .075), 40 s (p = .058), or 60 s de-
lays (p = .054). In sessions 40–42, the pattern was essentially the same (lesion: F1,17 = 9.47, p = .007; le-
sion × delay: F1.6,28.0 = 1.286, ε?  = .412, NS), except that individual differences were now significant at all
delays (p < .05).
3.4.8 Locomotor activity, body mass, and food consumption
H-lesioned animals were hyperactive compared to sham-operated controls in both experiments (Figure
44a,b), as reported previously (Good & Honey, 1997; McNish et al., 1997). In Experiment 1, analysis of
the square-root-transformed number of infrared beam breaks using the model lesion2 × (bin12 × S) re-
vealed effects of lesion (F1,41 = 9.77, p = .003), reflecting hyperactivity in the H group, with additional
effects of bin (F8.2,335.7 = 58.4, ε?  = .744, p < .001), reflecting habituation, and a lesion × bin interaction
(F8.2,335.7 = 2.95, ε?  = .744, p = .003). In Experiment 2, hyperactivity was again observed (lesion: F1,17 =
24.1, p < .001; bin: F8.6,145.7 = 15.9, ε?  = .779, p < .001; lesion × bin: F < 1, NS).
In Experiment 1, they remained the same weight as sham-operated controls throughout, though in Ex-
periment 2, which lasted longer, they gained less weight than shams (Figure 44c). There were no differ-
ences between groups preoperatively in either experiment (Fs ≤ 1.35, NS); in Experiment 1, the groups
gained weight at the same rate (lesion × time, F < 1, NS; group difference at second time point: F < 1,
NS), but in Experiment 2, which lasted longer, the H-lesioned rats weighed less at the end of the experi-
ment (lesion × time, F1,15 = 14.5, p = .002; group difference at second time point: F1,15 = 8.56, p = .01).
Data from two H-lesioned subjects in Experiment 2 were lost.
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H-lesioned rats consumed their maintenance chow more quickly and consumed more of it, but they did
not differ from sham-operated controls in their consumption of the sucrose pellets employed as rein-
forcers in the behavioural tasks. In 30 minutes, H-lesioned rats consumed more chow (11.2 ± 0.6 g) than
shams (8.2 ± 0.8 g) (F1,7 = 8.36, p = .01). However, there were no differences between the mass of su-
crose pellets consumed in 30 minutes by H-lesioned rats (17.5 ± 1.2 g) and by shams (18.3 ± 1.6 g) (F <
1, NS). H-lesioned rats were quicker to consume 2.5 g of chow (taking 302 ± 18 s) than shams (385 ± 24
s) (Levene’s test indicated significant heterogeneity of variance; Mann–Whitney U7,12 = 18, p = .045).
However, although H-lesioned rats were also slightly quicker to consume 2.5 g of sucrose pellets (taking
160 ± 9 s) than shams (who took 176 ± 12 s), this difference was not significant (F1,17 = 1.24, p = .281).
Figure 44: Locomotor activity in a novel
environment and body mass in H-
lesioned and sham-operated rats
H-lesioned rats were significantly hyperac-
tive compared to sham-operated controls, in
both (a) Experiment 1 (p = .003) and (b)
Experiment 2 (p < .001). (c) Body mass
across both experiments. There were no
differences between groups preoperatively
in either experiment; in Experiment 1, the
groups gained weight at the same rate, but
in Experiment 2, which lasted longer, the H-
lesioned rats weighed less at the end of the
experiment (p = .01).
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3.5 DISCUSSION
Excitotoxic lesions of the dorsal and ventral hippocampus slightly retarded instrumental learning on a
continuous reinforcement (FR-1) schedule in the absence of response–reinforcer delays. However, H-
lesioned rats were only impaired when reinforcement was delivered immediately, and not when it was
delivered after a delay. H-lesioned rats were less sensitive to the deleterious effects of response–reinforcer
delays on learning, to the extent that with long (20 s) response–reinforcer delays, H-lesioned rats showed
numerically better discrimination between the active and inactive levers than shams (Figure 40, Figure
42). Despite this delay-dependent facilitation of instrumental conditioning, H-lesioned rats were less able
than shams to choose a delayed, large reinforcer in preference to an immediate, small reinforcer (Figure
43). That is, H-lesioned rats exhibited impulsive choice.
3.5.1 Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning with delayed reinforcement
Free-operant instrumental conditioning, and instrumental discrimination learning, have long been known
to be impaired systematically by response–reinforcer (action–outcome) delays (Skinner, 1938; Grice,
1948; Lattal & Gleeson, 1990; Dickinson et al., 1992). This might be for several reasons (Mackintosh,
1974; Ainslie, 1975; Cardinal et al., 2004) because instrumental responding depends on several processes,
including knowledge of the action–outcome contingency, a representation of the instrumental incentive
value of the outcome, S–R habits, and the influence of Pavlovian CSs that have motivational significance
through processes such as conditioned reinforcement and PIT (Dickinson, 1994; Dickinson & Balleine,
1994; Cardinal et al., 2002a). Action–outcome delays might affect several of these processes. For exam-
ple, such delays may hinder the subject’s ability to perceive the action–outcome contingency, so the sub-
ject is unaware that its actions will result in the outcome. Delays might reduce the value of the goal, so
the subject is less willing to work for it. Delays might also impair the process by which S–R habits are
reinforced; finally, they might affect the degree to which stimuli associated with reinforcement by Pav-
lovian conditioning are capable of motivating behaviour. In the present experiment, no explicit stimuli
were presented associated with either the response or the reinforcer, to minimize the possible contribution
of processes such as conditioned reinforcement. Nevertheless, it is largely an open question which proc-
esses contributing to instrumental learning and performance are the ones most affected by response–rein-
forcer delays; for example, it is not present known whether responses acquired with delayed reinforce-
ment are governed by a different balance of habits and goal-directed actions than responses acquired with
immediate reinforcement.
However, one process has been clearly demonstrated to influence learning with delays, and that proc-
ess involves the environmental context. The effect of contextual factors on learning was first demon-
strated in Pavlovian conditioning; the two paradigms typically used are known as delay conditioning and
trace conditioning. In both cases, the interstimulus interval (ISI), which is the time between the onset of
the CS and the onset of the US, is greater than zero. When a CS is followed by a US and the two overlap
and are contiguous in time, the paradigm is known as “delay” conditioning (the terminology is somewhat
confusing). When a CS is followed by a US and the two do not overlap, so that there is a gap between the
end of the CS and the start of the US, the paradigm is known as “trace” conditioning (because the US
must be associated with a “trace” of the CS) (Mackintosh, 1974). “Trace” Pavlovian conditioning, with a
CS–US gap, results in poorer learning than “delay” Pavlovian conditioning, even if the ISI is held con-
stant (Pavlov, 1927; Ellison, 1964; Kamin, 1965; Schneiderman, 1966; Mackintosh, 1974; McEchron et
al., 1998; McEchron & Disterhoft, 1999; Weiss et al., 1999b; Beylin et al., 2001; Desmedt et al., 2003),
just as insertion of an action–outcome gap retards instrumental conditioning (Grice, 1948; Lattal & Glee-
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son, 1990; Dickinson et al., 1992), although delay conditioning can, if necessary, be made as hard as trace
conditioning for purposes of direct comparison by extending the ISI in the delay condition (Ivkovich et
al., 2000; Beylin et al., 2001). It has been suggested that delay and trace conditioning proceed via differ-
ent psychological mechanisms in humans, with the former depending on procedural memory and the lat-
ter on declarative memory (Clark et al., 2001a). Regardless, several lines of evidence suggest that con-
textual competition might reduce responding to the discrete CS in trace conditioning. As the trace gap is
lengthened, CRs tend to occur to the context instead of to the discrete CS (Odling-Smee, 1975; Marlin,
1980; Marlin & Miller, 1981; Selden et al., 1991; Parkinson et al., 1999b; Desmedt et al., 2003). Trace
conditioning can be improved by the addition of a “filler” stimulus during the CS–US gap, which might
decrease contextual competition or act as a secondary or conditioned reinforcer (Kamin, 1965; Kaplan &
Hearst, 1982; Rescorla, 1982). The smaller the ratio of the ISI to the intertrial interval (ITI; the time be-
tween the end of the US and the start of the next trial’s CS), the faster conditioning proceeds (Gallistel,
1994), and one explanation of this is that long ITIs reduce the strength of context–US associations, mak-
ing CS–US associations more salient. Finally, pre-exposure to the context in the absence of any US im-
proves subsequent conditioning to a discrete CS, as would be expected under the contextual competition
account since pre-exposure should produce latent inhibition of the context (see Boughner et al., 2004).
The idea that reinforcing outcomes may be associated with either a discrete predictor (such as a Pav-
lovian CS or an instrumental response) or the background context, and that the two compete in some way
for such association, also explains observations concerning the effect of contextual manipulations on in-
strumental conditioning (Dickinson et al., 1992; Dickinson & Balleine, 1994). Dickinson et al. (1992)
trained rats on a free-operant, FR-1 schedule of reinforcement very similar to the one used in the present
experiments, except that responding on the active lever was compared not to responding on an inactive
lever, but to responding of a yoked control group (who received the same pattern of reinforcement as the
“master” rats but whose lever presses had no consequence). They found that the rate of learning, and the
asymptotic level of responding, declined across groups as the response–reinforcer delay was increased
from 0 to 32 s; rats trained with a 64-s delay failed to learn at all, compared to yoked controls. However,
when rats were exposed to the training context, in the absence of the lever or any reinforcers, prior to
training, their learning was improved, and successful discrimination was seen even with a delay of 64 s.
This is exactly what would be expected if a process of contextual competition was operating. The sub-
ject’s task is to distinguish P(outcome│action) from P(outcome│no action), or, making the contribution
of the context explicit, to distinguish P(outcome│action + context) from P(outcome│context). Pre-
exposure to the context would be expected to produce latent inhibition to the context, reducing the
strength of context–outcome associations. Viewed another way, non-reinforced exposure to the context
forces the subjects to experience a zero-response, zero-reinforcer situation, i.e. P(outcome│context) = 0.
When they are then exposed to the instrumental contingency, such that P(outcome│action + context) > 0,
this prior experience may enhance their ability to detect the instrumental contingency ∆P =
P(outcome│action) – P(outcome│no action). This interpretation is also supported by the demonstration
that delivering “free” rewards (not contingent upon any response of the subject) during the contextual pre-
exposure reduces the beneficial effect of this pre-exposure on instrumental learning (Dickinson et al.,
1992); by increasing P(outcome│context), this reduces the subject’s ability to detect the contingency
(Wagner et al., 1968; Dickinson & Charnock, 1985; Colwill & Rescorla, 1986). Thus, the formation of
context–outcome associations may explain at least some of the ability of action–outcome delays to retard
instrumental learning.
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3.5.2 Contribution of the hippocampus to instrumental conditioning in the absence of
response–reinforcer delays
In the present study, excitotoxic hippocampal lesions impaired instrumental conditioning on an FR-1
schedule in the absence of response–reinforcer delays. This contrasts with the findings of Corbit et al.
(2000) that electrolytic lesions of the dorsal hippocampus did not affect the acquisition of instrumental
responding on a training schedule that progressed from a FI-20 schedule (in which reinforcement is deliv-
ered contingent upon the first response that is more than 20 s after the previous reinforcer) up to a RR-20
schedule [in which P(reinforcer│response) = 0.05], consistent with earlier results (Schmaltz & Isaacson,
1967). Rats with excitotoxic NMDA lesions of the dorsal hippocampus also responded at similar, or
greater, rates than sham-operated controls in this training regimen (Corbit et al., 2002). Obviously, the
discrepancy between these findings and the present results might be due to the differences in the sched-
ules used (FR-1 versus RR-20) or in the lesion (dorsal + ventral hippocampus versus dorsal hippocampus
only). However, it is less likely that the impairment seen in the present study was due to a primary moti-
vational difference: although the H-lesioned rats gained less mass than shams, the food consumption tests
showed that they ate as many of the pellets used as reinforcers as shams, and as quickly, suggesting that
the impairment observed was not due to reduced primary motivation for the food. It is, however, possible
that the impairment represents a rate-dependent impairment (i.e. that the H-lesioned rats in the zero-delay
condition were responding at their maximum possible rate).
Furthermore, electrolytic lesions of the dorsal hippocampus have been shown to render rats insensitive
to changes in the instrumental action–outcome contingency—but in a very specific manner (Corbit &
Balleine, 2000; Corbit et al., 2002). One way to test subjects’ sensitivity to this contingency is to train
them to respond on two levers for two different outcomes, and then to deliver one of the outcomes non-
contingently, as well as contingent upon the response. Subjects that are sensitive to the action–outcome
contingency should selectively reduce their responding for the foodstuff being delivered noncontingently
(Balleine & Dickinson, 1998). Electrolytic dorsal hippocampal lesions impaired this ability, though not
the ability to discriminate the two foodstuffs or to respond to changes in their value (Corbit & Balleine,
2000; Corbit et al., 2002). This may have been because the lesion affected contextual conditioning: if an
animal cannot associate noncontingent rewards with the context, it may erroneously associate them with
its own action. However, excitotoxic lesions of the dorsal hippocampus did not produce this effect, which
was reproduced instead by excitotoxic lesions of the entorhinal cortex and subiculum (Corbit et al.,
2002); lesions of these structures have also been shown to impair contextual conditioning in Pavlovian
tasks (Corodimas & LeDoux, 1995; Maren & Fanselow, 1997; Maren, 1999; Sacchetti et al., 1999; Bucci
et al., 2000; Burwell et al., 2004) (though see Phillips & LeDoux, 1995; Bannerman et al., 2001).
3.5.3 Contribution of the hippocampus to instrumental conditioning in the presence of
response–reinforcer delays
In contrast, when a delay was imposed between responding and reinforcement in an FR-1 schedule, H-
lesioned rats were not impaired at instrumental conditioning, and were even somewhat facilitated in
learning, relative to shams, when the reinforcer was delayed by 20 s. Since H-lesioned rats were impaired
in the absence of delays, this indicates a delay-dependent improvement in learning, relative to shams.
Furthermore, asymptotic rates of responding were reduced less by the delay in H-lesioned rats than in
controls. The facilitation of learning after a lesion strongly suggests that the lesion has disrupted one pro-
cess or strategy that normally competes with another process involved in solving the task (e.g. Jaffard &
Meunier, 1993; Kim & Baxter, 2001). Given the involvement of the hippocampus in contextual condi-
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tioning (Selden et al., 1991; Kim & Fanselow, 1992; Phillips & LeDoux, 1992; Honey & Good, 1993;
Jarrard, 1993; Kim et al., 1993; Phillips & LeDoux, 1995; Maren & Fanselow, 1997; Anagnostaras et al.,
1999; Holland & Bouton, 1999; Good, 2002; Rudy et al., 2002), the most obvious explanation is that the
lesions facilitated instrumental conditioning with delayed reinforcement by reducing competition from
context–reinforcer associations that normally hinder the formation or expression of response–reinforcer
associations.
Certain simple explanations of the present results can be ruled out. The delay-dependent impairment
makes an explanation in terms of differences in primary motivation for the food per se unlikely, and the
use of a control (inactive) lever means that differences in responding were not attributable to differences
in general activity levels, but instead to the contingencies in force on the active lever. The results also in-
dicated that when there were programmed delays to reinforcement, H-lesioned animals experienced
shorter response–reinforcer collection delays, partly because they collected the reinforcer more promptly
than shams. This effect probably improved learning in the delay conditions. However, in addition to this
effect, there was a further delay-dependent improvement exhibited by H-lesioned rats: even allowing for
the shorter response–collection delays that they experienced, their instrumental learning was impaired less
by delays than that of sham-operated controls.
The role of the hippocampus in learning an instrumental response with delayed reinforcement has been
examined before, though in a very different way. Port et al. (1993) found that aspirative lesions of the
dorsal hippocampus did not impair appetitive instrumental conditioning with delayed reinforcement. Nu-
merically, lesioned rats were slightly faster to learn (to reach a criterion number of reinforced responses)
than shams, but the difference was not significant. This is certainly consistent with the present results, in
which a delay-dependent improvement was seen as a result of excitotoxic lesions of the dorsal and ventral
hippocampus. However, direct comparison is difficult. Firstly, the lesion extent was different. Secondly,
aspirative lesions destroy not just overlying cortex but also fibres of passage (axons of non-hippocampal
neurons traversing the hippocampus) (Jarrard & Meldrum, 1993). Thirdly, the task used by Port et al.
(1993) was quite different to that used in the present study: lever presses led to the delivery of responses
after a 5-s delay, while responses during the delay were not reinforced; thus, higher rates of responding
inevitably reduced the action–outcome contingency. Fourthly, no other delays were tested and no zero-
delay condition was used, so any delay-dependent changes would not have been apparent. Fifthly, no
control lever was present, so that responding could only be compared across conditions (inferences from a
single condition being potentially confounded with general activity levels). Finally, an autoshaping pro-
cedure was used to train the rats, and autoshaping is itself known to be impaired by hippocampal lesions
(Reilly & Good, 1989; Good & Honey, 1991; Richmond & Colombo, 2002), so this may have mitigated
against finding an improvement in the lesioned group.
3.5.4 Contrasting the effects of hippocampal lesions on instrumental and Pavlovian
conditioning involving delayed reinforcement
Hippocampal lesions have also been found to affect Pavlovian conditioning involving temporally non-
contiguous stimuli. As discussed above, the two main paradigms used for this purpose are delay condi-
tioning (in which the CS and US overlap and are contiguous) and trace conditioning (in which there is a
gap between the CS and the US and they are non-contiguous). Trace conditioning is clearly more analo-
gous to the instrumental conditioning task with delayed reinforcement used in the present study, which
had response–reinforcer gaps (Mackintosh, 1974). Hippocampal lesions have been reported to impair
trace conditioning to a discrete explicit CS, sparing delay (contiguous) conditioning (Solomon et al.,
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1986; McEchron et al., 1998; McEchron & Disterhoft, 1999; Weiss et al., 1999a; Beylin et al., 2001;
Christian & Thompson, 2003; Shors, 2004). Trace discrimination learning can also be impaired by hippo-
campal lesions (Schmitt et al., 2004). Thus, hippocampal lesions appear to impair the acquisition of a
Pavlovian CR when there is a gap between CS and US. Indeed, it has been suggested that the hippocam-
pus is particularly important for associating discontiguous events—that is, when there is a temporal, or
indeed spatial, discontiguity or gap between two events to be associated (Wallenstein et al., 1998). In the
current study, however, hippocampal lesions delay-dependently facilitated (relative to shams) the acqui-
sition of an instrumental response when there was a gap between action and outcome. What accounts for
these apparently contradictory results?
Firstly, the neural differences between trace and delay conditioning may be not as great as it first
seems. The fact that hippocampal lesions have often been shown to impair trace conditioning, but not de-
lay conditioning, may be because trace conditioning is more difficult. If delay conditioning is rendered as
hard as trace conditioning by extending the delay (“long-delay conditioning”), the hippocampus is re-
quired (Beylin et al., 2001); similarly, H-lesioned subjects can exhibit trace conditioning if pretrained in a
delay conditioning paradigm (Beylin et al., 2001; Shors, 2004), some trace discrimination tasks are intact
after hippocampal lesions (Savage et al., 2004), and the hippocampus is not required for expression of the
trace response after learning (Takehara et al., 2002).
Secondly, it may be that a representation of context can help trace (and perhaps long-delay) Pavlovian
conditioning, while contextual associations only hinder instrumental responding in the present task, so a
lesion that disrupts contextual processing has a differential effect on the two. For example, if the CS dur-
ing trace conditioning acts as an occasion setter, signalling that the ensuing context will be followed by a
US (an example of feature-positive discrimination), then hippocampal lesions, which can impair both
feature-positive discrimination (Holland et al., 1999) and contextual conditioning, might be expected to
impair trace conditioning more than delay conditioning (N.J. Mackintosh, personal communication, 12
October 2004). Yet in instrumental conditioning with delayed reinforcement, as examined here, context–
outcome associations can only hinder the learning of response–outcome associations, so hippocampal le-
sions might be expected to improve learning in a delay-dependent fashion, as was observed.
A study by Desmedt et al. (2003) supports the hypothesis that trace and delay conditioning endow the
context with qualitatively different roles, though it does not allow a unifying conclusion to be drawn
about hippocampal function. Mice were trained on a contextual discrimination paradigm: they were given
electric shocks in one context (active context: A), but not in another (neutral context: N). The shocks
(USs) followed a discrete tone CS (here labelled C), with either a delay conditioning design (C → US) or
a trace conditioning design (C → 30 s → US). In the neutral context, CSs were given, but no USs. They
were then tested for their CRs to the two contexts (A versus N), and to the CS given in either context (AC
versus NC). It would be expected that mice learn more about the context–US association in the trace con-
dition, but more about the CS–US association in the delay condition—and normal mice did indeed learn
the context discrimination much faster and better (A > N) when trace conditioning was used; furthermore,
trace-conditioned subjects responded more to the context than to the context + CS combination (A > AC),
while delay-conditioned subjects did not. Delay-conditioned subjects were better at discriminating the
contexts in the presence of the CS than in its absence (AC – NC > A – N). Desmedt et al. argue that two
processes occur here: in the trace condition, subjects form direct context–US associations, while in the
delay condition, the context acts as an occasion setter for the tone (Holland & Bouton, 1999), with con-
text A signalling that C will be followed by shock, and context N signalling that it will not—or perhaps
vice versa, with the tone acting as an occasion setter for the context. In their study, excitotoxic hippocam-
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pal lesions appeared to facilitate occasion setting (improved AC/NC discrimination in the delay group,
with AC/NC discrimination now being better than A/N discrimination in the trace group) while impair-
ing direct context processing (impaired A/N discrimination in the trace group). Nevertheless, although
contexts clearly have several associative functions, the contribution to the hippocampus to these processes
is by no means clear cut (Holland & Bouton, 1999; Holland et al., 1999; Heldt et al., 2002).
3.5.5 Effect of hippocampal lesions on choice involving delayed reinforcement
If lesions of the hippocampus reduce the normal deleterious effects of delays on the ability to associate
actions with their outcomes, it might be expected that they would also improve subjects’ ability to choose
a delayed, large reward in preference to an immediate, small reward. Instead, the opposite pattern of re-
sults was observed: postoperatively, H-lesioned rats made impulsive choices, preferring the immediate,
small reward. This preference was flexible, responding to changes in the contingencies within the task,
and all subjects readily reverted to choosing the large reward when all delays were removed, indicating
that they could discriminate the large and small rewards and continued to prefer the large reward when it
was not delayed. Upon reintroduction of the delays, however, the preference for the large reward col-
lapsed in the H-lesioned group much more prominently than in shams, indicating that they were less tol-
erant of delays to reinforcement.
The present results are also somewhat similar to those reported by Rawlins et al. (1985), who exam-
ined choice between certain and uncertain rewards. Normal rats preferred immediate certain reward to
immediate uncertain reward, and also preferred delayed certain reward to immediate uncertain reward;
however, rats with hippocampal or medial septal lesions were less tolerant of the delay (or more tolerant
of the uncertainty), preferring immediate uncertain reward to delayed certain reward.
Some simple explanations for this effect may readily be ruled out. It is unlikely that lesioned rats’ im-
pulsive choice was caused by lower motivation to obtain the food, for two reasons. First, in a separate
test, there were no differences in the rate at which they consumed the sucrose pellets used as the rein-
forcer. Second, the performance of H-lesioned rats was not comparable in other respects to that of a sub-
ject with lower primary motivation, such as a sated rat (Cardinal et al., 2000); for example, they did not
make more omissions than sham-operated controls. It is also unlikely that H-lesioned rats’ preference for
the small, immediate reward were the consequence of a positional bias away from the lever producing
large, delayed reward: when the delays were omitted, all the H-lesioned rats readily and consistently
chose the large reinforcer, only to prefer the small reinforcer again when delays were re-introduced. Fur-
thermore, it is difficult to see that impaired contextual conditioning could explain the pattern of results; as
discussed above, the absence of context–reinforcer associations should help, rather than hinder, the ability
to associate actions with delayed outcomes. Likewise, although context–response associations may influ-
ence instrumental responding and contexts may act as occasion setters (signalling the operation of a par-
ticular action–outcome contingency), there is no a priori reason to believe that the context should differ-
entially cue instrumental responding more when the outcome is delayed; neither is there conclusive evi-
dence suggesting that hippocampal lesions impair such a process (see Holland & Bouton, 1999).
One obvious difference between the two experiments is that in Experiment 1, lesions were made be-
fore training, whereas in Experiment 2, lesions were made after training. Hence it is possible that hippo-
campal lesions selectively impair the retrieval of a well-learned instrumental response or action–outcome
contingency involving delayed outcomes, while sparing those involving immediate outcomes. However,
there are two reasons why this scenario is unlikely. Firstly, animals must be able to perform an action in
order for that action to be conditioned instrumentally. Experiment 1 demonstrated that H-lesioned rats
Chapter 3: Hippocampal lesions on learning and choice with delayed reinforcement 106
were able to acquire instrumental responses for delayed reinforcement at least as well as, if not better
than, sham-operated controls. Therefore, it is unlikely that hippocampal lesions selectively impair the
performance of instrumental responses for delayed outcomes. Secondly, this idea would not explain why
H-lesioned rats showed a reduced preference for the large, delayed reinforcer upon reintroduction of de-
lays, after they had shown a strong postoperative preference for the large reinforcer when delays had been
consistently omitted. This required new learning on their part, and again Experiment 1 demonstrated that
learning with delayed reinforcement is normal in H-lesioned rats, a result that would predict self-
controlled rather than impulsive choice upon reintroduction of delays.
The task used does not determine whether H-lesioned rats exhibit altered sensitivity to reinforcer mag-
nitude or delay, for either abnormality might produce impulsive choice (Ho et al., 1999) (see e.g. p. 41).
Although H-lesioned rats were able to discriminate in absolute terms between the large and the small re-
inforcer (consistent with previous studies, e.g. Kesner & Williams, 1995), it is possible that they dis-
criminated between the reinforcer magnitudes to a lesser extent than shams. In this scenario, H-lesioned
rats might have exhibited impulsive choice simply because the perceived value of the large reinforcer was
not subjectively big enough to compensate for the normal effects of the delay. Alternatively, H-lesioned
rats may perceive reward magnitudes normally, and exhibit impulsive choice because they are specifi-
cally hypersensitive to (intolerant of) the effects of delays to reinforcement. Such evidence as exists sug-
gests that H-lesioned rats perceive reward magnitude normally (Kesner & Williams, 1995; Gilbert &
Kesner, 2002). Experiment 1 indicated that H-lesioned rats are somewhat better than shams at instru-
mental conditioning with action–outcome delays of >10 s. This suggests that H-lesioned rats associated
the action with the delayed outcome normally in Experiment 2, so if they also perceived its magnitude
normally, then it is likely that they valued the delayed outcome less.
The present results may also be explained in terms of altered temporal perception. For example, a le-
sion that increased the speed of an “internal clock” (Gibbon et al., 1997; Buhusi & Meck, 2005) might
affect choice prospectively in this task (i.e. the lesioned subject perceives itself to be at a later time point
in the session than it actually is, hastening the within-session shift towards the immediate lever), or might
affect retrospective choice (i.e. the lesioned subject experiences the delay to the large reinforcer as longer
than it actually is, causing it to value the reinforcer less than shams). However, the evidence for the role
of the hippocampus in temporal perception is inconclusive: some studies have found that aspirative hip-
pocampal lesions did not affect timing behaviour (Rawlins et al., 1983; Port et al., 1986; Dietrich et al.,
1997; Dietrich & Allen, 1998), whereas others have suggested that lesions of the hippocampus or fim-
bria/fornix speed up an internal clock, or reduce the estimation of time periods when a stimulus being
timed is interrupted (Meck et al., 1984; Olton et al., 1987; Meck, 1988; Hata & Okaichi, 1998; Wallen-
stein et al., 1998).
Finally, the hippocampus is heavily connected to a number of other structures known to play a role in
subjects’ relative preference between immediate, small and delayed, large rewards. Lesions of the AcbC,
BLA, and OFC have all been found to produce impulsive choice (Cardinal et al., 2001; Kheramin et al.,
2002; Mobini et al., 2002; Winstanley et al., 2004b). OFC lesions appear to alter the processing of reward
magnitude as well as delay, and lesions here have produced both impulsive and self-controlled choice
under different circumstances (Kheramin et al., 2002; Mobini et al., 2002; Kheramin et al., 2003; Win-
stanley et al., 2004b). AcbC lesions appear to have a more selective effect on the processing of delays,
impairing both preference for, and learning with, delayed rewards in the absence of effects on reward
magnitude processing (Cardinal et al., 2001; Cardinal & Cheung, 2005) (Chapter 4). Although the hippo-
campal formation projects heavily to most of the Acb, via the subiculum (Brog et al., 1993), and H-
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lesioned rats in the present study showed the impulsive choice known to be exhibited by AcbC-lesioned
rats, H-lesioned rats showed the opposite effect to AcbC-lesioned rats in the simple instrumental learning
task, being delay-dependently improved rather than impaired relative to shams.
3.6 CONCLUSIONS
These experiments have demonstrated that excitotoxic lesions of the hippocampus ameliorate the delete-
rious effects of response–reinforcer delays on instrumental learning. H-lesioned rats responded slightly
less than controls in the absence of delays, but they became better at learning (relative to shams) as the
delays increased, in a delay-dependent fashion. This may have been because the lesion hindered the for-
mation of context–outcome associations, promoting response–outcome association instead. In contrast,
lesioned rats exhibited impulsive choice, preferring an immediate, small reward to a delayed, larger re-
ward, even though they preferred the large reward when it was not delayed. Thus, lesioned rats were bet-
ter at learning with delayed reinforcement but worse at choosing it, suggesting that self-controlled choice
and learning with delayed reinforcement tax different psychological processes.
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Chapter 4: Effects of lesions of the
nucleus accumbens core on choice
between small certain rewards and large
uncertain rewards in rats
4.1 ABSTRACT
Background: Animals must frequently make choices between alternative courses of action, seeking to maximize
the benefit obtained. They must therefore evaluate the magnitude and the likelihood of the available outcomes. Little
is known of the neural basis of this process, or what might predispose individuals to be overly conservative or to
take risks excessively (avoiding or preferring uncertainty, respectively). The nucleus accumbens core (AcbC) is
known to contribute to rats’ ability to choose large, delayed rewards over small, immediate rewards; AcbC lesions
cause impulsive choice and an impairment in learning with delayed reinforcement. However, it is not known how
the AcbC contributes to choice involving probabilistic reinforcement, such as between a large, uncertain reward and
a small, certain reward. The present experiments examined the effects of excitotoxic lesions of the AcbC on prob-
abilistic choice in rats.
Results: Rats chose between a single food pellet delivered with certainty (p = 1) and four food pellets delivered with
varying degrees of uncertainty (p = 1, 0.5, 0.25, 0.125, and 0.0625) in a discrete-trial task, with the large-reinforcer
probability decreasing or increasing across the session. Subjects were trained on this task and then received excito-
toxic or sham lesions of the AcbC before being retested. After a transient period during which AcbC-lesioned rats
exhibited relative indifference between the two alternatives compared to controls, AcbC-lesioned rats came to ex-
hibit risk-averse choice, choosing the large reinforcer less often than controls when it was uncertain, to the extent
that they obtained less food as a result. Rats behaved as if indifferent between a single certain pellet and four pellets
at p = 0.32 (sham-operated subjects) or at p = 0.70 (AcbC-lesioned subjects) by the end of testing. When the prob-
abilities did not vary across the session, AcbC-lesioned rats and controls strongly preferred the large reinforcer when
it was certain, and strongly preferred the small reinforcer when the large reinforcer was very unlikely (p = 0.0625),
with no differences between AcbC-lesioned and sham-operated groups.
Conclusions: These results support the view that the AcbC contributes to action selection by promoting the choice
of uncertain, as well as delayed, reinforcement.
4.2 BACKGROUND
Animals often need to choose between different courses of action on the basis of the eventual rewarding
or reinforcing outcomes of those actions. However, the relationship between an action and an outcome is
frequently uncertain: animals do not always obtain that for which they work. Therefore, animals must
incorporate information on the probability of obtaining different rewards when making decisions about
what to do. Little is known of the neural basis of this process. Furthermore, when making decisions under
conditions of uncertainty, individuals vary as to how much uncertainty or risk they are willing to tolerate.
Formally, individuals differ in how much they “discount” the value of reinforcers as the uncertainty of the
reinforcer increases (i.e. as the probability of the reinforcer declines, or the odds against obtaining the
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reinforcer increase) (Ho et al., 1999). Risk taking is one aspect of the personality trait of impulsivity
(Daruna & Barnes, 1993; Eysenck, 1993; Evenden, 1999a) and is a feature of a number of psychiatric
disorders, including pathological gambling and certain personality disorders (Roy et al., 1989; Coccaro &
Siever, 1995; APA, 2000; Holt et al., 2003). The term “risk” implies exposure to the possibility of an
aversive consequence (OUP, 1997), which may include the possibility of not obtaining an anticipated re-
ward. In the appetitive domain, risk taking is exemplified by the tendency to choose large rewards that are
very uncertain, in preference to smaller, certain rewards. Abnormal risk taking may reflect dysfunction of
reinforcement learning systems that mediate the effects of uncertain reward or punishment.
The Acb is one candidate structure that may influence choice involving uncertainty. The Acb responds
to anticipated rewards in humans, other primates, and rats (Schultz et al., 1992; Miyazaki et al., 1998;
Martin & Ono, 2000; Schultz et al., 2000; Breiter et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2001; Cromwell & Schultz,
2003; Bjork et al., 2004), and is innervated by dopamine (DA) neurons that respond to errors in reward
prediction in a manner appropriate for a teaching signal (Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 1998; Schultz et
al., 1998; Schultz & Dickinson, 2000). There is clear evidence that the Acb is involved in the processing
of delayed reinforcement and its influence upon choice. Damage to the AcbC produces impulsive choice
in rats (Cardinal et al., 2001; 2003b), reducing their ability to choose large, delayed rewards in preference
to small, immediate rewards, yet these and other similar lesions do not appear to impair rats’ ability to
discriminate reward size (Balleine & Killcross, 1994; Salamone et al., 1994; Brown & Bowman, 1995;
Cousins et al., 1996; Salamone et al., 2001; Cardinal et al., 2003b; 2004; Giertler et al., 2004; Cardinal &
Cheung, 2005) (Chapter 4). Furthermore, AcbC lesions impair rats’ ability to learn instrumental actions
when the outcomes of those actions are delayed (Cardinal & Cheung, 2005) (Chapter 4). The Acb may
also be involved in the processing of uncertain or probabilistic reinforcement. DA neurons that innervate
the Acb may fire in a manner related to reward probability (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Niv et al., 2005; Tobler
et al., 2005) and the midbrain, the site of the cell bodies of these neurons, responds to stimulus uncer-
tainty in humans (Aron et al., 2004). A greater BOLD response is observed in the human Acb during the
selection of high-reward/high-risk options, compared to low-reward/low-risk outcomes, in a task where
the risk is of not winning (Ernst et al., 2004), with similar activation to high-reward/high-risk option se-
lection in a task where the risk is of losing (Matthews et al., 2004); this latter activation was correlated
with personality measures of harm avoidance. However, these studies are correlative, and it is not known
whether the AcbC is causally involved in regulating choice involving uncertain reinforcement.
The present study sought to examine the contribution of the AcbC to choice involving probabilistic
reinforcement in rats. Rats were trained on a task in which they could choose regularly between a certain,
small reward and an uncertain, large reward in discrete trials (Figure 45, p. 110); excitotoxic AcbC le-
sions were then made before the rats were retested postoperatively. Preoperatively, the proportion of
choice trials in which the large reinforcer was chosen was approximately a linear function of the large-
reinforcer probability. Postoperatively, after a transient period in which AcbC-lesioned rats were rela-
tively indifferent between the two reinforcers, compared to sham-operated controls, a stable state emerged
in which AcbC-lesioned rats chose the large, uncertain reinforcer less often than shams did. This pattern
persisted regardless of whether the large-reinforcer probability increased or decreased across the session.
AcbC-lesioned rats and controls continued to exhibit a strong preference for the large reinforcer when it
was consistently certain, and a strong preference for the small, certain reinforcer when the large reinforcer
was very unlikely; the lesioned and sham-operated groups did not differ from each other in either of these
conditions. These results suggest that the AcbC is necessary for the normal impact of unlikely (as well as
delayed) reinforcers upon choice.
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Figure 45: Task schematic: choice be-
tween small, certain and large, uncertain
rewards
Probabilistic choice task, based on similar
tasks involving choice between delayed
reinforcers (Evenden & Ryan, 1996; Cardi-
nal et al., 2000). Hungry rats regularly
chose between two levers. Responding on
one lever led to the certain delivery of a
small food reward (1 pellet); responding on
the other led to a much larger food reward
(4 pellets), but this reward was uncertain,
and was delivered with a probability (p)
ranging from 1 to 0.0625. The figure shows
the format of a single trial. Trials began at
regular intervals (every 40 s). Sessions con-
sisted of 5 blocks. In each block, 16 single-
lever trials were given (8 trials for each
lever, randomized in pairs), to ensure the
animals sampled the options available at
that time; these were followed by 10 choice
trials. The probability of delivery of the
large reinforcer was varied systematically
across the session: probabilities for each
block were initially 1, 0.5, 0.25, 0.125, and
0.0625, respectively (see Table 6, p. 113).
4.3 METHODS
4.3.1 Subjects and housing conditions
The subjects were 24 male Lister hooded rats (Harlan-Olac UK Ltd) housed in a temperature-controlled room
(minimum 22°C) under a 12:12 h reversed light–dark cycle (lights off 07:30 to 19:30). Subjects were approximately
15 weeks old on arrival at the laboratory and were given a minimum of a week to acclimatize, with free access to
food, before experiments began. Preoperatively, subjects were housed in pairs; postoperatively, they were housed
individually. Experiments took place between 09:00 and 21:00, with individual subjects being tested at a consistent
time of day. Subjects had free access to water. During behavioural testing, subjects were fed ~15–16 g/day, an
amount that maintains ~85–90% of free-feeding mass in normal male Lister hooded rats (the free-feeding mass be-
ing a steadily increasing quantity at this age). Feeding occurred in the home cages at the end of the experimental
day. As it was possible for subjects to earn substantial amounts of food in the behavioural tasks, the amount of food
actually earned was taken into account when feeding with the maintenance diet in the home cages. All procedures
were subject to UK Home Office approval (Project Licence 80/1767) under the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act
1986.
4.3.2 Behavioural apparatus
Behavioural testing was conducted in one of two types of operant chamber of identical configuration (from Med
Associates Inc., Georgia, Vermont, USA, or Paul Fray Ltd, Cambridge, UK). Each chamber was fitted with a 2.8 W
overhead house light and two retractable levers on either side of an alcove fitted with an infrared photodiode to de-
tect head entry and a 2.8 W lightbulb (“traylight”). Sucrose pellets (45 mg, Rodent Diet Formula P, Noyes, Lancas-
ter, New Hampshire, USA) could be delivered into the alcove. The chambers were enclosed within sound-
attenuating boxes fitted with fans to provide air circulation. The apparatus was controlled by software written by
RNC in C++ (Stroustrup, 1986) using the Whisker control system (Cardinal, 2000; Cardinal & Aitken, 2001). Equal
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numbers of subjects were trained in the two brands of operant chamber (12 subjects in each type). Individual sub-
jects were always tested in the same operant chamber.
4.3.3 Initial training
Rats were first trained to press the left lever for single pellets on an FR-1 schedule, in 30-min sessions, until they
had obtained a total of 100 pellets. This procedure was repeated for the right lever. They were then trained to nose-
poke to initiate presentation of a lever in discrete trials. Each session began with the levers retracted and the operant
chamber in darkness. Every 40 s, a trial began with illumination of the houselight and the traylight. The subject was
required to make a nosepoke response within 10 s, or the current trial was aborted and the chamber returned to dark-
ness. If the subject nosepoked within this time limit, the traylight was extinguished and a single lever presented. If
the rat failed to respond on the lever within 10 s, the lever was retracted and the chamber darkened, but if it re-
sponded, the houselight was switched off, a single pellet was delivered immediately and the traylight was illumi-
nated until the rat collected the pellet (or until a 10-s collection time limit elapsed, whereupon the chamber was
darkened). In every pair of trials, the left lever was presented once and the right lever once, though the order within
the pair of trials was random. The schedule was implemented in the ImpulsiveChoice program (Cardinal, 2002a).
Rats were trained to a criterion of 60 successful trials in one hour (the maximum possible with a 40-s period being
90). They then proceeded to the full task.
4.3.4 Probabilistic choice task
The task was based on delayed reinforcement choice tasks that have been described before (Evenden & Ryan, 1996;
Cardinal et al., 2000). The session began in darkness with the levers retracted; this was designated the intertrial
state. Trials began at 40-s intervals; the format of a single trial is shown in Figure 45 (p. 110). Each trial began with
the illumination of the houselight and the traylight. The rat was required to make a nosepoke response, ensuring that
it was centrally located at the start of the trial (latency to poke was designated the initiation latency). If the rat did
not respond within 10 s of the start of the trial, the operant chamber was reset to the intertrial state until the next trial
began and the trial was scored as an omission. If the rat was already nosepoking when the trial began, the next stage
followed immediately. Upon a successful nosepoke, the traylight was extinguished and one or both levers were ex-
tended. One lever was designated the Large/Uncertain lever, the other the Small/Certain lever (counterbalanced
left/right). The latency to choose a lever was recorded. (If the rat did not respond within 10 s of lever presentation,
the chamber was reset to the intertrial state until the next trial and the trial was scored as an omission.) When a lever
was chosen, both levers were retracted and the houselight was switched off. Choice of the Small lever caused the
certain delivery of one pellet; choice of the Large lever caused the delivery of 4 pellets with a particular probability
(see below). When reinforcement was delivered, the traylight was switched on. Multiple pellets were delivered 0.5 s
apart. If the rat collected the pellets before the next trial began, then the traylight was switched off and the time from
delivery of the first pellet until a nosepoke occurred was recorded as the collection latency. If the rat did not collect
the food within 10 s of its delivery, the operant chamber entered the intertrial state, though collection latencies were
still recorded up to the start of the next trial. The chamber was then in the intertrial state and remained so until the
next trial. There was no mechanism to remove uneaten pellets, but failure to collect the reward was an extremely
rare event. The large-reinforcer probability was varied systematically across the session as follows. A session con-
sisted of 5 blocks, each comprising 16 trials in which only one lever was presented (8 trials for each lever, random-
ized in pairs) followed by 10 free-choice trials. The probability that the large reinforcer was delivered, given that the
Large lever had been chosen (preinforcer), varied across blocks: it was initially 1, 0.5, 0.25, 0.125, and 0.0625, respec-
tively, for each block. As trials began every 40 s and there were 130 trials per session, the total session length was
~87 minutes; subjects received one session per day. Choice ratios (percentage choice of the large reinforcer, for each
trial block) were calculated using only choice trials on which the subject responded. The schedule was implemented
in the ImpulsiveChoice program (Cardinal, 2002a).
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4.3.5 Excitotoxic lesions of the AcbC
Subjects were anaesthetized with Avertin (2% w/v 2,2,2-tribromoethanol, 1% w/v 2-methylbutan-2-ol, and 8% v/v
ethanol in PBS, sterilized by filtration, 10 ml/kg intraperitoneally) and placed in a Kopf or Stoelting stereotaxic
frame (David Kopf Instruments, Tujunga, California, USA; Stoelting Co., Wood Dale, Illinois, USA) fitted with
atraumatic ear bars. The skull was exposed and a dental drill was used to remove the bone directly above the injec-
tion sites. The dura mater was broken with the tip of a hypodermic needle, avoiding damage to underlying venous
sinuses. Excitotoxic lesions of the AcbC were made by injecting 0.5 µl of 0.09 M quinolinic acid (Sigma, UK) per
side through a glass micropipette at coordinates 1.2 mm anterior to bregma, ±1.8 mm from the midline, and 7.1 mm
below the skull surface at bregma; the incisor bar was 3.3 mm below the interaural line (Paxinos & Watson, 1998).
The toxin had been dissolved in 0.1 M phosphate buffer (composition 0.07 M Na2HPO4, 0.028 M NaH2PO4 in dou-
ble-distilled water, sterilized by filtration) and adjusted with NaOH to a final pH of 7.2–7.4. Toxin was injected over
3 min and the micropipette was left in place for 2 min following injections. Sham lesions were made in the same
manner except that vehicle was infused. At the end of the operation, animals were given 15 ml/kg of sterile 5% w/v
glucose, 0.9% w/v sodium chloride intraperitoneally. They were given a week to recover, with free access to food,
and were handled regularly. Any instances of postoperative constipation were treated with liquid paraffin orally and
rectally. At the end of this period, food restriction commenced or was resumed.
4.3.6 Postoperative testing
Subjects were trained preoperatively and tested postoperatively according to the schedule shown in Table 6. In the
basic task, used for preoperative training, the probability of large reinforcer delivery declined across trial blocks
from 1 to 0.0625 (in the order 1, 0.5, 0.25, 0.125, 0.0625). After subjects had been tested postoperatively for 12 ses-
sions on this schedule, satiety tests were given, to establish the effect of varying primary motivational state on pref-
erence for probabilistic reinforcement. Subjects were tested for 4 sessions while alternating between hungry and
sated states on consecutive days in counterbalanced fashion (half the subjects experienced hungry and sated days in
the order HSHS, and half in the order SHSH). Following a “hungry” session, animals were placed on free food
(maintenance diet) until the start of the next day’s “sated” session, at which time the food was again removed for the
“hungry” session to follow. The comparison was therefore between satiety and food deprivation for ~22 h. Next,
subjects were returned to the hungry state and tested for 6 sessions on a schedule in which both the large and small
reinforcer were delivered with certainty. Next, the element of uncertainty was reintroduced for another 12 sessions,
but this time the probability of large reinforcer delivery (given that the Large lever had been chosen) increased
across blocks from 0.0625 to 1 (in the order 0.0625, 0.125, 0.25, 0.5, 1). Finally, subjects were tested for 6 sessions
with the large reinforcer always being very unlikely (p = 0.0625), with the small reinforcer remaining certain.
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Sessions Description Probability (small reward of
1 pellet)
Probability (large reward of 4 pellets)
1–12 Preoperative training (12 sessions) p = 1 p = 1 to 0.0625, decreasing
— Surgery and recovery — —
13–24 Postoperative baseline testing (12 sessions) p = 1 p = 1 to 0.0625, decreasing
25–28 Satiety tests (4 sessions) p = 1 p = 1 to 0.0625, decreasing
29–34 Equal probabilities, certain (6 sessions) p = 1 p = 1
35–46 Increasing probabilities (12 sessions) p = 1 p = 0.0625 to 1, increasing
47–52 Large reinforcer always very unlikely (6 sessions) p = 1 p = 0.0625
Table 6: Testing schedule for probabilistic choice task
Subjects were trained and tested according to the schedule shown here. Initial pre- and postoperative testing was
conducted with the probability of large reinforcer delivery declining across trial blocks from 1 to 0.0625 (the steps
were p = 1, 0.5, 0.25, 0.125, and 0.0625). Subsequently, subjects were tested alternating between the hungry and
sated state (as described in the Methods), before the reinforcement probabilities were manipulated further, as indi-
cated.
4.3.7 Locomotor activity in a novel environment
Locomotor activity was measured in wire mesh cages, 25 (W) × 40 (D) × 18 (H) cm, each equipped with a water
bottle and two horizontal photocell beams situated 1 cm from the floor that enabled movements along the long axis
of the cage to be registered. The apparatus was controlled by software written by RNC in Arachnid (Paul Fray Ltd,
Cambridge), a real-time extension to BBC BASIC V running on an Acorn Archimedes series computer. Subjects
were placed in these cages, which were initially unfamiliar to them, and their activity was recorded for 2 h. All ani-
mals were tested in the food-deprived state. Locomotor hyperactivity and reduced body mass gain have previously
been part of the phenotype of AcbC-lesioned rats, though without alterations in the consumption of the reinforcer
used in the present experiments (Maldonado-Irizarry & Kelley, 1995; Parkinson et al., 1999a; Cardinal, 2001; Car-
dinal et al., 2001; Cardinal & Cheung, 2005) (Chapter 4).
4.3.8 Histology
Rats were deeply anaesthetized with pentobarbitone sodium (200 mg/ml, minimum of 1.5 ml i.p.) and perfused
transcardially with 0.01 M PBS followed by 4% paraformaldehyde in PBS. Their brains were removed and postfixed
in paraformaldehyde before being dehydrated in 20% sucrose for cryoprotection. The brains were sectioned co-
ronally at 60 µm thickness on a freezing microtome and every third section mounted on chromium potassium sul-
phate/gelatin-coated glass microscope slides and allowed to dry. Sections were passed through a series of ethanol
solutions of descending concentration (3 minutes in each of 100%, 95%, and 70% v/v ethanol in water) and stained
for ~5 min with cresyl violet. The stain comprises 0.05% w/v aqueous cresyl violet (Raymond A. Lamb Ltd, East-
bourne, UK), 2 mM acetic acid, and 5 mM formic acid in water. Following staining, sections were rinsed in water
and 70% ethanol before being differentiated in 95% ethanol. Finally, they were dehydrated and delipidated in 100%
ethanol and Histoclear (National Diagnostics, UK) before being cover-slipped using DePeX mounting medium
(BDH, UK) and allowed to dry. The sections were used to verify lesion placement and assess the extent of lesion-
induced neuronal loss. Lesions were detectable as the absence of visible neurons (cell bodies of the order of 100 µm
in diameter with a characteristic shape and appearance), often associated with a degree of tissue collapse (sometimes
with consequent ventricular expansion when the lesion was adjacent to a ventricle) and gliosis (visible as the pres-
ence of smaller, densely staining cells).
4.3.9 Data analysis
Data collected by the chamber control programs were imported into a relational database (Microsoft Access 97) for
case selection and analysed with SPSS 11. Figures were created with SigmaPlot 2001/v7 and Adobe Illustrator 8.
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All graphs show group means and error bars are ±1 standard error of the mean (SEM) unless otherwise stated. Count
data (e.g. locomotor activity counts), for which variance increases with the mean, were subjected to a square-root
transformation prior to any analysis (Howell, 1997). Homogeneity of variance was verified using Levene’s test
(Levene, 1960). General linear models are described as dependent variable = A2 × Bcov × (C5 × Dcov × S) where A is
a between-subjects factor with two levels, B is a between-subjects covariate, C is a within-subjects factor with five
levels, and D is a within-subjects covariate; S denotes subjects in designs involving within-subjects factors (Keppel,
1982). For repeated measures analyses, Mauchly’s test of sphericity of the covariance matrix was applied (Mauchly,
1940) and the degrees of freedom corrected to more conservative values by multiplying them by the Huynh–Feldt
epsilon ε?  for any terms involving factors in which the sphericity assumption was violated (Huynh & Feldt, 1970).
Where multiple comparisons were conducted post hoc following a significant overall ANOVA effect for a factor
with more than three levels, p values were corrected using the Šidák correction (Šidák, 1967), in which pcorrected = 1 –
(1 – puncorrected)n for n comparisons.
4.4 RESULTS
4.4.1 Histology
There were four postoperative deaths. Histological analysis revealed that the lesions were incomplete or
encroached significantly on neighbouring structures in two subjects. These subjects were excluded; final
group numbers were therefore 6 (AcbC)22 and 12 (sham)23. Lesions of the AcbC encompassed most of the
core subregion; neuronal loss and associated gliosis extended in an anteroposterior direction from ap-
proximately 2.7 mm to 0.2 mm anterior to bregma, and did not extend ventrally or caudally into the ven-
tral pallidum or olfactory tubercle. Damage to the ventromedial caudate–putamen was occasionally seen;
damage to the AcbSh was restricted to the lateral edge of the dorsal shell. Schematics of the lesions are
                                                     
22 AcbC group: final subjects R1, R5, R9, R10, R18, R24 (n = 6).
23 Sham group: final subjects R3, R4, R6, R11, R12, R15, R16, R17, R19, R20, R22, R23 (n = 12).
Figure 46: Schematic of lesions of the
AcbC
Black shading indicates the extent of neu-
ronal loss common to all subjects; grey in-
dicates the area lesioned in at least one
subject. Coronal sections are (from top to
bottom) +2.7, +2.2, +1.7, +1.2, +0.7, and
+0.2 mm relative (anterior) to bregma. Dia-
grams are modified from Paxinos & Watson
(1998).
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shown in Figure 46. Photomicrographs of lesions with identical parameters have been presented before
(Parkinson et al., 1999a; Cardinal, 2001; Cardinal & Cheung, 2005) (see Chapter 4, Figure 26, p. 61).
4.4.2 Preoperative choice
The groups remained matched for preoperative choice behaviour following later histological selection
(Figure 47a). Choice ratios (percentage choice of the large reinforcer, for each trial block) calculated
across sessions 10–12 (see Table 6, p. 113) were analysed using the model lesion intent2 × (large-
reinforcer probability5 × S). There was a robust effect of probability (F3.3,52.9 = 70.6, ε?  = .826, p < .001)
but no effect of lesion intent and no lesion intent × probability interaction (Fs < 1, NS).
Figure 47: Choice with probabilistic reinforcement in AcbC-lesioned and sham-operated rats
(a) Preoperative patterns of choice. There were no differences between the groups preoperatively. (b) The first three
postoperative sessions. Transiently, AcbC-lesioned rats exhibited relative indifference between the two alternatives;
their preference did not differ significantly from 50% at any large-reinforcer probability. As a result, AcbC-lesioned
rats preferred the large, unlikely reinforcer more than shams did when its probability was 0.0625 and 0.125 (## p <
.01, lesion × probability interaction; * p < .05, ** p < .01, comparison to shams at individual probabilities). How-
ever, both groups were influenced by the large-reinforcer probability (p ≤ .004). (c) The last three postoperative ses-
sions on the same basic task. By this point, AcbC-lesioned rats preferred the large reinforcer less when its probabil-
ity was 0.5 or 1 (## p < .01, interaction; * p < .05, simple effects). Again, both groups were influenced by the large-
reinforcer probability (p < .001). (d) When the four-pellet reinforcer and the one-pellet reinforcer were both certain,
all groups preferred the four-pellet reinforcer, and when the four-pellet reinforcer was always very unlikely (deliv-
ered with a probability of 0.0625) and the one-pellet reinforcer was certain, all groups preferred the one-pellet rein-
forcer, with no differences between AcbC-lesioned and sham-operated rats. This indicates that both groups dis-
criminated the reinforcers themselves and discriminated their probability of delivery. (e) Choice following further
training in which the large-reinforcer probability increased, rather than decreased, across each session. The pattern
of choice is similar to c, in that AcbC-lesioned rats were risk-averse compared to shams, i.e. less likely to choose the
large, unlikely reinforcer (### p < .001, interaction; * p < .05 and *** p < .001, simple effects). The similarity to c,
despite the reversed task order, also indicates that subjects’ choice reflected the probabilities in force rather than the
order within a session.
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4.4.3 Early postoperative choice
In the initial postoperative period, AcbC-lesioned rats exhibited relative indifference between the two al-
ternatives, choosing the large reinforcer close to 50% of the time at all large-reinforcer probabilities; as a
result, AcbC-lesioned rats were more likely than shams to choose the large reinforcer when it was most
uncertain (Figure 47b). An analysis of choice ratios calculated across sessions 13–15 was performed us-
ing the ANOVA model lesion2 × (probability5 × S). This revealed a lesion × probability interaction
(F3.3,53.5 = 5.22, ε?  = .836, p = .002). Comparison of the two groups at individual large-reinforcer prob-
abilities demonstrated that AcbC-lesioned rats chose the large/uncertain reinforcer more than shams at
preinforcer = 0.0625 (pstatistical = .02), and at preinforcer = 0.125 (pstatistical = .009), but did not differ from shams at
reinforcer probabilities of 0.25–1 (pstatistical ≥ .158). Nevertheless, simple effects of probability persisted
both in shams (F2.8,30.9 = 32.3, ε?  = .702, p < .001) and in AcbC-lesioned rats (F4,20 = 5.37, p = .004).
Choice at each preinforcer was compared to 50% (indifference) using post hoc two-tailed one-sample t tests,
correcting pstatistical values using the Šidák correction for 5 comparisons. For shams, choice differed sig-
nificantly from 50% at large-reinforcer probabilities of 0.0625 (when choice of the large reinforcer was
less than 50%), 0.125 (less than 50%), and 1 (greater than 50%) (corrected pstatistical ≤ 0.007), but for
AcbC-lesioned rats, choice did not differ significantly from 50% at any large-reinforcer probability (cor-
rected pstatistical ≥ 0.81).
4.4.4 Final postoperative choice
By the final three sessions of the basic task (sessions 22–24; see Table 6, p. 113), the pattern of choice in
AcbC-lesioned rats had changed (Figure 47c). Once more, an analysis of choice ratios using the model
lesion2 × (probability5 × S) revealed a lesion × probability interaction (F2.9,46.4 = 5.78, ε?  = .726, p = .002).
By now, however, AcbC-lesioned rats did not differ from shams with reinforcer probabilities of 0.0625–
0.25 (pstatistical ≥ .386) but chose the large reinforcer less than shams when its probability was 0.5 (pstatistical
= .037) and 1 (pstatistical = .015). As before, effects of probability persisted both in shams (F2.3,24.9 = 49.5, ε?
= .565, p < .001) and in AcbC-lesioned rats (F4,20 = 9.45, p < .001).
4.4.5 Choice when both reinforcers were certain, or both uncertain
When the large and small reinforcers were both delivered with certainty, AcbC-lesioned and sham-
operated rats strongly preferred the large reinforcer; when the small reinforcer was certain and the large
reinforcer was consistently unlikely (preinforcer = 0.0625), all rats strongly preferred the small reinforcer
(Figure 47d). There were no group differences in either case. This indicates that both AcbC-lesioned and
sham-operated rats successfully discriminated the large reinforcer from the small reinforcer, and dis-
criminated the certain large reinforcer from the uncertain large reinforcer. Choice ratios from the final
sessions of training in these two conditions (sessions 34 and 52; see Table 6, p. 113) were analysed using
the model lesion2 × (trial block5 × S). In the “certain” condition (session 34), there was no effect of lesion
(F1,15 = 2.54, p = .132), no lesion × block interaction (F = 1.42, NS), and no effect of trial block (F1.5,21.9 =
2.12, ε?  = .365, p = .154). Similarly, in the “uncertain” condition (session 52), there was no effect of le-
sion (F = 1.35, NS), no lesion × block interaction (F = 1.31, NS), and no effect of trial block (F < 1, NS).
4.4.6 Choice with ascending probabilities
After rats had been trained with the large-reinforcer probability increasing across the session, choice be-
haviour was similar to that with the decreasing-probability version of the task used initially, with AcbC-
lesioned rats choosing the large/uncertain reinforcer less often than shams (Figure 47e; compare Figure
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47c). Choice ratios from sessions 44–46 (see Table 6, p. 113) were analysed using the model lesion2 ×
(probability5 × S). As before, there was a lesion × probability interaction (F4,64 = 9.29, p < .001), in addi-
tion to main effects of lesion (F1,16 = 19.5, p < .001) and probability (F4,64 = 95.6, p < .001), and there
were strong effects of probability for both AcbC-lesioned rats (F1,20 = 20.7, p < .001) and shams (F3.1,34.4 =
119.6, ε?  = .781, p < .001). AcbC-lesioned rats differed from shams at reinforcer probabilities of 0.125
(pstatistical = .033), 0.25 (pstatistical < .001), 0.5 (pstatistical < .001), and 1 (pstatistical = .013), but not at preinforcer =
0.0625 (pstatistical = .881).
4.4.7 Postoperative choice: analysis by experienced probability
Since the task was genuinely probabilistic, and not pseudorandom, it is possible that the probabilities ex-
perienced by subjects differed from the programmed probabilities (although experienced probabilities
inevitably tend towards programmed probabilities as the number of trials increases). For example, one
subject choosing an uncertain reinforcer at preinforcer = 0.5 for 10 trials might experience 3 rewarded and 7
unrewarded trials (an experienced probability of 0.3), while another might experience 6 rewarded and 4
unrewarded (experienced preinforcer = 0.6). To establish whether such effects accounted to any degree for
the pattern of choice observed in AcbC-lesioned and sham-operated rats, choice was re-analysed for four
sets of sessions (preoperative sessions 10–12, early postoperative baseline sessions 13–15, late postop-
erative baseline sessions 22–24, and sessions 44–46 at the end of training on the increasing-probability
version of the task; see Figure 48a–d, and compare to the corresponding programmed-probability versions
in Figure 47a–c,e). In each case, choice ratios were analysed using the model lesion2 × (experienced
probabilitycov × S), with the factor × covariate term included in the model. Experienced probabilities were
calculated for all trial types (forced and choice trials), across the sessions concerned.
These analyses confirmed the pattern of results obtained on the basis of programmed probabilities. For
the preoperative sessions, as expected, there was a main effect of experienced probability (F1,54 = 319.1, p
< .001) but no significant terms involving lesion intent (Fs < 1, NS). For the baseline (decreasing-
probability) task, both early (sessions 13–15) and late (sessions 22–24) in the postoperative testing, there
was a lesion × experienced probability interaction (early: F1,54 = 25.7, p < .001; late: F1,54 = 20.8, p <
.001). For the increasing-probability schedule (sessions 44–46), there was no lesion × experienced prob-
ability interaction (F1,54 = 1.80, p = .185) but there was a main effect of lesion (F1,16.0 = 9.36, p = .007).
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Figure 48: Choice, by experienced prob-
ability, in AcbC-lesioned and sham-
operated rats
Choice, replotted by experienced (as op-
posed to programmed) large-reinforcer
probabilities. Panels a–d correspond to pan-
els a–c/e of the previous figure. The statis-
tical patterns of choice remained the same
(### p < .001, lesion × experienced delay
interaction; ** p < .01, main effect of le-
sion).
4.4.8 Indifference probabilities
Choice ratios from sham-operated rats on sessions 22–24 (the final 3 postoperative sessions on the basic
task; see Table 6, p. 113) were analysed using four different linear predictors, based either on the prob-
ability of delivery of a large reinforcer (given choice of the Large lever), preinforcer, or of the odds against
delivery of a large reinforcer, calculated as odds against = (1 – preinforcer)/preinforcer. This established that
choice patterns were predicted best, in linear fashion, by experienced probabilities (within-subject pre-
dictor allowing different slopes for each subject, r2 = 0.85) and programmed probabilities (r2 = 0.84),
rather than by experienced odds (r2 = 0.61) or programmed odds (r2 = 0.67). Additionally, optimal be-
haviour would give choice that was a step function of probability: it is optimal to choose the
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small/certain lever whenever the four-pellet reinforcer is delivered with preinforcer < 0.25 and to choose the
large/uncertain lever whenever preinforcer > 0.25. Therefore, a single-parameter continuous function ap-
proximating a step function was also used to predict subjects’ choice: the logistic function y = 100/e–(x–
m)÷b with y as the percentage choice of the large reinforcer, x as the programmed probability, b = 0.01 as
an approximation to b = 0 and m as the free parameter. However, this gave a poor fit (r2 calculated as
SSmodel/SStotal for a nonlinear fit: mean r2 = 0.26; note that individual values of r2 can fall outside the
range [0,1] when calculated this way for nonlinear models) (Cameron & Windmeijer, 1997). Conse-
quently, since choice was best described as a linear function of probability, indifference probabilities
were calculated for sham-operated and AcbC-lesioned rats, namely the probability at which rats were
equally likely to choose the small/certain and large/uncertain reinforcers. These were calculated via a
linear regression of probability on choice (i.e. a regression in which probability was predicted from
choice). This method has the potential to produce nonsensical probabilities for individual rats (if, for ex-
ample, an individual’s curve does not go both above and below the 50% choice point in a given set of
sessions) but is nonetheless useful for group comparison. Experienced large-reinforcer probabilities
(across all types of trials) were used, rather than programmed probabilities, though the pattern of results
presented below was not altered by the use of programmed probabilities instead.
The main finding was that by the end of testing, AcbC-lesioned rats had higher indifference probabili-
ties (0.70) than sham-operated rats (0.32) (Figure 49)—that is, while sham-operated rats behaved as if
indifferent between a one-pellet certain reinforcer and a four-pellet reinforcer delivered with probability
0.32 (mathematically, an expected number of pellets of 0.32 × 4 = 1.28), AcbC-lesioned rats behaved as if
indifferent between a one-pellet certain reinforcer and a four-pellet reinforcer delivered with probability
0.70 (an expected number of pellets of 2.8). That is, AcbC-lesioned rats appeared to exhibit risk aversion
by the end of testing. The full analysis was as follows. Preoperatively (sessions 10–12), indifference
probabilities were 0.43 ± 0.08 (AcbC) and 0.54 ± 0.09 (sham); these did not differ (F < 1, NS). In the ini-
tial postoperative period (sessions 13–15), indifference probabilities were numerically lower in the le-
sioned group, being 0.25 ± 0.28 (AcbC) and 0.59 ± 0.12 (sham), but indifference probabilities were
highly variable in both groups and these did not differ (F1,16 = 1.76, p = .204). In the later postoperative
period (sessions 22–24), indifference probabilities were higher in the lesioned group, being 0.75 ± 0.22
(AcbC) and 0.39 ± 0.15 (sham), though again these did not differ significantly (F1,16 = 1.90, p = .187). In
the increasing-probability version of the task (sessions 44–46), indifference probabilities were again
higher in the lesioned group, being 0.70 ± 0.15 (AcbC) and 0.32 ± 0.02 (sham). By this stage the differ-
ence was highly significant (F1,16 = 12.6, pstatistical = .003), even if corrected for four comparisons (pstatistical
Figure 49: Indifference probabilities in AcbC-lesioned
and sham-operated rats
Subjects’ behaviour was analysed using a linear regression
technique (see text for method of calculation) to estimate
the large-reinforcer probability at which they were indiffer-
ent between a four-pellet uncertain large reinforcer and a
one-pellet certain small reinforcer. Rational choice, and
optimal choice in this task, would be an indifference prob-
ability of 0.25 (that is, it is rational to be indifferent between
a certain one-pellet reinforcer and a four-pellet reinforcer
delivered with a probability of 0.25), shown by the dotted
line. Lower indifference probabilities imply risk-prone be-
haviour; higher indifference probabilities imply risk-averse
behaviour. Preoperative and successive postoperative indif-
ference probabilities are shown for AcbC-lesioned and
sham-operated control rats (** p < .01, difference from
controls).
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= .012) using the Šidák correction.
4.4.9 Omissions and latencies
Omissions were infrequent and not influenced by reinforcer probability or the lesion. Omission data from
the final postoperative baseline sessions (sessions 22–24) were analysed. Overall, omissions (either fail-
ures to initiate a trial or to respond to an initiated trial) across all trial types occurred at a rate of 2.9 ± 0.9
% (sham) and 5.5 ± 1.9 % (AcbC). Omissions on choice trials for the same sessions were analysed using
the model lesion2 × (probability5 × S). There were no effects of lesion (F1,16 = 1.95, NS) or probability
(F1.6,25.2 = 2.56, ε?  = .394, p = .107), and no interaction (F = 1.04, NS). Almost all omissions were failures
to initiate a trial (shams 0.9% of choice trials, AcbC 4.4%) rather than failures to respond once a trial had
been initiated (shams 0.06% of choice trials, AcbC 0%).
Initiation latencies on choice trials for sessions 22–24 were analysed in the same manner. They were
not affected by the lesion (F < 1, NS), nor by the large-reinforcer probability (F4,64 = 1.41, NS), and there
was no lesion × probability interaction (F < 1, NS).
Response latencies were not affected by the lesion, but were affected both by the time in the session,
with responding tending to get slower as the session progressed, and by the likelihood of obtaining a large
reinforcer, with responding tending to get faster as large-reinforcer delivery became more likely. Re-
sponse latencies on choice trials for sessions 22–24 were analysed using the model lesion2 × (trial block5
× choice2 × S). Response latencies varied across trial blocks: response latencies were initially 0.82 s (in
the first trial block, when the large-reinforcer probability was 1) and slowed to 1.1 s (in the last trial
block, when the large-reinforcer probability was 0.0625) (F3.1,25.1 = 2.97, ε?  = .785, p = .049). Latencies
were not affected by the lesion, or the lever being chosen, and there were no interactions (maximum F
was for response: F1,8 = 2.96, p = .124). To establish whether these effects were due to the large-
reinforcer probability, or to progressive satiation or the passage of time, data from sessions 44–46 were
also analysed, because in these sessions the large-reinforcer probability increased within the session. This
time, there was a response × trial block interaction (F4,28 = 6.44, p = .001), with no other terms significant
(Fs < 1, NS). Responding on the small/certain lever initially took 0.71 s in the first trial block and slowed
to 0.95 s in the last trial block (F2.3,24.8 = 3.58, ε?  = .564, p = .038), but responding on the large/uncertain
lever initially took 0.97 s (in the first trial block, when the large-reinforcer probability was 0.0625) and
speeded up to 0.79 s (in the last trial block, when the large-reinforcer probability was 1) (F3.5,38.8 = 3.222,
ε?  = .883, p = .027).
The lesion did not affect the latency to collect reward. Food collection latencies on rewarded trials
were analysed across sessions 22–24, this time including both forced and choice trials to enable an analy-
sis by response and probability. The model lesion2 × (probability5 × response2 × S) was used; this re-
vealed main effects of response (F1,13 = 13.8, p = .003) and probability (F2.5,32.8 = 3.53, ε?  = .631, p =
.031), but no other significant terms (maximum F was for lesion × response, F1,13 = 3.94, p = .069). Col-
lection was faster following delivery of the large reinforcer than the small (4.1 versus 5.3 s, respectively),
and got slightly slower across the session (4.4 s in the first trial block and 4.9 s in the last).
4.4.10 Amount of food obtained
AcbC-lesioned rats obtained less food as a result of their choices (Figure 50a,b). An analysis of the aver-
age number of pellets obtained on choice trials in sessions 13–15 using the model lesion2 × (probability5 ×
S) revealed a main effect of lesion (F1,16 = 8.69, p = .009), as well as an effect of probability (F1.9,30.1 =
97.5, ε?  = .470, p < .001), but no interaction (F < 1, NS). A similar analysis of the final baseline postop-
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erative sessions 22–24 revealed a lesion × probability interaction (F2.1,33.8 = 3.29, ε?  = .529, p = .047) in
addition to main effects of lesion (F1,16 = 14.2, p = .002) and probability (F2.1,33.8 = 122.2, ε?  = .529, p <
.001). However, the only probability at which groups significantly differed was p = 1 (statistical p =
.014); when the large reinforcer probability was 0.0625–0.5, the two groups did not differ in the amount
of food obtained (pstatistical ≥ .129).
Figure 50: Amount of food obtained, and
effects of satiety on choice, in AcbC-
lesioned and sham-operated rats
(a) Number of pellets obtained in each trial
block; average of the first three postopera-
tive sessions, 13–15 (** p < .01, main effect
of lesion). The grey area indicates the ex-
pected range of options available to a rat
making no omissions: consistent responding
on the lever delivering the small, certain
reward of a single pellet yields 10 pellets
per trial block (horizontal border of the grey
area); consistent responding on the lever
delivering the large, uncertain reward yields
an expected number of pellets that varies
with the probability in force (as shown by
the diagonal border of the grey area). Opti-
mal behaviour, to maximize the expected
amount of food, is to choose the
small/certain lever when the large (four-
pellet) reinforcer probability is less than
0.25 and to choose the large/uncertain lever
when this probability exceeds 0.25. (b) As
for (a), but showing data from the final
baseline postoperative sessions, 22–24 (# p
< .05, lesion × probability interaction; * p <
.05, simple effect of lesion). (c) Effects on
choice of alternating subjects between states
of hunger and satiety. The error bar is twice
the SED for the three-way (lesion × hunger
× probability) interaction.
4.4.11 Effects of hunger and satiety on choice
Alternating between hunger and satiety had no substantial effects on choice (Figure 50c). Choice ratios
for sessions 25–28 were analysed using the model lesion2 × (hunger2 × probability5 × S). As before, a
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main effect of probability (F2.0,32.6 = 38.4, ε?  = .510, p < .001) and a lesion × probability interaction
(F2.0,32.6 = 4.29, ε?  = .510, p = .022) were present; in addition, there was a marginally significant lesion ×
hunger × probability interaction (F4,64 = 2.51, p = .05). However, an effect of hunger was not detectable in
either group alone, either for shams (hunger: F1,11 = 2.45, NS; hunger × probability: F4,44 = 2.18, NS) or
for AcbC-lesioned rats (hunger: F < 1, NS; hunger × probability: F4,20 = 1.79, NS). Similarly, the differ-
ences between groups persisted both in the hungry (lesion × probability: F2.6,41.7 = 3.66, ε?  = .652, p =
.024) and the sated (lesion × probability: F2.5,39.3 = 4.24, ε?  = .615, p = .016) conditions.
4.4.12 Locomotor activity and body mass
AcbC-lesioned rats were hyperactive and slower to habituate to a novel environment (Figure 51). AcbC-
lesioned rats also gained less mass postoperatively. At the time of surgery, the groups did not differ in
mass (shams, 357 ± 4 g; AcbC, 362 ± 6 g; F < 1, NS), but at the end of the experiment AcbC-lesioned rats
weighed less than shams (shams, 421 ± 7 g; AcbC, 358 ± 10 g; lesion × time, F1,16 = 80.1, p < .001; sim-
ple effect of lesion at final time point: F1,16 = 24.5, p < .001). Both effects are consistent with previous
results: AcbC-lesioned rats are known to exhibit locomotor hyperactivity (Maldonado-Irizarry & Kelley,
1995; Parkinson et al., 1999a; Cardinal et al., 2001; Cardinal & Cheung, 2005) (Chapter 4) and to weigh
less than sham-operated controls (Maldonado-Irizarry & Kelley, 1995; Parkinson, 1998; Cardinal et al.,
2001; Cardinal & Cheung, 2005) (Chapter 4). They also eat the food used as the maintenance diet in the
present study more slowly than sham-operated controls, and eat less of it in a given time, but do not differ
in consumption of the sucrose pellets used as reinforcers in the present study (Cardinal, 2001; Cardinal et
al., 2001). It is not known whether there are metabolic differences in AcbC-lesioned rats above and be-
yond the tendency to eat somewhat less and to be hyperactive (though see Kelley, 2004). However, dif-
ferences in mass between AcbC-lesioned and sham-operated rats are also apparent when they have been
fed ad libitum ever since the lesion was made, with AcbC-lesioned rats weighing ~88% as much as sham-
operated controls in this situation (Cardinal, 2001), much as in the present study (85%). This suggests that
the food deprivation regimen maintained the proportional relationship between actual and free-feeding
mass similarly in sham-operated and AcbC-lesioned rats.
Figure 51: Locomotor activity in a novel
environment in AcbC-lesioned and sham-
operated rats
AcbC-lesioned rats were hyperactive com-
pared to sham-operated controls, being
slower to habituate to a novel environment.
Analysis using the model lesion2 × (bin12 ×
S) revealed a lesion × bin interaction
(F8.3,133.4 = 2.20, ε?  = .758, # p = .029), re-
flecting a difference in habituation between
the groups, and a main effect of bin
(F8.34,133.4 = 9.02, p < .001), reflecting ha-
bituation, though there was no main effect
of lesion (F1,16 = 2.24, p = .154).
4.5 DISCUSSION
These results suggest that the AcbC contributes to the selection of uncertain rewards. AcbC-lesioned rats
exhibited risk-averse choice: they chose large, uncertain rewards less than sham-operated controls when
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offered a smaller, certain alternative, even though they showed a strong and unaltered preference for large
rewards over small rewards, and for certain rewards over uncertain rewards. By the end of testing, the
control group behaved as if indifferent between a single certain food pellet and four pellets delivered with
p = 0.32 (close to the probability of 0.25 that would represent rational indifference), while the AcbC-
lesioned group behaved as if indifferent between a single certain pellet and four pellets delivered with p =
0.70.
Though these results establish that the lesions used in this study caused this pattern of behaviour, the
precise mechanism by which this occurs is unknown: for example, it is possible that the damage caused to
structures adjacent to the AcbC, though limited, played a role in this pattern of choice, or that adaptations
in other structures consequent upon the lesion were important in the behavioural effects (particularly
given that risk aversion was not apparent immediately but emerged with further time and postoperative
experience with the task).
4.5.1 Choice in normal subjects
The dominant model of uncertainty or probability discounting (Rachlin et al., 1986; Rachlin et al., 1991;
Ho et al., 1999; Green & Myerson, 2004) suggests that subjects calculate a value for each reinforcer, ac-
cording to its size and other parameters, and discount this by multiplying it by 1/(1+Hθ), where θ repre-
sents the odds against obtaining the reinforcer, θ = (1 – p)/p, and H represents an odds discounting pa-
rameter that is specific to the individual subject but stable over time for that subject. In this model, value
is a hyperbolic function of the odds θ; such a hyperbolic function is supported by empirical research, at
least in humans (Rachlin et al., 1986; Rachlin et al., 1991; Rachlin & Siegel, 1994; Kacelnik, 1997b; Ri-
chards et al., 1999b; Rachlin et al., 2000). The present task is not well suited to evaluating such a quanti-
tative model, since in discrete-trial schedules it is often the case that animals maximize, or allocate most
of their choices to whichever option is the more favourable (Mackintosh, 1974). However, the behaviour
of normal subjects here can be evaluated as to its optimality. In the present task, neither risk aversion nor
risk taking is optimal if carried to extremes. Optimal behaviour, to maximize the expected amount of
food, is to choose the small/certain lever when the large (four-pellet) reinforcer probability is less than
0.25, to choose the large/uncertain lever when the probability exceeds 0.25, and to be indifferent at p =
0.25 (i.e. to exhibit a step function in choice). Shams’ choice of the large reinforcer behaviour was better
described by a linear function of the large-reinforcer probability than by such a step function. Neverthe-
less, shams’ behaviour was reasonably close to the optimal in the most obvious way to measure optimal-
ity, namely the amount of food obtained (Figure 50b, p. 121).
4.5.2 Effects of AcbC lesions in terms of conditioning processes
AcbC-lesioned rats chose the large, uncertain reinforcer less often than shams did, but only when a
smaller certain reinforcer was available as an alternative; that is, they exhibited risk-averse choice. A
number of simple explanations of the present results may be ruled out. For example, it is unlikely that the
pattern of choice exhibited by AcbC-lesioned rats can be explained in terms of perseveration, within a
session, on the initially optimal lever. It might be that animals that perseverated on the lever delivering
the small, certain reinforcer, because that lever was initially optimal, would appear to exhibit risk-averse
choice in sessions in which the large-reinforcer probability increased across the session (Figure 47e, p.
115), but this could not explain the same pattern of choice in sessions in which the same lever was ini-
tially suboptimal, i.e. when the large-reinforcer probability decreased across the session (Figure 47c, p.
115). Furthermore, although AcbC lesions are known to affect processes through which Pavlovian CSs
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affect behaviour, including PIT, autoshaping, and conditioned reinforcement (Parkinson et al., 1999a;
Parkinson et al., 1999b; Parkinson et al., 2000c; Hall et al., 2001; Cardinal et al., 2002b; de Borchgrave
et al., 2002; Parkinson et al., 2002), there was no Pavlovian CS that was differentially associated with
uncertain as opposed to certain reinforcement in this task, so these effects cannot explain the present re-
sults. It might be that the AcbC lesion impaired subjects’ knowledge of the instrumental action–outcome
contingency specifically for the uncertain outcome. There is some debate about the role of the AcbC in
instrumental conditioning (see Cardinal et al., 2002a; Cardinal & Everitt, 2004; Kelley, 2004) and goal-
directed action, a subset of instrumental conditioning (Dickinson, 1994; Dickinson & Balleine, 1994;
Cardinal et al., 2002a). Manipulation of the AcbC can certainly affect instrumental learning (Kelley et al.,
1997; Smith-Roe & Kelley, 2000; Baldwin et al., 2002a; Hernandez et al., 2002). However, the AcbC is
not required for simple instrumental conditioning: rats with AcbC lesions acquire lever-press responses
on FR-1 schedules at supernormal levels (Chapter 4; Cardinal & Cheung, 2005), and rats with Acb or
AcbC lesions are fully sensitive to changes in the action–outcome contingency (Balleine & Killcross,
1994; Corbit et al., 2001; de Borchgrave et al., 2002). However, when acquiring a sequence of RR sched-
ules, AcbC-lesioned rats respond somewhat less than sham-operated controls (Corbit et al., 2001), while
lesions of the whole Acb made rats respond slightly, though not significantly, less on a similar sequence
of RR schedules (de Borchgrave et al., 2002). RR schedules clearly involve probabilistic reinforcement,
so these results are consistent with the possibility that the present impairment shown by AcbC-lesioned
rats in choosing large, unlikely rewards is due to impaired instrumental conditioning when the outcome is
uncertain—and, conversely, that the impairment in simple instrumental learning seen previously (Corbit
et al., 2001) was specifically a result of the reward uncertainty inherent in a RR schedule, given that
AcbC-lesioned rats learn instrumental responses normally or supernormally with certain immediate rein-
forcement (Chapter 4; Cardinal & Cheung, 2005). It is also possible that AcbC-lesioned rats represent the
instrumental contingency normally with uncertain reward, but simply value the uncertain outcome less
and respond less for it accordingly, as discussed next.
4.5.3 Effects of AcbC lesions in terms of probability discounting and reinforcer
magnitude sensitivity
Since the present study required rats to choose between small, certain and large, uncertain rewards, an
effect of the lesion to alter the perception of relative reward magnitude might affect choice, just as an al-
teration in the perception of reward probability might. For example, altering the absolute magnitudes of
the reinforcers can affect choice involving probabilistic reinforcement (Mazur, 1988; Kirby & Marakovic,
1996), as would be predicted if reinforcer “value” is not simply a linear function of physical magnitude
(Ho et al., 1999). Specifically, the present results (a tendency for AcbC-lesioned rats to choose the small,
certain reinforcer more than shams) could be explained by “risk aversion” (increased or steeper uncer-
tainty/odds/probability discounting), or if the difference between 1 and 4 pellets was perceived to be
smaller by AcbC-lesioned subjects than by shams (due to reduced discrimination between the two rein-
forcer magnitudes, or perhaps with a normal ability to tell the two apart but with an altered perception of
relative value). For example, if a normal subject assigned values of 1 and 4 to the reinforcers, and a le-
sioned subject assigned values of 1 and 3 to the same reinforcers, then the lesioned subject would be less
likely than the sham to choose the large reinforcer when it was made uncertain, even without any primary
abnormality in the processing of probability. At first glance, this interpretation would appear to be sup-
ported by the observation that AcbC-lesioned rats chose the large reinforcer somewhat less often than
shams when it was certain, as well as when it was uncertain. However, several lines of evidence suggest
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this explanation is not the correct one. When the large and the small reinforcers were both made consis-
tently certain, there were no differences between AcbC-lesioned rats and controls (Figure 47d, p. 115).
Furthermore, other evidence indicates that AcbC lesions do not impair reinforcer magnitude discrimina-
tion or the perception of relative reinforcer value. Excitotoxic lesions of the whole Acb do not prevent
rats from detecting changes in reward value, induced either by altering the concentration of a sucrose re-
ward or by changing the deprivational state of the subject (Balleine & Killcross, 1994). Such lesions also
do not impair rats’ ability to respond faster when environmental cues predict the availability of larger re-
wards (Brown & Bowman, 1995), and nor does inactivation of the Acb with local anaesthetic or blockade
of AMPA glutamate receptors in the Acb (Giertler et al., 2004; 2005); the effects of intra-Acb NMDA
receptor antagonists have varied (Hauber et al., 2000; Giertler et al., 2003; 2005). AcbC-lesioned rats can
still discriminate large from small rewards (Cardinal et al., 2003b; 2004). Similarly, DA depletion of the
Acb does not affect the ability to discriminate large from small reinforcers (Salamone et al., 1994; Cous-
ins et al., 1996; Salamone et al., 2001), and systemic DA antagonists do not affect the perceived quantity
of food as assessed in a psychophysical procedure (Martin-Iverson et al., 1987). Furthermore, a recent
study found evidence that AcbC-lesioned rats may even show somewhat enhanced reinforcer magnitude
discrimination, or an exaggerated perception of relative value (Chapter 4; Cardinal & Cheung, 2005).
Given that reinforcer magnitude discrimination appears to be unimpaired, at worst, by AcbC lesions, the
observation in the present study that AcbC-lesioned rats chose the large reinforcer somewhat less often
than controls in the task in which large-reinforcer probabilities changed throughout the session is more
likely to be explained by within-session generalization (Evenden & Ryan, 1996; Cardinal et al., 2000;
2003b)—i.e. that avoidance of the large reinforcer during trial blocks when it was uncertain generalized
to trial blocks when it was certain. Together, these findings suggest that the present results are best ex-
plained as an effect of AcbC lesions to increase the rate of uncertainty/odds/probability discounting—
effectively, a tendency to behave as if an uncertain outcome were less likely than it really is.
4.5.4 Probability versus delay discounting
It is known that AcbC lesions affect choice and learning involving delayed reinforcement (Chapters 1 and
4; Cardinal et al., 2001; 2003b; Cardinal & Cheung, 2005). As discussed earlier, it has been suggested
that delay or temporal discounting, the process by which delayed reinforcers lose value, and probability or
odds discounting, the process by which uncertain reinforcers lose value, reflect the same underlying proc-
ess (Rachlin et al., 1986; Stevenson, 1986; Rachlin et al., 1987; Mazur, 1989; Rachlin et al., 1991; Ma-
zur, 1995; Green & Myerson, 1996; Mazur, 1997; Sozou, 1998). For example, in the present task, choos-
ing the uncertain large reinforcer five times but only obtaining it on the fifth response might be seen as
equivalent to a very long delay, on average, between choice of the large reinforcer and its eventual deliv-
ery. Alternatively, delays may be seen as entailing the ecological risk of losing the reward during the de-
lay. The failure of AcbC-lesioned rats to choose an uncertain reinforcer (risk aversion, as seen in the sta-
ble phase of the present results) and their failure to choose a delayed reinforcer may therefore be ex-
plained in the same way. However, there is evidence that time and probability discounting are different
and dissociable processes (Ho et al., 1999; Mitchell, 2003; Green & Myerson, 2004). Most simply, it is
not surprising that currency inflation affects human decisions involving delayed but not probabilistic fi-
nancial reward (Ostaszewski et al., 1998). Moreover, the absolute magnitude of rewards can have differ-
ent effects on delayed and probabilistic discounting (Green et al., 1999; Myerson et al., 2003; Green &
Myerson, 2004). A study looking at human choices in a gambling task found that individuals’ propensity
to choose rapidly (one, perhaps motoric, measure of delay aversion) and their propensity to bet large
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amounts of money on uncertain outcomes (a measure of risk taking) represented independent factors
(Deakin et al., 2004). Some studies have found abnormal delay discounting, but not uncertainty dis-
counting, in drug addicts (Vuchinich & Calamas, 1997; Mitchell, 1999; Mitchell, 2003; Reynolds et al.,
2004b), while gamblers have been observed to discount probabilistic rewards less steeply than controls
(i.e. to take risks) without showing differences in delay discounting (Holt et al., 2003).
4.5.5 Implications for AcbC function and impulsivity
Impulsivity is multifaceted, reflecting—at the least—individual differences in distinct and dissociable
processes involving information gathering, the selection of outcomes, and the inhibition of motor actions
(Evenden, 1999b). Furthermore, as discussed above, delay discounting and probability discounting may
also reflect separate processes. Damage to the AcbC can produce impulsive choice in the sense of an im-
paired ability to choose delayed rewards (Cardinal et al., 2001), in addition to hyperactivity (Chapter 4;
Maldonado-Irizarry & Kelley, 1995; Parkinson et al., 1999a; Cardinal et al., 2001; Cardinal & Cheung,
2005), though without impairments in attentional function (Christakou et al., 2004) and without motoric
impulsivity as assessed by the stop-signal task (Eagle & Robbins, 2003). In the context of choice involv-
ing uncertain appetitive reinforcement, “impulsivity” would equate to risk taking—less steep uncertainty
discounting, or greater willingness to choose unlikely rewards. AcbC lesions, however, produced a risk-
averse or conservative pattern of choice in the present study. Clearly, then, AcbC-lesioned rats cannot be
characterized as impulsive in all senses. A more appropriate unifying concept would seem to be that the
AcbC promotes the selection, and perhaps the salience, of uncertain and delayed rewards—perhaps, in
general, of rewards that are not certain, imminent, or present (Cardinal et al., 2002a). The AcbC promotes
choice of (Cardinal et al., 2001) and learning with (Chapter 4; Cardinal & Cheung, 2005) delayed re-
wards. It appears to promote the selection of uncertain reinforcers (present results), and this is compatible
with human imaging studies showing increased Acb activation during the selection of high-risk options
(Ernst et al., 2004; Matthews et al., 2004). The Acb is required for PIT, the process by which Pavlovian
CSs signalling reward enhance instrumental responding for those rewards (Hall et al., 2001; de
Borchgrave et al., 2002). It is also required for autoshaping, or locomotor approach to appetitive Pavlov-
ian CSs (Parkinson et al., 1999a; Parkinson et al., 1999b; Parkinson et al., 2000c; Cardinal et al., 2002b;
Parkinson et al., 2002), and it influences conditioned reinforcement, the process of working for CSs pre-
viously paired with reinforcement (Taylor & Robbins, 1984; 1986; Cador et al., 1991; Parkinson et al.,
1999a). Acb DA also contributes to subjects’ motivation to work hard (Ikemoto & Panksepp, 1999;
Salamone & Correa, 2002; Salamone et al., 2003; Mingote et al., 2005; Salamone et al., 2005).
It is not known whether AcbC lesions would produce similar effects on choice involving uncertain
aversive events. It would be expected that increased odds/uncertainty/probability discounting—effec-
tively, a tendency to behave as if an uncertain outcome were less likely than it really is—would produce
risk aversion for appetitive outcomes (reduced willingness to choose large, unlikely rewards) but risk
proneness for aversive outcomes (increased willingness to choose large, uncertain punishments over
small, certain punishments) (Ho et al., 1999). In humans, at least, the delay and probability discounting
processes appear similar for rewards and losses (Ostaszewski & Karzel, 2002; Green & Myerson, 2004).
4.5.6 Relationship to structures and neuromodulator systems innervating the AcbC
The PFC, which projects heavily to the AcbC (Brog et al., 1993), is also involved in decision making un-
der conditions of uncertainty. Humans with OFC or ventromedial PFC damage are impaired on the Iowa
gambling task (Bechara et al., 1994; 1996; 1997), in which subjects must learn to differentiate between
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low-reward, low-risk card decks that yield a net positive outcome and high-reward, high-risk decks that
yield a net negative outcome, though the precise locus and nature of the deficit seen on this task is de-
bated (Manes et al., 2002; Clark et al., 2003; Fellows & Farah, 2005). Choice between small, likely re-
wards and large, unlikely rewards increases cerebral blood flow and BOLD signal in orbital and inferior
PFC (Rogers et al., 1999b; 2004b), and OFC damage also impairs performance of a task requiring human
subjects to choose between two possible outcomes and to bet on their choice, with lesioned subjects de-
ciding slowly and failing to choose the optimal, most likely outcome (Rogers et al., 1999a). Excitotoxic
lesions of the OFC make rats less likely than sham-operated controls to choose a large, uncertain reward
over a small, certain reward (Mobini et al., 2002); OFC-lesioned rats had lower indifference odds (higher
indifference probabilities; steeper uncertainty discounting) and exhibited risk-averse choice, just like the
AcbC-lesioned subjects in the present study. There is direct evidence that OFC lesions do alter sensitivity
to the relative magnitudes of the two rewards (Kheramin et al., 2005), as does OFC DA depletion
(Kheramin et al., 2004), but the effects on uncertainty discounting are present in addition to those on rein-
forcer magnitude sensitivity (Kheramin et al., 2003).
The Acb is also innervated by the a number of neuromodulator systems, including the 5-HT system
(Halliday et al., 1995). Although manipulations of 5-HT influence choice involving delayed reinforce-
ment, there is less evidence that they influence choice involving uncertainty and risk. Correlational stud-
ies have indicated that low CSF levels of the 5-HT metabolite 5-HIAA are associated with risk taking in
monkeys (Mehlman et al., 1994) and impulsive aggression, violence, and suicide in humans (Åsberg et
al., 1976; Linnoila et al., 1983; Brown & Linnoila, 1990; Linnoila et al., 1993; Mann, 2003). Forebrain 5-
HT depletion tends to steepen temporal (delay) discounting (reviewed briefly by Cardinal et al., 2004);
however, it does not appear to influence choice involving probabilistic reinforcement. Dietary tryptophan
depletion (Biggio et al., 1974; Clemens et al., 1980; Delgado et al., 1989) decreases levels of 5-HT me-
tabolites in CSF, an indirect indicator of brain 5-HT levels, but has not been shown to affect probability
discounting in humans (Anderson et al., 2003; Rogers et al., 2003); similarly, forebrain 5-HT depletion in
rats does not affect choice between small, certain rewards and large, uncertain rewards (Mobini et al.,
2000b). The AcbC also receives a substantial DA innervation, and DA neurons respond to reward predic-
tion errors (Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 1998; Schultz et al., 1998; Schultz & Dickinson, 2000; Schultz,
2006). Although systemic D2-type DA receptor antagonists can induce impulsive choice involving de-
layed reinforcement (Wade et al., 2000), this effect may not occur in the Acb (Winstanley et al., 2005b),
the response of DA neurons specifically to reward uncertainty is debated (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Niv et al.,
2005; Tobler et al., 2005), and little is known of the role of DA in choice involving uncertain rewards.
Systemic noradrenergic (NA) blockade has also been shown to affect decision making under uncertainty
in humans, by reducing the discrimination between magnitudes of different losses when the probability of
losing was high (Rogers et al., 2004a), though NA reuptake inhibition has not been shown to affect the
Iowa gambling task (O’Carroll & Papps, 2003). However, the Acb does not receive a substantial NA in-
nervation (Aston-Jones et al., 1995).
4.6 CONCLUSIONS
These experiments have shown that excitotoxic lesions of the AcbC induce risk-averse choice in rats.
AcbC lesions did not prevent rats from discriminating a large reward from a small reward, or a certain
reward from an uncertain reward. However, when offered the choice between a small/certain reward and
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a large/uncertain reward, AcbC-lesioned rats showed a reduced preference for the large/uncertain reward
(compared to sham-operated controls) in their final pattern of postoperative choice. AcbC-lesioned rats
exhibited a tendency to behave as if an uncertain outcome were less likely than was really the case. To-
gether with previous studies, these results suggest that the AcbC contributes to reinforcement and choice
particularly when the reinforcer is temporally distant or uncertain.
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Chapter 5: General discussion
5.1 OVERVIEW
The experiments described in this thesis addressed the role played by the AcbC in rats’ ability to learn
from delayed rewards, to perform previously learned actions for delayed rewards, to assess reward mag-
nitudes, and to choose uncertain rewards, together with the role of the hippocampus in the ability to learn
from delayed rewards and to choose delayed rewards. In this concluding chapter, the findings from these
experiments will first be summarized briefly. The results have already been discussed in Chapters 2–4; in
this chapter, their implications will be considered in the wider context of impulse control disorders and
the neural mechanisms that underlie reinforcement.
5.2 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
5.2.1 Role of the AcbC in learning with delayed reward
In Chapter 2 (Cardinal & Cheung, 2005), it was shown that excitotoxic lesions of the AcbC did not pre-
vent rats from learning a simple instrumental response when the reinforcing outcome followed their ac-
tion immediately. However, AcbC lesions impaired rats’ ability to learn the same instrumental response
when the outcome was delayed by 10 or 20 s. Increasing delays impaired learning in normal rats to some
degree, which is a well-known finding (Grice, 1948; Lattal & Gleeson, 1990; Dickinson et al., 1992).
Rats with AcbC lesions were unimpaired (compared to sham-operated controls) when there was no delay,
but were profoundly impaired when there was a delay between action and outcome, compared to shams
learning with the same delay. AcbC lesions also impaired performance of an instrumental response that
was learned preoperatively, but again only when response–reinforcer delays were present.
The fact that pre-exposure to the context improves instrumental learning in normal rats (Dickinson et
al., 1992) suggests one possible mechanism by which AcbC lesions might retard learning when delays are
present. When a reinforcer arrives, it may be associated either with a preceding response, or with the
context. Therefore, in normal animals, pre-exposure to the context may retard the formation of context–
reinforcer associations by latent inhibition, or it might serve to retard the formation of associations
between irrelevant behaviours and reinforcement. Non-reinforced exposure to the context forces the
subjects to experience a zero-response, zero-reinforcer situation, i.e. P(outcome│no action) = 0. When
they are then exposed to the instrumental contingency, such that P(outcome│action) > 0, this prior
experience may enhance their ability to detect the instrumental contingency ∆P = P(outcome│action) –
P(outcome│no action). In one aversive Pavlovian conditioning procedure in which a CS was paired with
electric shock, AcbC lesions have been shown to impair conditioning to discrete CSs, but simultaneously
to enhance conditioning to contextual or background CSs (Parkinson et al., 1999b), though not all
behavioural paradigms show this effect (Levita et al., 2002; Jongen-Relo et al., 2003). It is therefore
possible that enhanced formation of context–reinforcer associations may explain the retardation of
response–reinforcer learning in AcbC-lesioned rats in the presence of delays.
Acb lesions have also produced delay-dependent impairments in a delayed-matching-to-position task
(Dunnett, 1990; Reading & Dunnett, 1991). Their effects on the delayed-matching-to-sample paradigm
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have also been studied, but a more profound and delay-independent deficit was observed, likely due to
differences in the specific task used (Burk & Mair, 2001).
5.2.2 Role of the AcbC in assessing reward magnitude
Previous studies have found that excitotoxic lesions of the whole Acb do not prevent rats from detecting
changes in reward value (Balleine & Killcross, 1994). Such lesions also do not impair rats’ ability to re-
spond faster when environmental cues predict the availability of larger rewards (Brown & Bowman,
1995), and nor does inactivation of the Acb with local anaesthetic or blockade of AMPA glutamate re-
ceptors in the Acb (Giertler et al., 2004). The effects of intra-Acb NMDA receptor antagonists have var-
ied (Hauber et al., 2000; Giertler et al., 2003). AcbC-lesioned rats can still discriminate large from small
rewards (Cardinal et al., 2003b; 2004). Similarly, DA depletion of the Acb does not affect the ability to
discriminate large from small reinforcers (Salamone et al., 1994; Cousins et al., 1996; Salamone et al.,
2001), and systemic DA antagonists do not affect the perceived quantity of food as assessed in a psycho-
physical procedure (Martin-Iverson et al., 1987). These studies suggest that AcbC lesions do not prevent
rats from discriminating qualitatively between large and small rewards, and that DA antagonism does not
alter quantitative reward magnitude discrimination. For the purposes of analyses involving reward delay,
it is important to know whether AcbC lesions alter the quantitative perception of reward magnitude—e.g.
whether such lesions alter the magnitude sensitivity parameter Q in the model of Ho et al. (1999). In
Chapter 2 (Cardinal & Cheung, 2005), it was observed that excitotoxic AcbC lesions did not impair, but
rather improved, rats’ ability to allocate their responses across two schedules in proportion to the experi-
enced reinforcement rate, even when the two schedules were identical except in the magnitude of the rein-
forcements they provide, suggesting their sensitivity to reinforcer magnitude is quantitatively no worse
than shams’.
5.2.3 Role of the hippocampus in learning with and choosing delayed reward
As discussed in Chapter 1, a role of the hippocampus in learning with delayed reinforcement might be
suspected, because there is good evidence that the hippocampus contributes to the representation of con-
text (Hirsh, 1974; Good & Honey, 1991; Selden et al., 1991; Kim & Fanselow, 1992; Phillips & LeDoux,
1992; Honey & Good, 1993; Jarrard, 1993; Kim et al., 1993; Phillips & LeDoux, 1994; Phillips &
LeDoux, 1995; Chen et al., 1996; Maren & Fanselow, 1997; Anagnostaras et al., 1999; Holland & Bou-
ton, 1999; Good, 2002; Rudy et al., 2002; Ito et al., 2005) and, as discussed earlier, contextual condi-
tioning is important in learning with delays. Since context–outcome associations are thought to hinder
instrumental learning with delayed reinforcement through contextual competition (Dickinson et al., 1992;
Dickinson & Balleine, 1994), it follows that if H lesions impair the formation of associations involving
the context, such lesions might reduce contextual competition and hence facilitate instrumental condi-
tioning when there is an action–outcome delay.
Indeed, excitotoxic lesions of the H ameliorated the deleterious effects of response–reinforcer delays
on instrumental learning (Chapter 3; Cheung & Cardinal, 2005). H-lesioned rats responded slightly less
than controls in the absence of delays, but they became better at learning (relative to shams) as the delays
increased, in a delay-dependent fashion. This may have been because the lesion hindered the formation of
context–outcome associations, promoting response–outcome association instead.
Unexpectedly, in separate experiments H-lesioned rats exhibited impulsive choice, preferring an im-
mediate, small reward to a delayed, larger reward (in a task based on that of Evenden & Ryan, 1996),
even though they preferred the large reward when it was not delayed (Chapter 3; Cheung & Cardinal,
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2005). Though a quantitative difference in sensitivity to reinforcer magnitude might explain these results,
as discussed above (Ho et al., 1999) (see Chapter 1, p. 40), H-lesioned rats were able to discriminate the
large from the small reinforcer, and such evidence as exists suggests that H-lesioned rats perceive reward
magnitude normally (Kesner & Williams, 1995; Gilbert & Kesner, 2002). These results may also be ex-
plained in terms of altered temporal perception (as discussed on p. 106), affecting choice prospectively or
retrospectively. For example, a lesion that increased the speed of an “internal clock” (Gibbon et al., 1997)
might affect choice prospectively in this task (i.e. the lesioned subject perceives itself to be at a later time
point in the session than it actually is; since the task used a delay for the LL reward that increased across
the session, such an effect would hasten the within-session shift towards the SS alternative), or might af-
fect retrospective choice (i.e. the lesioned subject experiences the delay to the large reinforcer as longer
than it actually is, causing it to value the reinforcer less than shams). The evidence for the role of the hip-
pocampus in temporal perception is inconclusive: some studies have found that aspirative hippocampal
lesions did not affect timing behaviour (Rawlins et al., 1983; Port et al., 1986; Dietrich et al., 1997;
Dietrich & Allen, 1998), whereas others have suggested that lesions of the hippocampus or fim-
bria/fornix speed up an internal clock, or reduce the estimation of time periods when a stimulus being
timed is interrupted (Meck et al., 1984; Olton et al., 1987; Meck, 1988; Hata & Okaichi, 1998; Wallen-
stein et al., 1998). In any case, H-lesioned rats were better at learning with delayed reinforcement but
worse at choosing it, suggesting that self-controlled choice and learning with delayed reinforcement tax
different psychological processes.
5.2.4 Role of the AcbC in choosing uncertain reward
As discussed in Chapter 1, correlational studies have suggested that the Acb may also be involved in the
processing of uncertain or probabilistic reinforcement (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Aron et al., 2004; Ernst et al.,
2004; Matthews et al., 2004; Fiorillo et al., 2005; Niv et al., 2005; Tobler et al., 2005), yet this issue had
not previously been addressed in a controlled interventional study. In Chapter 4 (Cardinal & Howes,
2005), excitotoxic lesions of the AcbC were found to induce what might be characterized as risk-averse
choice in rats. AcbC lesions did not prevent rats from discriminating a large reward from a small reward,
or a certain reward from an uncertain reward. However, when offered the choice between a small/certain
reward and a large/uncertain reward, AcbC-lesioned rats showed a reduced preference for the
large/uncertain reward (compared to sham-operated controls) in their final pattern of postoperative
choice. AcbC-lesioned rats exhibited a tendency to behave as if an uncertain outcome were less likely
than was really the case. Together with studies examining the effects of AcbC lesions on delayed rein-
forcement, these results suggest that the AcbC contributes to reinforcement and choice particularly when
the reinforcer is temporally distant or uncertain.
5.3 WIDER IMPLICATIONS
There is evidence that the AcbC is involved in the pathogenesis of impulsive choice: the integrity of the
AcbC is critical for animals to tolerate delays to appetitive reinforcement (Cardinal et al., 2001), to learn
normally from delayed appetitive reinforcement (Cardinal & Cheung, 2005), and to choose uncertain ap-
petitive reinforcement normally (Cardinal & Howes, 2005). Likewise, normal hippocampal function ap-
pears necessary for rats to choose delayed appetitive reinforcement normally (Cheung & Cardinal, 2005),
although the hippocampus appears to make a different contribution to learning with delayed reinforce-
ment. In addition to providing neuroanatomical insight into the normal process through which delayed
and/or uncertain reinforcement affects behaviour, this finding suggests a mechanism by which dysfunc-
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tion of these structures may contribute to addiction, ADHD, and other impulse control disorders. In this
section, I will set the contribution of the hippocampus to delayed reinforcement in the wider context of
theories of time-limited hippocampal memory storage, and discuss broader implications of the present
findings regarding hippocampal and AcbC function for disorders of impulse control.
5.3.1 The hippocampus and time-limited memory storage
The involvement of the hippocampus in learning with delayed reinforcement was hypothesized (Chapter
1, p. 49; Chapter 3, p. 81) to be a consequence of its role in representing contexts. In turn, this may be due
to the ability of the hippocampus rapidly to associate arbitrary stimuli (see Chapter 1, p. 34).
It is not known whether the delay-related contribution of the hippocampus to instrumental learning is
permanent or transient. However, many types of memory that are initially dependent upon the hippocam-
pus do not remain so. This concept originally stemmed from the observation of a temporally graded retro-
grade amnesia in humans following medial temporal lobe resection or more restricted hippocampal dam-
age, with good memory for events long past but poor memory for relatively recent events preceding the
insult, in addition to the more obvious profound anterograde amnesia (Scoville & Milner, 1957; Zola-
Morgan et al., 1986; Corkin et al., 1997; Corkin, 2002). Similar effects were observed in many animal
models involving lesions restricted to the hippocampal formation (see Squire et al., 2001). These obser-
vations led to the hypothesis that the hippocampus is involved in consolidating memories held elsewhere
(Scoville & Milner, 1957; Squire et al., 1975; 1980; Squire, 1986; 1992; Squire et al., 2001): recent
memories are vulnerable to hippocampal damage, but with time they become independent of the hippo-
campus, perhaps depending instead on cortical sites.
The major competing view is the “multiple memory trace” hypothesis of Nadel & Moscovitch (1997).
They argue that the duration of retrograde amnesia for human autobiographical episodes following medial
temporal lobe damage is extremely long (25–40 years), implying that most humans throughout history
would never have “fully” consolidated a memory, and that the retrograde amnesia may not even be tem-
porally graded at all (i.e. that the hippocampus causes a “flat” retrograde amnesia, with loss of all memo-
ries that ever depended upon it). Nadel & Moscovitch (1997) consider the hippocampus to be perma-
nently involved in the storage of autobiographical memories, taking the viewpoint that autobiographical
memory, personal semantic memory, and “general” semantic memory (vocabulary, grammar, object rec-
ognition) are progressively less sensitive, in that order, to retrograde amnesia following medial temporal
lobe lesions in humans. In their view, the hippocampus provides a permanent spatial or contextual “index”
that helps to retrieve a given memory. One-off (e.g. recent) autobiographical memories are dependent
upon their index for retrieval, so are vulnerable to hippocampal damage. Semantic information is ex-
tracted from repeated episodic experiences; therefore, semantic information—and well-rehearsed, i.e. old,
autobiographical memory—is supported by multiple memory traces, and is less dependent upon the hip-
pocampal “contextual index” for retrieval. Recent statements of this hypothesis have been provided by
Nadel & Bohbot (2001) and Rosenbaum et al. (2001).
However, retrograde amnesia is difficult to study in humans, because it is necessarily done retrospec-
tively—the experimenter must assess the subject’s memory for recent and ancient experience after the
onset of amnesia, but it is difficult to sample memory equivalently from different past time periods, and to
know that these memories were of comparable “strength” before the event that caused amnesia. The ideal
test to compare these two hypotheses therefore involves prospective studies in animals (see Murray &
Bussey, 2001, for these and other important methodological issues). The majority of such studies have
shown temporally graded retrograde amnesia following a variety of hippocampus, fornix, and entorhinal
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cortex lesions (see Squire et al., 2001), supporting the view that the hippocampus does play a transient
role in the storage of at least some types of memory.  Amongst these studies, electrolytic or excitotoxic
lesions of the hippocampus produce a time-limited retrograde amnesia for contextually conditioned fear
(see Anagnostaras et al., 2001).
Thus, memories of certain kinds initially depend upon the hippocampus but with time they become in-
dependent of the hippocampus. Transient hippocampal involvement does not require memories to “move”
in a physically arbitrary way; there are perfectly plausible ways in which a memory might depend on a
structure only temporarily (e.g. McClelland et al., 1995). Figure 52 illustrates one possible simple
mechanism. Recent studies have provided direct support for the view that hippocampal–cortical interac-
tions are involved in the consolidation of some types of memory (Maviel et al., 2004).
Figure 52: A simple mechanism for transient involvement of the hippocampus in memory storage
Left to right: schematics of how the hippocampus might interact with the cerebral cortex to consolidate memories
“held” elsewhere. If the hippocampus exhibits rapid synaptic plasticity (but this is transient or easily disrupted) and
the cortex exhibits slower but more stable plasticity, a plausible mechanism might proceed as follows. Left: hippo-
campal neurons have permanent connections to regions of neocortex (vertical dotted lines). A memory is formed by
the hippocampus rapidly associating a number of active neurons, via synaptic plasticity (horizontal dashed lines).
The memory is dependent upon the hippocampus. Centre: subsequent hippocampal activity promotes the firing of a
cortical network that corresponds to the group of associated hippocampal neurons. As a direct result, this promotes
an increase in the connectivity between the cortical neurons. Right: with time, the cortical links become strong
enough not to require further hippocampus-driven consolidation. The memory is now independent of the hippocam-
pus.
The impermanence of hippocampal memories has been demonstrated both at the behavioural and the syn-
aptic level. Active processes appear to be involved in the decay of hippocampal memories. For example,
Villarreal et al. (2002) have shown that systemic administration of the NMDA antagonist 3-(2-
carboxypiperazin-4-yl)-propyl-1-phosphonic acid (CPP) blocks decay of hippocampal LTP; when given
systemically between training and testing of performance in a radial 8-arm maze task known to depend on
the hippocampus, CPP improved the retention of the memory, though it was not shown that this was due
specifically to the drug’s effect on the hippocampus. Perhaps decay of LTP, or long-term depression
(LTD), which also depends on NMDA receptors (Dudek & Bear, 1992; Morris, 1994), is required to al-
low the hippocampus to acquire new memories, at the expense of old ones. If a rapidly associating net-
work does not have the ability to lose old memories, there is catastrophic interference when new memo-
ries are laid down; this is the stability–plasticity dilemma familiar to connectionist modellers (Grossberg,
1982; McCloskey & Cohen, 1989). Rosenzweig et al. (2002) suggest that Villarreal et al. (2002) blocked
exactly this loss of old memories with CPP.
Moreover, old memories that were once dependent upon the hippocampus can become so again. A
“standard” view of consolidation would be that memories are created in a labile state (sometimes thought
of as short-term memory, although this term has other uses), and with time, they are consolidated into a
stable state (sometimes termed long-term memory). For example, electroconvulsive shock (ECS) or elec-
troconvulsive therapy (ECT), which disrupts all ongoing electrical activity in the regions of the brain to
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which current is applied, induces amnesia if given shortly after training, but not if given a long time after
training (Duncan, 1949; Squire et al., 1975). While the formation of new memories does not require pro-
tein synthesis, the consolidation of memories does; thus, administering the protein synthesis inhibitor an-
isomycin during contextual fear conditioning does not impair the memory of mice if they are tested one
hour later, but that memory fades by 24 h as compared to a control group (see e.g. Abel et al., 1997; Kan-
del, 2001). The same is true of hippocampal LTP: “early” LTP is not dependent upon protein synthesis,
but it fades; normally, it is made long lasting by a second phase, “late” LTP, which requires protein syn-
thesis (see Beggs et al., 1999).
This view is extended by the concept of reconsolidation. As before, this hypothesis suggests that
memories are created in a labile state and are consolidated into a stable state. However, in this theory,
recalling or reactivating a memory returns it to the labile state. Therefore, although protein synthesis in-
hibitors or other amnestic treatments do not disrupt stable memories, they should be able to disrupt old
memories that have been reactivated. Indeed, this has been observed (Misanin et al., 1968). Recently,
Nader et al. (2000) found that infusions of anisomycin into the BLA, a critical site of plasticity for CS–
US associations involved in conditioned freezing in the rat, disrupted memory for a CS–US association
that had been “retrieved” by presenting the CS. This disruption did not occur if anisomycin was given
without representation of the CS. The molecular mechanisms of consolidation and reconsolidation are
doubly dissociable (Lee et al., 2004), so they are not exactly the same process. Reconsolidation is
receiving considerable attention at the moment (Nader, 2003), partly because of the obvious clinical
potential for selective memory “erasure”; if this were achieved safely it would have enormous
implications for disorders in which aberrant memories play a prominent role, including obsessive–
compulsive disorder (OCD), drug addiction, post-traumatic stress disorder, and so on. To date, few
clinical studies have been based on the principle of reconsolidation. One notable exception is a series by
Rubin et al. (1969; Rubin, 1976), who gave ECT to patients with OCD after reactivating their
problematic compulsion, with apparently considerable success relative to conventional, non-reactivation
ECT under anaesthetic. Some cautions have been raised, not all of them critical for the clinical
implications; for example, some of the effects attributed to inhibition of protein synthesis have on
occasion turned out to be due to unrelated side effects of particular drugs, with these side effects affecting
consolidation or retrieval (Flexner et al., 1963; 1967; Davis & Squire, 1984). Likewise, it has been a
matter of enduring debate whether amnesia is a result of a storage deficit or a retrieval deficit (e.g.
Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1970; Squire, 1980; Squire et al., 1987). Many forms of amnesia can be
reversed by reminder treatments, indicating that the memories were present all along and the deficit was
one of retrieval (Millin et al., 2001). Typical animal studies used ECS to induce amnesia; subsequent
exposure to the CS, the US, or the ECS have all been shown to reverse the amnesia (Miller & Springer,
1972; Springer & Miller, 1972; Miller et al., 1974; see Millin et al., 2001). This applies equally to
reconsolidation studies (Millin et al., 2001): again, “reminder” effects occur, implying a retrieval deficit
(Judge & Quartermain, 1982; Mactutus et al., 1982; Debiec et al., 2002).
     This reconsolidation phenomenon has been termed “cellular reconsolidation”, in which reactivation of
a memory returns it to a labile state at the same neural site. A further phenomenon is “systems reconsoli-
dation” (Debiec et al., 2002), in which reactivation of a memory appears to make the memory depend
upon a structure that it once depended upon before. Debiec et al. gave rats CS(context)–US(shock) pair-
ings. Such associations are known to depend on the hippocampus early after learning, but with consolida-
tion they become independent of the hippocampus (see above). After 45 days, they then presented the CS
on its own (or not) and lesioned the hippocampus (or not). In the absence of CS presentation, the memory
did not depend on the hippocampus (no effect of the lesion); presentation of the CS caused the memory to
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depend on the hippocampus again, but only for ~48 hours. Debiec et al. suggest, based on these and other
experiments, that a memory is formed, initially depends on the hippocampus, and during this time it can
undergo “cellular” reconsolidation if activated. With time, the memory is consolidated in neocortex and
no longer requires the hippocampus, unless it is reactivated, in which case it depends on the hippocampus
for a while (albeit for a shorter time than during initial consolidation), and so on.
These time-limited memory storage phenomena are indirectly relevant to the issues of instrumental
free-operant learning with delayed reinforcement and impulsive choice, though not specifically to their
relationship with contextual conditioning (discussed in Chapter 3, p. 100). It is not known how the hippo-
campus contributes to performance of instrumental responses learned with delayed reinforcement. Hippo-
campal lesions made before training delay-dependently improved free-operant instrumental learning with
delayed reinforcement (Figure 40, p. 92; Figure 42, p. 95) in that delays retarded learning less in H-
lesioned subjects than in shams. If this was due to a hippocampus-dependent contextual memory com-
peting with the instrumental response for association with the reinforcer, then since one would expect
long-established contextual memories to have become relatively independent of the hippocampus
(Anagnostaras et al., 2001), it may be that pre-exposure to the experimental context, in addition to im-
proving learning itself (Dickinson et al., 1992), would reduce the effect of hippocampal lesions made be-
fore the instrumental learning task. Potentially, by the systems reconsolidation argument, contextual re-
trieval might increase the effects of hippocampal lesions again. It is more difficult to predict what would
happen if hippocampal lesions were made after training on this task. If a contextual representation com-
petes during performance, as well as learning, of an instrumental response, and the hippocampal lesion
were made whilst that contextual memory was still dependent upon the hippocampus, then one would
expect hippocampal lesions to produce a delay-dependent improvement in performance of a previously
learned instrumental response, in addition to any delay-independent effects. The hippocampus appears to
play a time-limited role in trace eyeblink conditioning (Takehara et al., 2002); however, as discussed on
pp. 100 and 103, the effects of hippocampal lesions on trace conditioning and instrumental conditioning
with delayed reinforcement differ even when the lesions are made before training, and the conceptual re-
lationship between the two tasks is not perfectly clear.
In the case of the impulsive choice task (Figure 43, p. 97), hippocampal lesions were made after 19
sessions of training on the task, when performance was stable and subjects were well trained. Since H
lesions impaired subjects’ ability to choose the large delayed reinforcer, this suggests (but does not dem-
onstrate conclusively) that the hippocampus makes an enduring contribution to promoting the choice of
delayed reinforcers. Finally, it is not known what the effects of hippocampal lesions made prior to train-
ing on this task would be. One would expect three competing effects: a relative delay-dependent en-
hancement of learning the action–outcome contingency for delayed reinforcement, a retardation of learn-
ing of this contingency at zero delay, and a reduction in preference for the delayed reinforcer.
5.3.2 ADHD
Interventional neuroanatomical studies of impulsive choice are clearly important for the understanding of
the pathogenesis of ADHD, for they allow a causal role to be established between dysfunction of a brain
region and impulsive choice. This may make it possible to distinguish the brain regions that underlie dif-
ferent types of impulsivity (Evenden, 1999b), and to segregate the neural abnormalities that contribute to
complex disorders such as ADHD and drug addiction, as well as to normal variation in impulsive behav-
iour such as during adolescence (discussed later).
The integrity of the Acb is critical for animals to tolerate delays to appetitive reinforcement (Cardinal
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et al., 2001; Cardinal & Cheung, 2005). In addition to being impulsive, AcbC-lesioned rats are also hy-
peractive (Maldonado-Irizarry & Kelley, 1995; Parkinson et al., 1999a; Cardinal et al., 2001; Cardinal &
Cheung, 2005), but they do not appear to be inattentive: accuracy in tests of visuospatial attentional func-
tion is unaffected by AcbC lesions (Cole & Robbins, 1989; Christakou et al., 2004). Destruction of the
AcbC does not, therefore, mimic all the signs of ADHD, but these findings suggest that the behaviour of
rats with AcbC damage resembles that of humans with the hyperactive–impulsive subtype of ADHD
(APA, 2000).
The present results also suggest a role for the hippocampus in self-controlled choice (Cheung & Car-
dinal, 2005). Although the hippocampus has long been known to have a mnemonic role, the idea that the
hippocampus plays a direct role in the selection of delayed rewards over immediate rewards appears
novel, especially since the hippocampus does not appear to contribute to the association of actions with
their outcomes over a delay. If anything, it appears to hinder this process (Cheung & Cardinal, 2005).
Structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) studies have not shown differences in hippocampal volume
between patients with ADHD and controls (Castellanos et al., 1996; Filipek et al., 1997), but adolescent
girls with ADHD appear to have altered hippocampal glucose metabolism (Ernst et al., 1997). Alterations
in hippocampal function have been observed in a number of animal models of ADHD, including the
coloboma mutant mouse and the neonatal rat hypoxia model (see Davids et al., 2003); focal X-irradiation
of the hippocampus in rats produces hippocampal granule cell (“microneuronal”) hypoplasia and a syn-
drome of hyperactivity that also resembles ADHD (Diaz-Granados et al., 1994). Ernst et al. (2003) found
that adults with ADHD show less of a hippocampal blood flow increase than controls in a gambling game
in which subjects were required to choose cards from decks that differed in the amounts and probabilities
of gains and losses, akin to the Iowa gambling task of Bechara et al. (1994); however, choices involving
reward delays were not examined.
In contrast, damage to other regions does not produce impulsive choice: for example, although the
ACC, mPFC, and AcbSh have been shown to be abnormal in disorders of impulsivity (Papa et al., 1996;
Carey et al., 1998; Ernst et al., 1998; Papa et al., 1998; Bush et al., 1999; Rubia et al., 1999; Sadile,
2000), damage to these regions does not produce impulsive choice in rats (Cardinal et al., 2001;
Pothuizen et al., 2005). The abnormalities of structure or function observed in these regions in ADHD
brains may therefore be responsible for other features of the disorder (such as inattention or motoric dis-
inhibition) (Muir et al., 1996), or these regions may have altered as a consequence of a disease process
beginning elsewhere. A clearer understanding of the neurochemical and neuroanatomical basis of disor-
ders of impulsive choice may lead to more effective therapy.
5.3.3 Adolescent impulsivity
Adolescence is a time when people are prone to taking risks and seeking novel experiences. For the ma-
jority, this period is navigated safely and much useful experience is gained, but adolescence is a period of
disproportionately high morbidity and mortality due to maladaptive behaviour (USA, 2001). Although
adolescents are physically stronger and more resilient than children, morbidity and mortality increase
200% during adolescence, with the majority of the serious health problems related to difficulties with the
control of behaviour and emotions; these problems include, for example, suicide, homicide, depression,
and abuse of alcohol, nicotine, and other drugs (Dahl, 2004; Kelley et al., 2004). In particular, adolescents
may make choices that are rewarding in the very short term but poor in the longer term, i.e. impulsive.
The adolescent Acb differs both in dopamine function and synaptic plasticity from that of the adult (see
e.g. Andersen & Teicher, 2000; Philpot et al., 2001; Schramm et al., 2002). The hippocampus appears to
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be more sensitive to ethanol, and may be more vulnerable to ethanol neurotoxicity, during adolescence
(White & Swartzwelder, 2004). Similarly, development of the PFC (Giedd, 2004), inhibitory circuits in
the PFC (Lewis et al., 2004), and the projection from the amygdala to the PFC (Cunningham et al., 2002)
proceeds through this time, with PFC responsiveness also changing (Leslie et al., 2004). If and how any
such changes contribute to impulsive behaviour in adolescence (Adriani & Laviola, 2003) is at present
unknown, though there are also demonstrable functional improvements during this time, such as in the
ability to inhibit prepotent responses (see Luna & Sweeney, 2004).
5.3.4 Integration of AcbC functions with respect to impulsivity
Impulsivity is multifaceted, reflecting individual differences in distinct processes involving information
gathering, the selection of outcomes, and the inhibition of motor actions (Evenden, 1999b). Furthermore,
delay discounting and probability discounting may also reflect separate processes that both contribute to
the selection of outcomes (see Chapter 1, p. 9). As discussed above, AcbC damage can produce impulsive
choice, an impaired ability to choose delayed rewards (Cardinal et al., 2001). In the context of choice in-
volving uncertain appetitive reinforcement, “impulsivity” would equate to risk taking (less steep uncer-
tainty discounting or greater willingness to choose unlikely rewards). AcbC lesions, however, have pro-
duced a risk-averse or conservative pattern of choice (Cardinal & Howes, 2005). Therefore, AcbC-
lesioned rats cannot be characterized as impulsive in all senses. Instead, it seems that the AcbC promotes
the selection, and perhaps the salience, of uncertain and delayed rewards—perhaps, in general, of rewards
that are not certain, imminent, or present (Cardinal et al., 2002a). The AcbC promotes choice of, and
learning with, delayed rewards (Cardinal et al., 2001; Cardinal & Cheung, 2005). It appears to promote
the selection of uncertain reinforcers (Cardinal & Howes, 2005), and humans show increased Acb activa-
tion during the selection of high-risk options (Ernst et al., 2004; Matthews et al., 2004). The Acb is re-
quired for PIT, or the enhancement of instrumental responding by Pavlovian CSs signalling reward (Hall
et al., 2001; de Borchgrave et al., 2002), for autoshaping, or approach to appetitive Pavlovian CSs
(Parkinson et al., 1999a; 1999b; 2000c; Cardinal et al., 2002b; Parkinson et al., 2002), for normal condi-
tioned reinforcement, or working for CSs previously paired with reinforcement (Taylor & Robbins, 1984;
1986; Cador et al., 1991; Parkinson et al., 1999a), and Acb DA is required for the motivation to work
hard (Ikemoto & Panksepp, 1999; Salamone & Correa, 2002; Salamone et al., 2003; Mingote et al., 2005;
Salamone et al., 2005).
What would one expect in an aversive context? As discussed earlier, increased probability discount-
ing—a tendency to behave as if an uncertain outcome were less likely than it really is—would be ex-
pected to produce risk aversion for appetitive outcomes but risk proneness for aversive outcomes (Ho et
al., 1999). Similarly, enhanced delay discounting or temporal myopia would produce impulsive choice in
an aversive context, impairing the ability to choose a small immediate penalty in preference to a large
delayed penalty. In humans, at least, the delay and probability discounting processes appear similar for
rewards and losses (Ostaszewski & Karzel, 2002; Green & Myerson, 2004). At present, it is not known
whether AcbC lesions also affect choice involving delayed or uncertain outcomes in an aversive context;
however, it is clear that the Acb is involved in aversive motivation (Salamone, 1994; Parkinson et al.,
1999b), including in the regulation of attention to stimuli predictive of aversive outcomes (Iordanova et
al., 2006).
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5.3.5 Addiction
To consider the contribution of the AcbC and hippocampus to addiction, and the contribution of impul-
sive choice to addiction, I will first review major current theories of addiction.
5.3.5.1 Theories of addiction
In the context of the multifactorial psychological reinforcement learning framework described earlier (p.
2), the major neuropsychological theories of drug addiction—none of them mutually exclusive—can be
summarized (Robbins et al., 2005):
Direct positive effects of drugs; self-medication; tolerance
• Drugs are taken for their positive effects (positive reinforcement); that is, they have high instrumental
incentive value. These positive effects may include euphoria, enhanced social experiences, enhanced
intellectual or attentional performance, enhanced effects of other reinforcers (such as food or sex),
and so on (see Wikler, 1965; 1973; Altman et al., 1996; Feldman et al., 1997). The precise effects de-
pend on the drug class (Wise, 1996; Feldman et al., 1997); for example, opiates such as heroin pro-
duce euphoria, and brain opioid systems may be directly involved in the assessment of “hedonic
value” or pleasure (Berridge, 2000).
• An aspect of this may be that people “self-medicate” to achieve a desired level of mood, social per-
formance, and so on (Khantzian, 1985; Weiss & Mirin, 1986; Altman et al., 1996; Markou et al.,
1998; Newhouse et al., 2004), although the extent to which self-medication of overt psychopathology
occurs is debated (e.g. Castaneda et al., 1994; Newhouse et al., 2004). Furthermore, the effect of the
drug depends upon the user’s expectations (Mitchell et al., 1996) and prior mood, and varies across
people (Uhlenhuth et al., 1981; de Wit et al., 1986).
• Tolerance to pleasant drug effects may build up, requiring the user to take more drug to achieve the
same effect. Tolerance can be due to a decrease in drug bioavailability (“metabolic tolerance”), a re-
duction in the number or responsiveness of receptors or intracellular mechanisms (“pharmacody-
namic tolerance”), or a compensatory mechanism (“behavioural tolerance”) (see Feldman et al., 1997,
p. 21). Tolerance may develop with chronic use, but in the case of cocaine, can develop in a single
session (Fischman, 1989), perhaps explaining cocaine “bingeing”. Metabolic tolerance is seen to bar-
biturates, ethanol and opiates (see Feldman et al., 1997, p. 21). Pharmacodynamic tolerance is seen to
a wide range of drugs including barbiturates, ethanol, opiates, amphetamine, cocaine, nicotine, and
caffeine (see Feldman et al., 1997, p. 21). Behavioural tolerance—conditioned tolerance—has been
observed to opiates, ethanol, nicotine, benzodiazepines, and other drugs (Siegel, 1975; 1976; Krasne-
gor, 1978; Dafters & Anderson, 1982; Siegel, 1999). Since conditioned tolerance may be situation-
specific, with the context serving as a CS, the lethality of drugs may be increased if the environment
changes (Siegel, 1999).
Conditioning and sensitization
• CSs associated with the pleasant aspects of drug taking may act to promote drug taking. Drug-
associated cues (including mood states, people, locations, and abuse paraphernalia) may induce some
of the primary effects of drugs (Kenny et al., 2003), but can also induce craving in addicts, and trig-
ger relapse (Siegel, 1988; Tiffany & Drobes, 1990; Gawin, 1991; O’Brien et al., 1998). Addicts may
also work directly for drug-associated stimuli (conditioned reinforcement), leading them to the pri-
mary drug reinforcer.
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• Sensitization (“inverse” or “reverse” tolerance) may also occur; this is where repeated doses of a drug
enhance one or more of its effects. Prototypically, moderate, spaced doses of amphetamine enhance
the subsequent locomotor response to amphetamine (Robinson & Berridge, 1993; Altman et al.,
1996; Kalivas et al., 1998). Sensitization can exhibit environmentally specific (conditioned) proper-
ties (Post & Weiss, 1988), but sensitization regimes can also induce changes in drug pharmacody-
namics (Pettit et al., 1990). It has been suggested that the ability of drug-associated CSs to promote
drug seeking or craving also sensitizes as a consequence of repeated drug taking (Robinson & Ber-
ridge, 1993; Wyvell & Berridge, 2001). Amphetamine sensitization also enhances the subsequent de-
velopment of habits (Nelson & Killcross, 2006), discussed below.
Withdrawal and conditioned withdrawal
• Some drugs, notably the opiates and alcohol, produce powerful physical withdrawal syndromes,
which are aversive. Withdrawal symptoms are improved by the drug, so the drug is taken to avoid or
escape from withdrawal (negative reinforcement) (Wikler, 1965; 1973). Here, incentive learning op-
erates for drugs of abuse just as for natural reinforcers. Just as hunger, a natural motivational state, in-
creases the hedonic impact of foodstuffs (Berridge, 1991) and this in turn teaches the animal that it is
worth working for those foodstuffs more when it is hungry (Dickinson & Balleine, 1994), opiate
withdrawal reflects a “new” motivational state that the animal can perceive interoceptively, and rats
have to learn that heroin has a high value in the state of opiate withdrawal (Hutcheson et al., 2001a).
The hedonic impact of a reinforcer may be a “common currency” for determining the value of widely
different reinforcers (e.g. Cabanac, 1992).
• Environmental stimuli may become associated with withdrawal (Goldberg & Schuster, 1967; O’Brien
et al., 1975; 1976; 1977); CSs for withdrawal may then provoke drug taking just as withdrawal itself
does (Wikler, 1965; 1973).
• Drugs such as cocaine that do not produce obvious physical withdrawal syndromes may nonetheless
have unpleasant after-effects on mood (dysphoria) (Koob & Bloom, 1988; Gawin, 1991; Markou &
Koob, 1991; Koob et al., 1997; Knackstedt et al., 2002), which may promote drug taking in the same
way that physical withdrawal does. “Opponent process” theories (Solomon & Corbit, 1973; 1974;
Solomon, 1980a; 1980b; Koob et al., 2004) use the idea that a long-lasting anhedonic or dysphoric
(i.e. unpleasant) process opposes the euphoric effects of drugs, and that with chronic use, the euphoric
effects diminish and the dysphoric process comes to dominate, leading to drug taking via negative
reinforcement.
Habit learning
• Drugs may activate habit-learning systems directly, so that actions that led to the drug are directly
reinforced, creating powerful stimulus–response habits or “involuntary” responding, faster than with
natural reinforcers (O’Brien & McLellan, 1996; Tiffany & Carter, 1998; Robbins & Everitt, 1999;
Everitt et al., 2001; Everitt & Wolf, 2002). A hallmark of habitual (as opposed to goal-directed) re-
sponding is that it persists even if the reinforcer’s value is reduced (Dickinson, 1994). Habits are
sometimes thought of as “compulsive” responding when they occur at an abnormally high level, since
they do not depend on the current value of the goal. Alcohol seeking may reflect primarily habitual
responding (Dickinson et al., 2002), and while cocaine seeking can be goal directed (Olmstead et al.,
2001), under some circumstances responding for cocaine can be less susceptible to devaluation of the
reinforcer (that is, more habitual) than responding for natural reinforcers (Miles et al., 2003). Simi-
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larly, soon after acquisition, cocaine seeking behaviour is readily suppressed by an aversive CS,
whereas following prolonged experience of cocaine, this conditioned suppression is lost
(Vanderschuren & Everitt, 2004). Psychostimulant sensitization also enhances subsequent habit for-
mation (Nelson & Killcross, 2006). Craving and habits both capture something of the casual defini-
tion of addiction as “compulsive” behaviour (e.g. APA, 1994; Leshner, 1997; Koob et al., 1998a).
Individual vulnerability
• People who become drug addicts may be more vulnerable than other people to one or more of these
neuropsychological effects, as well as being more predisposed to try drugs of abuse in the first place.
Comparison of drug taking to alternative activities
• At a higher level of analysis, with a behavioural economic perspective, addicts weight up the benefits
and costs of drug taking. They may do so rationally (Stigler & Becker, 1977; Becker & Murphy,
1988), or may exhibit decision-making flaws characteristic of humans, such as focusing inappropri-
ately on short-term rather than long-term goals and being inconsistent in their choices (Ainslie, 1975;
1992; Herrnstein & Prelec, 1992; Heyman, 1996; Rachlin, 1997; 2000a; Ainslie, 2001).
• Drug addicts may be predisposed to act even more for short-term benefit than other people, or drugs
may induce decision-making deficits in regular users (Petry et al., 1998; Bickel et al., 1999; Madden
et al., 1999; Rogers et al., 1999a; Volkow et al., 1999; Ainslie & Monterosso, 2003; Bickel & John-
son, 2003; Mitchell, 2003; Vuchinich & Heather, 2003); for example, as discussed earlier (p. 18),
there is some evidence that self-control deficits may be a reversible consequence of cigarette depend-
ence (Bickel & Johnson, 2003).
None of these theories, or indeed levels of explanation, is adequate on its own (Heather, 1998). For ex-
ample, although heroin may be taken to alleviate withdrawal, heroin self-administration can persist in the
absence of withdrawal (Bozarth & Wise, 1981; 1984), and although heroin has euphoric effects, humans
will work for doses that they cannot subjectively distinguish from placebo (Lamb et al., 1991). However,
to focus on or seek a single theory of drug addiction is to miss the point that drugs of abuse have many
effects, people take drugs for many reasons, and those reasons vary across people.
5.3.5.2 Behavioural economic approaches to addiction
To bridge the gap between neuroscientific and behavioural economic approaches to addiction, a little
further elaboration of the behavioural economic approach is necessary. A direct application of traditional
economics to addiction is the calculation of elasticity of demand for goods, such as drugs. A “good” is a
commodity that, all other things being equal, agents prefer more of to less. In a barter economy, and
therefore in animal experiments, the “price” of a commodity has no absolute meaning; we can speak of
price only in terms of what other commodities an animal will give up to obtain the good, and that may
depend on the specific commodities being traded (Friedman, 1990; Rachlin, 2003; Vuchinich & Heather,
2003). In humans, elasticity has an more general meaning, since humans use a monetary economy.
Money is a single commodity that is substitutable for almost all others (is fungible), so we can calculate
elasticity as the change in consumption as monetary price changes. Own-price elasticity measures the
change in consumption of a good as its price changes. Formally,
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To take a simple example, suppose that biscuits cost £0.10 each, and I eat 100 biscuits/week; this costs
me £10/week. If the price doubles to £0.20, I could do several things. I could halve my weekly consump-
tion to 50 biscuits, so I continue to spend £10/week. This would be called unit elasticity (ε = –1). I could
reduce my consumption by more than this, saving money. This would be elastic demand (ε < –1): my
demand is very sensitive to price. Or I could not cut back very much, say to 90 biscuits/week, spending
more money in total; this would be inelastic demand (–1 < ε). If demand were totally inelastic, I would
consume the same no matter what the price (ε = 0). For most goods, demand is inelastic at low prices and
elastic at high prices, termed “mixed” elasticity. Cross-price elasticity measures the consumption of a
good as the price of other goods changes. Some commodities are substitutes, like butter and margarine. If
the price of butter goes up, we may buy more margarine instead (ε > 0). Some commodities are comple-
ments, like gin and tonic. If the price of gin goes up, gin drinkers may buy less tonic, because they buy
less gin (ε < 0). Some commodities are independent, like butter and computers, where the price of one
doesn’t affect consumption of the other (ε = 0).
An obvious way to think about addiction is that demand for drugs is inelastic compared to demand for
other things. The more someone is addicted, the more inelastic their demand is; if the price increases, they
will therefore sacrifice other commodities such as work, money, or social interaction, rather than sacrifice
their drug. For example, alcohol demand in rats can be more inelastic than demand for food (Heyman et
al., 1999; Heyman, 2000). Yet drug demand is certainly not completely inelastic, and addiction is not an
all-or-nothing phenomenon. Most users of heroin, cocaine, and alcohol do not use extremely large
amounts, as the stereotype of an addict would suggest. Instead, most use infrequently, or “chip”
(NHSDA, 2001; MacCoun, 2003b). Furthermore, most (>75%) of those dependent on an illicit drug re-
cover (Warner et al., 1995; Heyman, 2003). In fact, the elasticity of demand for cigarettes is typically
about –0.4 (Gruber et al., 2002; Chaloupka et al., 2003); that is, if the price goes up by 10%, consumption
goes down by 4%. This is for two reasons. First, when price goes up, some people quit altogether (termed
participation elasticity). Second, people who continue to smoke, smoke less (termed conditional elasticity
of demand, or elasticity given that someone uses the drug at all).
As for most commodities, the elasticity of drugs of abuse varies with price. Smokers working for ciga-
rette puffs in the laboratory are fairly inelastic when the price is low (ε = –0.56 at a price ranging between
12–1600 responses per puff), but become more elastic when the price goes up (ε = –1.58 at a price rang-
ing between 400–4500 responses per puff) (Bickel et al., 1995b; DeGrandpre & Bickel, 1995; Chaloupka
et al., 2003). Probably for this reason, elasticity is greater for poorer smokers, for whom cigarettes are
proportionally more expensive (Gruber et al., 2002). In the UK, national elasticity of demand for alcohol
ranges from about –1.69 for wine through –0.86 for spirits to –0.76 for beer (Smith, 1999). Participation
price elasticities (the effect of price on the number of people using a drug) are about –0.90 to –0.80 for
heroin and –0.55 to –0.36 for cocaine; overall elasticities (the effect of price on the total amount con-
sumed) are about –1.80 to –1.60 for heroin and –1.10 to –0.72 for cocaine (Saffer & Chaloupka, 1995).
Elasticity also varies with motivational state and other factors. Animals’ demand for food is more inelas-
tic when they are hungry and if there are no alternative ways of obtaining food (e.g. Hursh, 1978); simi-
larly, demand for cigarettes is more inelastic when smokers have been abstinent (Madden & Bickel,
1999). When considering drug policy, it is also important to consider cross-price elasticity: if a policy
reduces consumption of drug A, will the benefits be mitigated by increased consumption of drug B? In
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the case of alcohol and cigarettes, the two are either complements (ε < 0) or independent, so reducing
consumption of one tends to reduce (or not affect) consumption of the other (Gruber et al., 2002). Similar
analyses have been conducted for other drugs and non-drug reinforcers (Bickel et al., 1995a).
Some leading economists have characterized addiction as being rational (Becker & Murphy, 1988), in
that addicts take the future consequences of their behaviour into account and have stable preferences. In
rational addiction theory, addiction arises because the quantities of the addictive good consumed at differ-
ent time points are complements, which can lead to unstable states; this accounts, for example, for binges
of consumption. Certainly, assuming rationality allows us to predict behaviour much better than not as-
suming rationality, unless we can predict the specific way in which people will be irrational (Friedman,
1990). A major contribution of rational addiction theory (Stigler & Becker, 1977; Becker & Murphy,
1988) was therefore to consider price as a major influence on the consumption of addictive drugs
(MacCoun, 2003a). However, the premise that drug addicts choose rationally, maximizing their total hap-
piness, has been criticized (e.g. Winston, 1980; Ainslie & Monterosso, 2003; MacCoun, 2003a). Cer-
tainly, humans do not always choose according to rational norms, as discussed in Chapter 1 (p. 1). Since
hyperbolic temporal discounting is a feature of human and animal intertemporal choices (Chapter 1, p. 9),
many major behavioural economic theories of addiction (Ainslie, 1975; 1992; Herrnstein & Prelec, 1992;
Heyman, 1996; Rachlin, 1997; 2000a; Ainslie, 2001) emphasize that addiction results from the maximi-
zation of short-term rather than long-term utility (see MacCoun, 2003a; Vuchinich & Heather, 2003),
with preferences that are inconsistent over time thanks to hyperbolic discounting, and that drug addictions
Figure 53: The “primrose path” to addiction
Good now, bad in the long run—the “primrose path” to addiction (Herrnstein & Prelec, 1992; Rachlin, 1997; 2003;
Vuchinich & Heather, 2003). At any point, drug taking has a higher value than other activities, so you take the drug.
But drug taking lowers both the value of future drug taking: for example, alcohol consumption causes tolerance,
meaning that future alcohol isn’t worth as much. Moreover, drug taking lowers the value of other activities: for ex-
ample, the more alcohol you consume, the less you socialize and the worse you are at socializing; the more heroin
you take, the worse you are at your job. So as you drink more, your total happiness goes down: you’d be better off
not being an alcoholic. But even when you are an alcoholic, drinking now is worth more than not drinking now, for
you are sensitive to local, not global, utility. As Rachlin (2000b) puts it: “The alcoholic does not choose to be an
alcoholic. Instead he chooses to drink now, and now, and now, and now. The pattern of alcoholism emerges in his
behaviour… without ever having been chosen.”
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(Rachlin, 2003) are bad (“negative” addictions) because short-term selection of drugs leads to lower long-
term overall utility. Consumption of drugs reduces the value of future activities—the “primrose path” to
addiction (Figure 53). Knowledge of one’s own predisposition to be temporally inconsistent allows the
use of self-control strategies (Ainslie, 2001; Ainslie & Monterosso, 2003; Homer, ~800 BC / 1996), such
as precommitment to a particular course of action, which improve long-term utility.
Economic theories of addiction are also relevant when considering the extent to which drug use is vol-
untary. The diagnostic criteria for drug dependence (APA, 2000) include a compulsion to take the drug,
yet drug use can certainly be voluntary. Drug use certainly has utility to the user; this may be in the form
of euphoria, enhanced social experiences, or enhanced intellectual performance, depending on the drug
(see Feldman et al., 1997). It is debatable whether even addicts take drugs involuntarily: just because
someone says they don’t want to smoke and then later smokes doesn’t mean they’re smoking involuntar-
ily—it might simply be that they’re inconsistent (Schaler, 2000; Skog, 2003). Furthermore, not everyone
who smokes wants to give up. Appreciating these differences leads to a broader classification of addiction
than is conventional (Figure 54).
Figure 54: Skog’s classification of addiction
Skog’s (2003) view of addiction. A person may be unaware that it is difficult for him or her to live without a drug.
Such a person is enslaved, but unaware; Skog calls them “naïve” addicts. He offers the example of a heavy drinker
in Paris in World War II, who had never realised that he was dependent on alcohol until rationing came along and he
was limited to one litre of wine per week. Then there are those who know that life would be harder without, but are
happy with this situation: “happy” addicts, such as the 1950s smoker who thought that smoking was good for you
(or at least, not bad). Those who are aware smoking is bad for you but feel no particular motivation to cut back are
called “subclinical” addicts by Skog. Finally, there are those who have tried and failed but aren’t trying at the mo-
ment, and those in an active struggle to quit.
The fact that people do not act to maximize their total, long-term expected reward can explain a number
of otherwise counterintuitive results: for example, cigarette taxes can make smokers happier (Gruber &
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Mullainathan, 2002). This implies that addiction is not “rational”—addicts’ preferences are not consistent
over time, and so cigarette taxes make smokers happier because they serve as a valuable self-control de-
vice, helping them to avoid smoking. Such self-control strategies are not merely a human phenomenon
(Rachlin & Green, 1972; Ainslie, 1974; Ainslie & Herrnstein, 1981), as was discussed earlier. Drug ad-
dicts may discount the future more steeply (and therefore be even more impulsive and short-termist) than
non-addicts (Petry et al., 1998; Bickel et al., 1999; Madden et al., 1999; Ainslie & Monterosso, 2003;
Bickel & Johnson, 2003; Mitchell, 2003; Vuchinich & Heather, 2003). Similar short-termism can explain
relapse (Heyman, 2003): since one cigarette is unlikely to cause cancer and one shot of heroin doesn’t
condemn you to a junkie lifestyle, a person can correctly reason that since it’s “just for one last time”, the
drug is the better choice. But a series of “one-last-times” turns into a relapse.
5.3.5.3 Contribution of the AcbC
In the context of addiction, impulsive choice plays a prominent role in maintaining the selection of drugs
of abuse in favour of other, longer-term rewards (Poulos et al., 1995; Heyman, 1996; Bickel et al., 1999;
Evenden, 1999a; Mitchell, 1999); see also p. 18. Drugs of abuse including opiates, ethanol, and psy-
chostimulants can produce chronic adaptations in brain regions including the Acb (Koob et al., 1998b),
and chronic methamphetamine has been shown to increase impulsive choice in rats (Richards et al.,
1999a).
Furthermore, as discussed on p. 31, the motivational process provided by the AcbC (exemplified by
PIT) has been suggested to be particularly significant in some addictions, perhaps becoming sensitized,
and modification of this process may have therapeutic potential. If the suggestion that Pavlovian (cue-
induced) motivational processes contribute to preference reversal effects and to addiction is correct
(Loewenstein, 1996; Cardinal et al., 2003b; Gjelsvik, 2003; Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2004), then the
role of the AcbC is doubly important (see Cardinal et al., 2002a). PIT requires the AcbC (Hall et al.,
2001), noncontingent CSs elevate AcbC DA levels (Bassareo & DiChiara, 1999; Ito et al., 2000), DA
antagonists block PIT (Dickinson et al., 2000), and enhancement of Acb DA function boosts PIT (Wyvell
& Berridge, 2000). PIT can also be amplified by CRH acting in the AcbSh (Pecina et al., 2006), a poten-
tial mechanism through which stress may produce cue-triggered relapse in addiction. As noted above, the
process of addiction is complicated further by the ability of drugs of abuse to alter the function of neural
structures including the Acb (see Koob et al., 1998b). Addictive drugs may be unique among reinforcers
in producing sensitization, the phenomenon by which repeated drug administration leads to an enhanced
response to the drug (Robinson & Berridge, 1993; Altman et al., 1996; Kalivas et al., 1998). Psy-
chostimulant sensitization enhances the sensitivity of the Acb to DA stimulation (Cador et al., 1995), and
enhances PIT subsequently (Wyvell & Berridge, 2001).
One mechanism contributing to addiction may therefore be the ability of drugs of abuse to induce
damage or dysfunction in the AcbC, further promoting subsequent impulsive choice and future drug tak-
ing.
It is worth noting, however, that although a detailed knowledge of the operation of these neural sys-
tems may offer opportunities for pharmacological treatment of addiction (O’Brien, 1997), this might not
change the fact that the simplest and most powerful way to influence these neural systems is often
through conventional economic manipulations (MacCoun, 2003b). Nevertheless, one centre has attempted
to treat addiction in humans by stereotaxic ablation of the Acb (Gao et al., 2003). Citing experiments
showing a reduction in heroin seeking and self-administration after AcbC lesions in rats (Alderson et al.,
2001; Hutcheson et al., 2001b), Gao et al. made bilateral radiofrequency lesions of the Acb in 28 con-
scious recidivist opiate addicts. The authors comment that the subsequent relapse rate was markedly
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lower than following the same subjects’ previous detoxification attempts, after which 100% had relapsed
within three weeks. Postoperatively, two subjects were lost to follow-up and were not analysed further;
two (7.7% of those analysed) had relapsed within one month, 10 (38.5%) within six months, and 15
(57.7%) had relapsed by the time of publication, with those 11 (42.3%) subjects who were still abstinent
beyond six months having been followed up for 8–15.5 months. Craving was apparently reduced, though
no data were presented to support this assertion. This study is not a model of the scientific method: the
trial was clearly neither blind nor randomized, and the control condition was the same subjects preopera-
tively. It is notable that the authors themselves reported improvements across their series of subjects,
which they attributed to patient selection and preparation, lesion parameters, and post-discharge care; one
alternative hypothesis, of course, would be that aspects of this process other than the lesion were respon-
sible for some of the benefits. No subjects suffered intracranial bleeding or infection; side effects included
“character change” (not otherwise specified) in two subjects and “slight symptoms” (not otherwise speci-
fied) in one of these, with non-disabling memory loss in four subjects. Neuropsychological data were not
reported, and it is not clear whether a deficit in self control or in pursuing long-term goals was apparent.
One obvious question is raised by this set of studies. Destruction of the AcbC has been observed to
reduce drug seeking in an animal model (Alderson et al., 2001; Hutcheson et al., 2001b); destruction of
the Acb has been claimed to have similar effects in free-living humans (Gao et al., 2003). Destruction of
the AcbC produces impulsive choice in an animal model (Cardinal et al., 2001). Impulsive choice is sug-
gested to contribute to maladaptive behaviours including addiction (Poulos et al., 1995; Heyman, 1996;
Bickel et al., 1999; Evenden, 1999a; Mitchell, 1999; Ainslie, 2001). Taken at face value, these three
claims appear incongruent. There is insufficient evidence to resolve this question conclusively. However,
the simplest explanation may be that AcbC lesions do more than produce impulsive choice. For example,
such lesions impair free-operant responding for delayed rewards (Cardinal & Cheung, 2005), they impair
PIT (Hall et al., 2001; de Borchgrave et al., 2002), and they affect conditioned reinforcement (Taylor &
Robbins, 1984; 1986; Cador et al., 1991; Parkinson et al., 1999a), amongst other effects. In second-order
schedules of reinforcement such as those used in the rat models of drug seeking cited (Alderson et al.,
2001; Hutcheson et al., 2001b), responses are intermittently reinforced by a stimulus, and these stimuli
are intermittently paired with primary reinforcement. Clearly, impairment of a cue-triggered motivational
process or an inability to respond normally for conditioned reinforcers or delayed rewards might impair
responding on such a schedule, independently of any effects on impulsive choice. In turn, choice impul-
sivity might be expected to play a more prominent role in a situation involving multiple reinforcers and
genuine intertemporal choice. As was emphasized above, many factors contribute to addiction and to the
selection of actions in general. It is likely that under different circumstances the AcbC both helps and
hinders the pursuit of specific goals, such as a drug of abuse or any other reinforcer, as might be expected
of a structure involved in making decisions about the best goal to pursue at a given moment.
5.3.5.4 Contribution of the hippocampus
Although hippocampal function is related in a number of ways to addiction, no studies to date have spe-
cifically related hippocampal dysfunction to addiction via a mechanism of impulsive choice. Likewise,
while a number of studies have suggested an effect of chronic drug use on impulsivity (see p. 18), it is not
clear that any such effect is mediated via the hippocampus.
The role of the hippocampus in addiction has most often been related to its role in contextual process-
ing (see Robbins et al., 2005). Theta-frequency (4–7 Hz) burst stimulation of the hippocampus (specifi-
cally, 100 Hz stimulation in five-pulse trains repeated at 5 Hz) has been shown to reinstate extinguished
cocaine seeking in a manner that depended on glutamate transmission in the VTA. This has been sug-
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gested to mimic the process by which reinstatement occurs when animals are placed in a context associ-
ated with drug taking, rather than in response to discrete cocaine cues (Vorel et al., 2001). Dorsal hippo-
campal inactivation attenuates context-induced reinstatement of drug seeking, as does inactivation of the
dorsal mPFC (Fuchs et al., 2005). Hippocampal activity also correlates with the euphoriant effects of her-
oin (Sell et al., 2000) and with craving for cocaine (Kilts et al., 2001) or alcohol (Schneider et al., 2001).
Smoking-associated cues trigger hippocampal activation in nicotine-deprived smokers (Due et al., 2002).
Rats will self-stimulate the hippocampus electrically (Ursin et al., 1966; Campbell et al., 1978; Collier &
Routtenberg, 1984; Campbell & Milgram, 1985) and will self-administer opioids into the hippocampus
(Stevens et al., 1991). Neonatal ventral hippocampal lesions have been shown to enhance simple instru-
mental conditioning for sucrose or cocaine subsequently in life (Chambers & Self, 2002), though the sig-
nificance of this is unclear and the effects of neonatal ventral hippocampal lesions upon adult behaviour
differ from the effects of lesions made in the adult (see Chambers & Self, 2002). Moreover, hippocampal,
amygdala and PFC projections interact in the Acb in a way that is modulated by mesolimbic DA and that,
in turn, can modulate the release of DA and influence input from other afferents to the Acb (O’Donnell &
Grace, 1995; Blaha et al., 1997; Floresco et al., 1998; Floresco et al., 2001a; Floresco et al., 2001b).
Thus, the hippocampus, amygdala, and PFC may influence drug seeking through their convergent projec-
tions to the Acb.
Hippocampal structure and function is altered by certain drugs of abuse, including cocaine (Thompson
et al., 2004; Yamaguchi et al., 2004; Uz et al., 2005; Yamaguchi et al., 2005), nicotine (Abrous et al.,
2002), and opiates (Pu et al., 2002). In particular, adult hippocampal neurogenesis is reduced by a number
of drugs of abuse (reviewed recently by Eisch & Harburg, 2006). The relationship with addiction is un-
clear at present; however, parallels have been drawn with depression, in which hippocampal neurogenesis
is also reduced (Kempermann & Kronenberg, 2003; Malberg & Duman, 2003; Duman, 2004). In contrast,
active learning and memory formation is associated with an increase in hippocampal neurogenesis (Gould
& Gross, 2002; Shors et al., 2002); indeed, neurogenesis may be critical for trace conditioning (Shors,
2004), discussed earlier (pp. 100, 103). Interestingly, one action of antidepressant drugs is to increase
hippocampal neurogenesis and neuronal growth (Blows, 2000; Malberg & Duman, 2003; Castren, 2004).
In some cases, though not all, antidepressants are an effective therapy for drug dependence (Hughes et al.,
2004; Szerman et al., 2005).
5.3.5.5 Perspectives on preventing and treating addiction
If neurosurgery is not a panacea, then it seems likely that conventional macroeconomic and microeco-
nomic manipulations will remain the mainstay of the prevention and treatment of addiction. Addiction is
not an all-or-nothing problem, so focusing only on prevalence (the number of people using a drug) may
be inappropriate. A strategy of total harm reduction should also consider ways to reduce the average
quantity used and the amount of harm per use (MacCoun, 2003b).
Many neuroscientific addiction theories focus on the way in which drugs change the brain. As Kelley
& Berridge (2002) recently noted, drugs may activate the same circuits as natural rewards, perhaps in a
more potent manner; they may create new states, such as the motivational state of withdrawal; and they
may differentially affect the balance of processes that normally contribute to responding for natural re-
wards, such as habits, goal-directed actions, and cue-induced motivation. There may be other effects, too.
Food makes you full and exercise makes you tired, but not all drugs will satiate you to the same extent
(Heyman, 2003). Acute intoxication impairs decision making, so the decision to have the sixth pint of
beer may not be made in exactly the same way as the decision to have the first. Chronic use of some
drugs may alter the brain so as to impair the ability to make good choices (e.g. Rogers et al., 1999a).
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Some forms of brain damage may make people more likely to choose impulsively, maximizing short-term
rather than long-term gain (e.g. Cardinal et al., 2001). Future treatment strategies may focus on these ef-
fects, attempting to reduce drug consumption and reduce the frequency of relapse. Pharmacological
strategies (Altman et al., 1996; O’Brien, 1997) include drug replacement (e.g. methadone, nicotine sub-
stitution patches), antagonists to block direct drug effects (e.g. naltrexone), agents that trigger illness if
the abused drug is taken (disulfiram, acamprosate), drugs that reduce craving such as DA D3 partial ago-
nists (Pilla et al., 1999) and ondansetron (Johnson et al., 2002), and vaccination (Kantak, 2003). Psycho-
logical strategies include cue extinction, cognitive–behavioural therapy, and perhaps erasure of drug-
associated memories (Nader, 2003). Neuroscientific advances may contribute to the diagnostic process
and the matching of treatments to addicts. Techniques ranging from genetics to functional neuroimaging
may become useful as a way of predicting which treatments will work best for an individual patient, and
in assessing the likely efficacy of that treatment at preventing relapse before the patient is discharged.
Both would be important advances.
Macroeconomic approaches take a different perspective. Once addictive behaviours are recognized to
be sensitive to drug price and to the relative value of drugs and other activities, it is clear that many op-
tions currently available may be further refined. The UK pursues a policy of prohibition with regard to
drugs such as heroin and cocaine, intercepting ~20% of imported drugs (Shaw, 2000) and increasing the
street price. In the USA, prohibition is estimated to increase the price of cocaine by a factor of 2–4 and
heroin by a factor of 6–19 (Miron, 2003). The UK spends about £1 billion per year on programmes spe-
cifically to deal with illegal drugs (UK, 2000), of which £380 million is spent on reducing drug availabil-
ity and £400 million on treatment. Reducing drug availability increases price, and this reduces demand for
illicit drugs (Saffer & Chaloupka, 1995); however, if demand is somewhat inelastic (elasticity |ε| < 1), the
total amount spent on drugs increases, leading to a large criminal market (up to $500 billion per year
worldwide in 1996: Keh, 1996; Streatfeild, 2001) and health costs from contaminated drugs. Treatment of
addicts is cost-effective: the benefits are in health (to the addict), reduced health costs (to the state), and
reduced crime and criminal justice costs. In the USA, addiction treatment programs save about $42,000
per treated addict per year in the costs of crime and the criminal justice system (McCollister & French,
2003), compared to about $2,000 saved per addict treated per year in health costs. About 30% of those
arrested in the UK are dependent on an illegal drug (Shaw, 2000).
In contrast, the UK policy on nicotine and alcohol is to make them legally available but heavily taxed,
in order to reduce consumption, ensure that drugs are uncontaminated (by criminalizing unauthorized
supply), and to produce revenue that can be spend to the benefit of addicts (e.g. treatment programmes) or
society at large (e.g. health care, education). Arguably, the goal of policymakers should be to maximize
the overall benefit to society (Hutcheson, 1725; Hume, 1739-1740; Mill, 1863). Whether legalization or
prohibition is preferable may depend on the economics of specific drugs (Clark, 2003), but the legaliza-
tion-plus-taxation option is seen as strongly preferable by many economists (see Miron & Zwiebel, 1995;
Becker & Becker, 1998). In the USA, it has been estimated that legalization would lead to a ~100% in-
crease in heroin consumption and a ~50% increase in cocaine consumption (Saffer & Chaloupka, 1995),
but a net benefit of $24 billion per year (Miron & Zwiebel, 1995; Shaw, 2000). Opiates cause about 1,000
deaths per year in England and Wales, and cocaine causes about 80 deaths (Hansard, 17 July 2002). Al-
cohol misuse is estimated to cost the UK perhaps £20 billion per year, of which up about £1.5 billion is
spent by the NHS treating alcohol-related diseases, £6.4 billion represents lost economic productivity, and
about £12 billion represents the costs of alcohol-related crime (UK, 2003); estimates of the number of
deaths per year in England and Wales attributable to alcohol range from 5,000–40,000 (Hansard, 17 July
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2002). In contrast, alcohol taxation generates about £11 billion (Smith, 1999). Cigarette taxes currently
generate about £9.5 billion, and the NHS spends £1.5 billion treating smoking-related diseases (Parrott et
al., 1998), with about 120,000 deaths per year attributable to smoking in the UK (Hansard, 17 July 2002).
Such taxes reduce consumption and the adverse consequences of addiction (Keeler et al., 1993; Madden
& Bickel, 1999; Chaloupka et al., 2002; 2003). There are many macroeconomic ways to increase “price”,
including prohibition (reduced availability, higher financial cost, fear of criminal prosecution), restric-
tions on sale (availability), bans on public consumption (availability, legal sanction), taxation (financial),
and stigmatizing drug users (social).
When treating individual addicts, neuroscientific strategies can also be interpreted in economic terms,
allowing their comparison to other macroeconomic strategies. Pharmacological techniques can already
reduce the value of specific drugs. For example, methadone treats opiate withdrawal symptoms and re-
duces the “high” produced by concurrently administered heroin, thus reducing the value of heroin. Heroin
prescriptions (Uchtenhagen, 1997) reduce the value of contaminated, street heroin. Nicotine patches treat
nicotine withdrawal, reducing the value of nicotine. Disulfiram alters ethanol metabolism temporarily so
that ethanol consumption induces illness; thus, disulfiram reduces the value of alcohol. Vaccination
against cocaine is being tried at the moment (Kantak, 2003); this reduces the “high” and therefore the
value of cocaine. All of these can be seen as self-control tactics, and depend on the choices made by the
addict: because the addict would prefer a drug-free lifestyle in the long term, he deliberately adopts a
strategy (e.g. taking disulfiram) that reduces the future value of his drug. It is also possible to target the
brain’s motivational systems directly: thus, chemicals that reduce drug seeking in animals (e.g. Pilla et
al., 1999) may be another line of therapy.
Better knowledge of the risks of drug taking could also help reduce the perceived value of drugs
(Heyman, 2003), and effective advertising of risk should take advantage of human reasoning biases
(Slovic et al., 1982), such as by vivid images of the potential unpleasant outcomes of drug use (BHF,
2004). Taken to the opposite extreme, overestimation of the risks of drug taking may also help some peo-
ple avoid addiction. A personal theory that cocaine use inevitably leads to full-blown destructive addic-
tion might not be true (Warner et al., 1995; NHSDA, 2001; Heyman, 2003; MacCoun, 2003b), but this
belief is a self-control device that may prevent some people taking any cocaine (Ainslie, 2001). Misin-
formation is clearly not a useful public health strategy, since the credibility of advisers depends upon pro-
viding accurate information, but clear and vivid statements of genuine risks are of value.
Finally, the addict pays for drugs with money and therefore forfeits other alternative commodities, and
may also forfeit commodities that cannot be bought with money, such as social support. Therefore, other
strategies can be used to treat addiction (Rachlin, 2003). For example, making it easier for an addict to
obtain substitutes for drugs can be as effective as making it harder for the addict to obtain drugs (Green &
Fisher, 2000; McCollister & French, 2003; Rachlin, 2003). Rewarding abstinence directly with money or
other tangible rewards also promotes abstinence (Higgins et al., 2002; Heyman, 2003). Finally, addicts
can use self-control techniques like precommitment to improve their sensitivity to the long term (Ainslie,
2001).
Neuroscientific research aims to understand the neural mechanisms behind addiction, including the
operation of neural systems that mediate normal reinforcement and how they are affected by drugs of
abuse. In the long run, this research is likely to identify a series of molecular mechanisms that operate to
promote drug taking in the addicted brain. Some will prove to be therapeutic targets, for example to re-
duce drug craving, and may be useful in the treatment of established addiction. Some potential therapies
may be specific to the effects of drugs of abuse, but others will not be—for example, reducing strong
Chapter 5: General discussion 149
cravings for all reinforcers, not just abused drugs. The potential to erase drug-related memories selec-
tively (Nader, 2003) might be of substantial benefit if it can be translated to clinical practice. Other mo-
lecular markers may indicate individual vulnerability to addiction, though it is unlikely that this informa-
tion will be of much practical use, except to indicate to potential users which drugs might be relatively
safe to use and which would be likely to lead to strong addictions. Furthermore, techniques may become
available to predict which treatments will be best suited to an individual addict by analysing the patient’s
genetic makeup or neural responses. Thus the most important policy decision to be made regarding the
neuroscience of addiction is how much to spend on research that may lead to treatments, and how much
to spend on the treatment of addicts who seek help. However, the overall level of consumption of addic-
tive drugs, and therefore a major component of the harm to society related to such drugs, is determined
instead by macroeconomic decisions about drug regulation.
5.4 CONCLUSIONS: NEURAL SYSTEMS INVOLVED IN DELAY AND
RISK ASSESSMENT
A number of limbic corticostriatal structures, together with major forebrain neuromodulatory systems,
play a role in learning and choice involving delayed and probabilistic rewards. The contribution of these
structures is best understood for delayed reward (Figure 55), although recent functional imaging and le-
sion studies have examined the neuroanatomical basis of choice involving uncertain reward.
To summarize, many structures have been implicated in the processing of delayed and/or probabilistic
rewards by correlative studies, including studies of abnormalities in disorders of impulsivity such as
ADHD, animal single-cell recording studies, and functional imaging studies in normal humans. Not sur-
prisingly, these include many structures that are known to convey information concerning reward value.
Impulsive choice (preference for SS over LL rewards) has been induced by lesions of the AcbC, BLA,
OFC, and H; self-controlled choice has been induced by lesions of the OFC and STN. Lesions of PrL/IL
and ACC do not appear to affect SS/LL reward preference; lesions of the AcbSh do not affect preference
between immediate/uncertain and delayed/certain rewards. Studies examining SS/LL preference with a
single pair of reinforcers cannot determine whether impulsive or self-controlled choice is due to changes
in delay discounting or changes in reinforcer magnitude sensitivity. There is good evidence that changes
in reinforcer magnitude sensitivity are minimal following AcbC lesions, and that AcbC damage increases
delay discounting. OFC lesions appear both to enhance delay discounting and alter reinforcer magnitude
sensitivity. Quantitative determinations of reinforcer magnitude sensitivity following BLA, STN, and H
lesions are lacking, though there is some evidence that H lesions do not affect reward magnitude proc-
essing.
Lesions of the AcbC do not only impair choice of delayed rewards, but impair instrumental condi-
tioning specifically when reinforcers are delayed. In contrast, although H lesions produce impulsive
choice in rats, to some degree they ameliorate the deleterious effects of delays on instrumental condi-
tioning, possibly by reducing contextual competition.
Other structures may also be involved in delayed reinforcement: in principle, any structure that repre-
sents future reinforcers across a delay may contribute to their choice, and exert conditioned reinforcing
effects on current behaviour, while any structure that maintains a “memory trace” of responses across a
delay may support the reinforcement of those responses. The ventral striatum and OFC exhibit such ac-
tivity (Schultz et al., 1995; 1998; 2000), but so do other structures including the dorsal striatum (e.g.
Schultz et al., 1995), implicated in the reinforcement of stimulus–response habits (see Mishkin et al.,
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1984; Robbins & Everitt, 1992; Packard & McGaugh, 1996; White, 1997; Parkinson et al., 2000a). Fur-
thermore, the specific pathways of communication required for choice of a delayed reward may be tested:
if a structure such as the BLA or hippocampus interacts serially with the AcbC to promote choice of a
delayed reward, then a disconnection lesion or inactivation (in which, for example, the BLA is inactivated
in one hemisphere and the AcbC is inactivated in the other; see p. 30) should also impair subjects’ ability
to choose delayed reinforcement.
Neurochemically, DA D2 receptors have been shown to promote self-controlled choice, in that D2 an-
tagonists have the opposite effect. NA blockade appears to affect decision making under uncertainty by
reducing loss magnitude discrimination when loss probabilities are high. Forebrain 5-HT also appears to
promote self-controlled choice, in that a number of studies have shown impulsive choice following 5-HT
depletion or antagonists. However, not all studies have found this effect, the role of 5-HT receptor sub-
types and chronic adaptations of this system is complex, and 5-HT interacts with other neuromodulators,
including DA. Forebrain 5-HT depletion does not appear to alter reinforcer magnitude discrimination.
Fewer interventional studies have looked at the structures required to choose or learn from uncertain
rewards, though AcbC and OFC lesions both appear to make rats less willing to choose large, uncertain
rewards over small, certain rewards. 5-HT does not appear to affect choice between small, certain and
Figure 55: Key limbic corticostriatal structures involved in processing delayed reinforcement
Schematic of the limbic corticostriatal loop, showing key structures (as in Figure 7, p. 21) and their apparent influ-
ence on self-controlled choice (ability to tolerate delays to reward) as suggested by lesion studies in the rat. OFC,
orbitofrontal cortex; mPFC, medial prefrontal cortex (prelimbic/infralimbic cortex in the rat); ACC, anterior cingu-
late cortex; H, hippocampal formation; BLA, basolateral amygdala; CeA, central nucleus of the amygdala; Acb,
nucleus accumbens; STN, subthalamic nucleus; VP, ventral pallidum; MD, mediodorsal; VTA, ventral tegmental
area; SNc, substantia nigra pars compacta. Not all structures and connections are shown; for example, there are pro-
jections from prefrontal cortical regions, including the OFC, to the STN (Berendse & Groenewegen, 1991; Maurice
et al., 1998; Hamani et al., 2004).
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large, uncertain rewards. Human imaging studies have implicated a number of regions in decisions in-
volving risk, including parts of the medial PFC, the Acb, and the insula. Finally, ACC lesions, BLA le-
sions, and ACC–BLA disconnection all appear to make rats lazy, in the sense of being less willing to
choose large rewards requiring high effort to obtain, when a smaller but low-effort alternative is available.
These studies provide some insight into the pathways through which reward-related information is
processed, and suggest underlying neurobiological deficits that may contribute to disorders involving risk
taking and impulsive choice. Further considerations apply to drug addiction, since drugs of abuse can
produce chronic adaptations in brain regions including the Acb (see Koob et al., 1998b). Human addic-
tion is associated with steep temporal discounting, particularly for the abused drug, and deficits in deci-
sion making under uncertainty. Chronic use of psychostimulants has been shown to increase impulsive
choice in animal models. One mechanism contributing to addiction may therefore be the ability of drugs
of abuse to induce damage or dysfunction in structures that normally promote self-controlled choice, fur-
ther promoting subsequent impulsive choice and future drug taking. However, we do not yet have a
mechanistic description of the way in which delays and probabilities have their effects or are encoded, or
the ways in which these various limbic corticostriatal structures interact with each other to enable an ani-
mal to choose wisely.
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